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I Want to be Killed by an Indian Bullet
I heard the news long ago that they were looking for me; in the morning in the afternoon
at night. My children told me; my wife told me.
One morning they entered my drawing room, the five of them. Fire, water, air,
earth, sky — are the names of these five. They can create men; also destroy men at
whim.
They do whatever they fancy. The very avatar of might.
I ask them: “When will you kill me?”
The leader replied: “Now. We’ll kill you right now. Today is very auspicious. Say
your prayers. Have you bathed? Have you had your meal?”
“Why will you kill me? What is my crime? What evil deed have I done?” I asked them
again.
“Are you a poet who pens gobbledygook and drivel? Or do you consider yourself
a seer with oracular powers? Or are you a madman?” asked the leader.
“I know that I’m neither of the first two beings. I cannot tell you about the last
one. How can I myself tell whether I’m unhinged or not?”
The leader said: “You can be whatever you would like to be. We are not
concerned about this or that. We will kill you now. Our mission is to kill men.”
I ask: “In what manner will you kill me? Will you cut me with a knife? Will you
shoot me? Will you club me to death?”
“We will shoot you.”
“With which gun will you shoot me then? Made in India, or made in another
country?”
“Foreign made. All of them made in Germany, made in Russia, or made in China.
We don’t use guns made in India. Let alone good guns, India cannot even make plastic
flowers. When asked to make plastic flowers India can only produce toothbrushes.”
I said: “That’s a good thing. Of what use are plastic flowers without any
fragrance?”
vi
The leader said: “No one keeps toothbrushes in vases to do up a room. In life a
little embellishment has its part.”
“Whatever it may be, if you must shoot me please shoot me with a gun made in
India. I don’t want to die from a foreign bullet. You see, I love India very much.”
“That can never be. Your wish cannot be granted. Don’t ever mention Bharat to us.”
Saying this, they left without killing me; as if they didn’t do anything at all. Being
fastidious about death I escaped with my life.
Thangjam Ibopishak Singh, 2003.
Translated by Robin S Ngangom.
vii
Contents
Acknowledgement xii
Abstract xiv
Nederlandstalige Samenvatting xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Personal Shall Always be Political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Whose (forest) land is it, anyway?
Contextualizing Conflict — Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD)
and Northeast India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Historicizing the Conflict Context in BTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Political Ecology: Of Extraction, Conservation and Counter-Insurgency . . . . . . 10
1.5 Illegal Timber Extraction and Conservation on War-footing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6 “We are encroachers in the forest” — Of Space and Legal Geography . . . . . . . 16
1.7 Political Ecology (and Economy) of Livelihoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.8 The Notion of ‘Everyday’ and Northeast Indian Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.9 Organization of the PhD Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2 Methodology 37
2.1 Personal Intimacies of Conflict in the Everyday — Field Notes from Beyond the
Chicken’s Neck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 The Landscape and I: Context and Description of the Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Weaving Ethnography — Political Ecology and Conflict Studies in a Fragile Context 41
2.4 Living with the Rich while Researching the Poor —
Traversing through Challenging Terrains: the Insider-Outsider Conundrum . . . . . 44
2.5 “Why are you going to these Bodo villages? They have weapons in every house
and they burnt our villages and killed our sons” — Research Site(s), Restrictions on
Access and the Everyday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
viii
2.6 “So you are an Assamese? Or Bengali? Are you a Bangladeshi?”— In pursuit of
my positionality while doing ethnography at home, or is it home? . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.7 Risks and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 The Politics of Complexity in Bodoland: The Interplay of Contentious Politics, the
Production of Collective Identities and Elections in Assam 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Background: Creation of BTAD, Contentious Politics, Ethnic Identity and Identity-
Based Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Political and Cultural (Non)Representation, Ethnic Subjugation, Contention: Bodos
and the Ethnic ‘Others’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Parliamentary Elections: Collective Action, Mobilisation, and Shifts in Alliances . 70
3.5 Collective Action through Ethnic Mobilisation and Subsequent Retaliation . . . . . 71
3.6 The Bodo–Muslim Contention: Changing Demographics and Fear of Land Alienation 73
3.7 Making ‘Claims’: Retaliation Through the Use of Electoral Politics . . . . . . . . 74
3.8 Aftermath: Observations and the Post-Election Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4 Constellations of Power and Authority in the Political Economy of Illegal Timber
Extraction in BTAD, Assam 80
4.1 Illegal Timber Economies in Violent Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 The Constellation of Authority and Power in BTAD: (ex-)Rebels, the Indian State,
and the (ex-)Rebel-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 The Travels of the Illegal Timber Economy: From Firewood to High Value Logging 90
4.5 (Unequal) Relations of Exchange: Power, Authority, and Control over the Timber
Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.6 Regulatory Excess: Taxation, Protection, and Seizure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.7 Violence and the Timber Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.8 Coping Economies and Unequal Relations of Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.9 Conclusion: Everyday Timber Extraction Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.10 Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5 Rural Informalities and Forest Squatters in the Reserved Forests of Assam, India 106
5.1 Introduction —Why Rural Informality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
ix
5.2 Jungle Becomes Forest — The Colonial Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 ATheatre of Violent Conflict on Ethno-Religious Lines: Forest becomes Frontline 111
5.4 Comparative Epistemologies: Urban-Rural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 Ethnographic Inquiry into the Site and the Notion of Dokhol . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5.1 Recurring Violence on Ethnic Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5.2 Periodic Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.5.3 Episodic Evictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.5.4 Construction of (Semi-)Permanent Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.6 Counter-Insurgency Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Forest becomes Frontline — the Ecological Task Force, Conservation and Counter-
Insurgency in a Space of Violent Ethno-Religious Conflict in Assam, India 134
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2 Khaki Conservation or Green Militarization — Conservation, COIN and Conflict . 138
6.3 Conservation with Might . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4 Military and not Militarized Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.5 “Our mandate is not COIN” — the Military’s (ETF) Role in Risky Conservation in
Assam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.6 Conflict and Conservation in the RFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.7 The Forest Department and the ETF — Community Engagement, Inter-Institutional
Competition and Local Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.8 The ETF and the Local Political Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.9 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7 APhenomenological Exploration of Lived Experiences of Violence in Northeast India.161
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.2 The Two Cases — Sites of Violence and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.3 Situating the Study Within the Existing Discourse around Anthropology of Conflict 167
7.4 Analysing Comparative Lived Experiences of Conflict across Two Sites of Narratives168
7.4.1 The Case of the Relief Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.4.2 The Village of Misalmaari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.5 Emergence of two Tropes — Endurance and Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.6 In Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
x
7.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8 Conclusion — Carrying on in the Charred Forests 180
8.1 “This (forest)land is mine” — RF as Site(s) of Extraction, Encroachment and
Informalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.2 “No Counter-Insurgency is not our mandate and we are not here to foster relations
with local communities” — Conservation by Armed Forces in Zones of Conflict . . 186
8.3 Beyond the Woods — Conflict, Coping and the Everyday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.4 Avenues for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.5 “Every morning we go to work in the Bhutanese town of Gelephu, right across the
border” — the India-Bhutan Borderlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.6 “How does it matter who we vote for, our houses will be set on fire and our children
will be killed, anyway” — Post-Colonial Democracy and Elections in Sensitive
Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.7 “Look! Look at that deaf and mute woman there….a few years ago she was picked
up from her house and brutally raped by five paramilitary personnel” — Gendering
Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
8.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
xi
Acknowledgement
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’
’That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat.
’I don’t much care where -’ said Alice.
’Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.
’- so long as I get SOMEWHERE,’Alice added as an explanation.
’Oh, you’re sure to do that,’ said the Cat, ’if you only walk long enough.”
Lewis Carroll,Alice in Wonderland
…through the course of this PhD I lost and found my way, time and again, and this is because I
have been extremely fortunate and privileged to not have treaded this arduous path alone! I have so
many people to thank, for guiding me, enduring me, motivating me and most importantly being
there for me when I needed them the most — friends, family, strangers who became friends and
family, colleagues and peers and everyone that I crossed path with during this journey which in fact
began six years ago.
For starters, I owe this to my family — my father, mother, brother and my maternal Aunt, Shoma.
They have been my pillars of strength and inspiration. Thank you for not giving up on me and not
allowing me to give up!
My promoter, Bert Suykens- who has been a friend, a mentor, a guide and much more! He
believed in me when I did not believe in myself. He motivated me and inspired me and stood by me
throughout these four years with patience galore. Indeed this thesis would not have been possible
without the much needed help and support from Bert! The best supervisor ever!
My interlocutors and my host family and all the kind and generous souls who helped me during
the fieldwork! It is a long list of amazing people who taught me so much about life and indeed
fieldwork transformed me to look at things differently. Here is to Digambar, Raju, Swmdan, Jenny,
Sunilji, Satyanath, Stephen Lakra, Joshua, Ujji, Rinoy, Preetam. Thank you to Bwiti, Borgoyari
Uncle and Aunty for hosting me and feeding me till I burst every single day. You made Kokrajhar a
home away from home for me. I shall always be grateful for your hospitality.
My heartfelt thanks to my research assistants, especially Ricky for introducing me to Bodo culture
and taking me to places I would have never dared to venture into.
xii
Thanks to Dr. L.R. Bishnoi for all the administrative help and support and special thanks to the
Forest Department personnel for taking me deep inside the forest, and being so kind.
And this journey could not have been possible without the most amazing friends I have been
blessed with from around the world, who stood by me, listed to me bicker and complain and crib and
yet they continue to love me. Here is to Mireille, Cecilia, Devaki, Jahnvi, Mallika, Surya, Rachael,
Sreya, Harit, Rehana, Mitul, Amit, Mariet, Julian, Tanmoy, Alder, Alark, Ruth, Sophie, Andrea,
Sarthak, Mayuri, Subroto, Richard, Chanakya, Dmytro, Gaurav, Deepika and many many others
(you know who you are).
My wonderful colleagues at the department — for all the lunch time conversations and giving me
the space to bounce off ideas. It all adds up in the end.
And finally, Ferdinand, for being there and for tolerating me the most. You are the best!
xiii
Abstract
The North East region of India historically became prized because of the discovery of tea on the
hilly slopes of Assam, leading to its subsequent conquest by the British. The economic advantages
of obtaining tea led to wide scale expeditions to the frontier regions, which coupled with immense
administrative challenges also promised enormous wealth and fortune. Today the British have left,
but tea remains. The region now consisting of eight states has become part of the Indian republic,
sandwiched between Bangladesh, China and Myanmar. This is also a region that is extremely
ethnically, linguistically and religiously multitudinous, exhibiting a self-governing spirit that has
resulted in the emergence of distinct nationalisms and created “imagined communities” marked
by innumerous “secessionist” insurgencies. This has made the region highly sensitive with the
proliferation of armed insurgent groups, several of which remain active till date.
Assam remains a volatile space within the geography of India. Although the national government
continues to initiate talks regarding conflict resolution, emergency laws that deal with this so-called
“disturbed” area are still very much in place. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), for
instance, was extended in Assam for six months on February 28, 2018. Passed on September 11,
1958, by the Indian Parliament, the AFSPA authorizes the Indian security forces to arrest anyone
without a warrant, to search any place that allegedly harbors suspicious elements, and to fire and/or
use force (read torture) even to the point of causing death against any person or gathering of persons
who are considered to have broken the law in these professed “disturbed” regions. The military is
bestowed with legal immunity for any act(s) of extra-juridical killing in these “disturbed” areas.
Technically, the AFSPA is in contradiction of Article 21 (the right to life) and Article 22 (protection
against arbitrary arrest and detention) of the Constitution of India. Nevertheless this Act has been in
operation across seven states of the Indian Northeast, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya, in varying degrees since 1958. In fact, this has resulted
in some scholars from the northeast characterizing such laws as a reified expression of the militarism
that characterizes the policy of the Indian government towards the region from the foundational
years of the Republic of India.
Within the state of Assam, the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) have been a
theatre for recurrent contestations on ethnic and religious lines which has resulted in several episodes
of violent clashes between the different ethnic groups leading to colossal loss and destruction of lives
and property and large-scale internal displacement of populations since the early 1990s. Intriguingly,
xiv
it is the Reserved Forests (RF) that emerged as the centrifugal site of conflict and contestation,
counter insurgency operations, illegal forms of resource extraction and post-conflict rehabilitation
of internally displaced persons, within the BTAD. The Reserved Forests are thus more than just
vast stretches of forestland that have an historically important role in shaping the current conflict
landscape. With this in mind the PhD dissertation focused on the Chirang-Riphu and Ultapani
RF under the Haltugaon forest division in Kokrajhar district as the prime ethnographic site(s) of
investigation.
This PhD dissertation using a multi-scaler approach within a remote rural conflict setting indicates
that this is an important question to ask, as to how “political forests” emerge simultaneously as
geographies of conflict, competition, contestation and co-operation. This is an especially important
area of inquiry for analysis in conflict-affected zones, encompassing the intertwining of several
state and non-state actors embedded in unequal and evolving forms of power relations and authority
structures. To respond to the above, this PhD dissertation is theoretically situated at the interstices
of the broader literatures on political ecology of extraction, crisis conservation, livelihoods and
violent conflict; intersection of the fields of studies that share similar epistemological and ontologi-
cal underpinnings By juxtaposing the theoretical debates along side grounded empirics collected
using ethnographic methods over thirteen months of fieldwork, the thesis further underlines the
appropriation of RFs as sites of conflict and resettlement and also contribute to the overall debate
around ‘violent environment’ by applying it to a peripheral and sensitive space like that of the
RF in which the politics of conservation and management of forest itself is embedded in a larger
context of violent conflict. The thesis in the various chapters focuses on issues of (il)legal forms of
extraction, encroachment and conservation by armed forces, encompassing there-in the numerous
state and non-state actors and authority structures embedded in these process. This is done keeping
in mind the on-going low-intensity violent conflict which continues in the backdrop. This aids in
advancing and strengthening the conceptual debates in political ecology dealing with conservation,
counter-insurgency and violent conflict, through the addition of novel empirical insights.
After providing a blueprint of the RF as a space encompassing within it the issues of violent
conflict, extraction, conservation, encroachment and the numerous state and non-state actors who
are embedded in these processes; the thesis subsequently transitions to the notions of everyday that
operate within these conflict contexts. This is done by narrowing down to the way communities
most affected by violent conflict make sense and live through it, while engaging in the extractive
economy and dokhol or encroachment practices. This tendency to conceptualize the northeast
of India as a perpetual localization of the state of exception, especially when filtered through the
Agambenian lens over the past two decades in northeast Indian studies is but a reductive approach.
This has resulted in deficient attention to the quotidian, the mundane and the ordinary, which seems
xv
to disappear in this exclusive focus on the realms of the symbolic and the spectacular choreographies
of violence and death. This impelled me within the scope of this thesis to pay closer attention to the
distinctly ordinary ways through which populations survive and endure states of dispossession and
abandonment. In the more particular context of the RF in the BTAD, this sustained emphasis on
the uneventful as the locus of survival expressed in myriad forms as seen in spheres of livelihood
practices, moving deeper into the forest, building of temporary settlements, enduring evictions
and COIN operations, is illustrative of the ways in which the local populations engage with the
quotidian.
Finally, this thesis extends the call towards a closer and infinitesimal examination of the political
in political ecology and society in nature-society relationships in conservation areas like the BTAD
and beyond. Especially since such areas are typically identified as spaces where a wide array of
different types of violence unfolds —physical, structural, symbolic, epistemic, slow, and green
violence. In hindsight, a recalibrated sense of the political and the social can potentially emerge
both from attention to the aleatory and the capricious in the realm of everyday life and forms of
being.
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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting
Historisch was de noordoostelijke regio van India gegeerd door van de ontdekking van thee op de
hellingen van Assam, die leidde tot de daaropvolgende verovering door de Britten. De economische
winsten verbonden met thee leidden tot grootschalige expedities naar de grensregio’s die, ondanks
de immense administratieve uitdagingen, ook enorme rijkdom en fortuin beloofden. Vandaag zijn de
Britten vertrokken, maar thee is gebleven. De regio die nu uit acht deelstaten bestaat, is onderdeel
geworden van de Indiase republiek, ingeklemd tussen Bangladesh, China en Myanmar. Het is
ook een regio die uitermate etnisch, taalkundig en religieus verscheiden is, en een zelfbesturend
esprit vertoont. Dit heeft geresulteerd in de opkomst van verschillende vormen van nationalisme
en ’imagined communities’ die bovendien worden gekenmerkt door ontelbare ’secessionistische’
opstanden. Dit heeft de regio zeer gevoelig gemaakt met de het ontstaan en de verspreiding van
gewapende groepen, waarvan er verschillende actief blijven tot op de dag van vandaag. Assam
blijft een volatiele ruimte binnen de geografie van India. Hoewel de centrale regering gesprekken
blijft voeren met betrekking tot conflictresolutie, zijn er nog steeds veel wetten actief die betrekking
hebben op dit zogenaamde ”verstoorde” gebied. DeArmed Forces Special PowersAct (AFSPA)werd
bijvoorbeeld op 28 februari 2018 in Assam voor zes maanden verlengd. AFSPA, op 11 september
1958 gestemd door het Indiase Parlement, laat de Indiase veiligheidstroepen toe om iemand te
arresteren zonder arrestatiebevel, elke plaats te onderzoeken die naar verluidt verdachte elementen
herbergt, en om the schieten en / of geweld te gebruiken (lees marteling) zelfs tot op het punt de
dood te veroorzaken tegen een persoon of bijeenkomst van personen waarvan wordt aangenomen dat
ze de wet overtreden hebben in deze zogenaamde ”verstoorde” regio’s. Het leger krijgt juridische
immuniteit voor elke vorm van extra-juridische doding in deze ”verstoorde” gebieden. Technisch
gezien is AFSPA in tegenspraak met artikel 21 (het recht op leven) en artikel 22 (bescherming tegen
willekeurige arrestatie en detentie) van de Indiase grondwet. Desalniettemin is deze wet in werking in
zeven staten van het Indiase noordoosten, namelijk: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur,
Mizoram, Tripura enMeghalaya, in verschillende mate sinds 1958. Dit heeft een aantal onderzoekers
uit het noordoosten ertoe genoopt om zulke wetten te typeren als de geconcretiseerde uitdrukking van
het militarisme dat kenmerkend is voor het beleid van de Indiase regering ten opzichte van de regio en
dit vanaf de vroege jaren van de Republiek India. Binnen de staatAssam zijn de Bodoland Territorial
Autonomous Districts (BTAD) het theater geweest voor steeds herhaalde contestatie rond etnische
en religieuze breuklijnen die hebben geresulteerd in verschillende episodes van geweldtussen de
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verschillende etnische groepen en die een verregaantd menselijke tol geëist hebben alsook geleid
hebben tot het verlies van eigendommen en grootschalige interne ontheemding sinds het begin van
de jaren negentig. Het is intrigerend dat binnen de BTAD de Reserved Forests (RF) de centrale plaats
zijn gaan innemen niet alleen in conflict en contestatie, maar ook in counter-insurgency operaties,
illegale vormen van ontginning van natuurlijke rijkdommen en in de post-conflict rehabilitatie van
intern ontheemden,. De RF zijn dus meer dan alleen uitgestrekte bosgebieden die een historisch
belangrijke rol spelen in het vormgeven van het huidige conflictlandschap. Met dit in gedachten
richtte dit proefschrift zich op de Chirang-Riphu en Ultapani RF onder de bosafdeling van Haltugaon
in het district Kokrajhar als de voornaamste etnografische onderzoekslocatie(s). Dit proefschrift,
gebruik makend van een multi-scalaire benadering in de analyse van een afgelegen conflictsetting op
het platteland, wil het belang aantonen van de vraag hoe ’politieke bossen’ zich tegelijkertijd laten
begrijpen als geografieën van conflict, competitie, betwisting én samenwerking. Dit is een bijzonder
belangrijk onderzoeksgebied voor de analyse van door conflicten getroffen gebieden, waaronder de
verstrengeling van verschillende staats- en niet-statelijke actoren ingebed is in ongelijke en steeds
veranderende machtsverhoudingen en gezagsstructuren. Om te antwoorden op de bovenstaande
vraag is dit proefschrift theoretisch gelegen op de intersectie van de bredere literatuur over politieke
ecologie van ontginning, natuurbeheer in crisisomstandighende, levensonderhoud en gewelddadige
conflicten; de kruising van studiegebieden met vergelijkbare epistemologische en ontologische
onderbouwing Door de theoretische debatten in contact te brengen en in contrast te stellen met
diepgaand empirische materiaal, verzameld met behulp van etnografische methoden gedurende
dertien maanden veldwerk, onderstreept het proefschrift verder de centrale plaats van RF’s als
locaties van conflicten en hervestiging en draagt ook bij aan het algemene debat rond ‘violent
environments’ door dit toe te passen op een perifere en sensitieve ruimte zoals die van de RF
waarin de politiek van conservatie en beheer van bossen zelf is ingebed in een bredere context
van gewelddadig conflict. Het proefschrift concentreert zich in de verschillende hoofdstukken op
kwesties zoals (il) legale vormen van winning, encroachment en natuurbeheer door strijdkrachten,
hierdoor ook de talrijke staats- en niet-statelijke actoren en gezagsstructuren ingebed in deze
processen te integreren. Hierbij wordt steeds rekening gehouden met het aan de gang zijnde
gewelddadige conflict van lage intensiteit dat op de achtergrond voortduurt. Hierdoor worden
aan aantal debaten binnen de politieke ecologie ondersteund en versterkt, in het bijzonder deze
die te maken hebben met natuurbehoud, counter-insurgency en gewelddadige conflicten, door
de toevoeging van nieuwe empirische inzichten. Na het aantonen dat de RF als het ware een
blauwdruk vormen van een ruimte in zichzelf de problematieken van gewelddadig conflict, winning,
conservatie, encroachment en vele staats- en niet-statelijke actoren die ingebed zijn in deze processen
draagt, gaat het proefschrift vervolgens over naar het exploreren van noties van het alledaagse die
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binnen deze conflictcontexten opereren. Dit wordt gedaan door te focussen op de manier waarop
gemeenschappen die het zwaarst door gewelddadige conflicten zijn getroffen, deze doorleven en
tegelijkertijd deelnemen aan de extractieve economie en aan praktijken van dokhol- of encroachment.
De tendens om het noordoosten van India te conceptualiseren als een eeuwigdurende locatie waarin
de uitzonderingstoestand gegreond is, zeker wanneer bovendien gefilterd door de Agambeniaanse
lens die in de afgelopen twee decennia in Noordoost-Indiase studies populair was, is slechts reductief.
Deze aanpak heeft bovendien geresulteerd in een ondermaatse aandacht voor het alledaagse en
gewone, dat lijkt te verdwijnen door een vaak deze exclusieve focus op de symbolische en de
spectaculaire choreografieën van geweld en dood. Dit dreef mij ertoe om binnen het kader van
dit proefschrift meer aandacht te schenken aan de duidelijk gewone manieren waarop populaties
overleven en een toestand van onteigening en verlatenheid doorstaan. In de meer specifieke context
van de RF in de BTAD, deze aanhoudende nadruk op het onspectaculaire als de locus van overleven,
zoals uitgedrukt in ontelbare vormen zoals gezien in praktijken van levensonderhoud, het dieper
in het bos trekken, het bouwen van tijdelijke nederzettingen, niet-aflatende uitzettingen en COIN
operaties, is illustratief voor de manier waarop de lokale bevolking met het dagdagelijkse omgaat.
Ten slotte wil dit proefschrift de oproep uitdragen voor een minutieus onderzoek van het politieke
in de politieke ecologie en samenleving in de relatie natuur-samenleven de in beschermde gebieden
zoals de BTAD en daarbuiten; Vooral omdat dergelijke gebieden kunnen worden geïdentificeerd als
ruimtes waarin een breed scala van verschillende soorten geweld zich ontvouwt - fysiek, structureel,
symbolisch, epistemisch, langzaam en groen geweld. Uit dit proces kan een gerekalibreerd aanvoelen
voor het politieke en sociale ontstaan, zowel vanuit de aandacht voor het aleatorische en het
wispelturige binnen het dagelijks leven en vormen van zijn.
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Glossary
AASU All Assam Students Union. Is a students union in the state of Assam, India that formally
adopted its constitution in August 1967.
ABSU All Bodo Students Union. Is a non-political student’s organization formed in 1967 in
the Bodoland region of Assam, India.
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act. AFSPA gives the Indian armed forces the power to
maintain public order in “disturbed areas”. They have the authority to prohibit a gathering
of five or more persons in an area, can use force or even open fire after giving due warning
if they feel a person is in contravention of the law. If reasonable suspicion exists, the army
can also arrest a person without a warrant; enter or search a premises without a warrant; and
ban the possession of firearms. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Bill was passed by both
the Houses of Parliament and it was approved by the President on September 11, 1958. It
became known as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958. https://bit.ly/2Sfgncm
AGP Assam Gana Parishad. Translated, as Assam People’s Party is a political party in the state of
Assam in India that was formed in 1985. http://www.asomganaparishad.in/
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party. Translated, as Indian People’s Party is one of the two major national
political parties in India. As of 2018, it is India’s largest political party in terms of representa-
tion in the national parliament and state assemblies, and it is the world’s largest party in terms
of primary membership.
BLT Bodo Liberation Tigers. Now surrendered BLT is an armed insurgent group that operated
in the Bodo dominated regions of Assam India. The group initially wanted to carve out a
separate state of Bodoland but laid down arms with the establishment of Bodoland Territorial
Council in 2003.
BPF Bodoland People’s Front. The BLT after surrendering transformed itself into a state political
party called the BPF. Since 2003 BPF has been in power in the BTAD, with Mr. Hagrama
Mohillary as its chief. https://bit.ly/2D4EiqO
BTAD Bodoland Territorial Area Districts. BTAD refers to the area under the jurisdiction of
Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in Assam. Created under the sixth schedule of the
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Constitution of India, BTAD consists of 4 districts —Kokrajhar, Baksa, Udalguri and Chirang.
These districts were carved out of seven existing districts ofAssam—Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon,
Nalbari, Barpeta, Kamrup, Sonitpur and Darrang. The current capital of BTAD is Kokrajhar.
BTC Bodoland Territorial Council. On February 10, 2003, the Assam government, the Union
government and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) signed the Memorandum of Settlement to
form the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The jurisdiction of the BTC extends over 3082
villages and the council has been given legislative powers over 40 subjects. The accord pro-
vides for an Executive Council comprising of a maximum of 12 ExecutiveMembers, including
a Chief and a Deputy Chief, with adequate representation to the non-tribal population.
Chai Tea
Dokhol AnAssamese/Bengali word which roughly translates to ‘grab or occupy by force’. In the
context of this thesis it was used by my interlocutors in relation to (forest)land.
Hagrama Mohilary An ex-BLT cadre, Mohilary is the chief of BTC and is the chairperson
of Bodoland People’s Front which is one of the major political party in BTAD in coalition
with the BJP.
Jungle Forest
Jonglee Wild
NDFB National Democratic Front of Bodoland. The NDFB is an armed insurgent group that seeks
to obtain a sovereign Bodoland for the Bodo people. The group was led by Ranjan Daimary
(RD) till 2009 and then split into two. The new group was called NDFB-P or Progressive and
was led by Dhiren Boro. In 2010 Daimary was arrested and NDFB(RD) is currently under
ceasefire. NDFB-P is in peace talks with the government. In the meanwhile a cadre by the
name Ingti Kathar Songbijit formed the NDFB(S), which continues to remain active till date.
SC Scheduled Caste. The term SC is a legal designation under the Constitution of India. It was
adopted in 1935 when the British listed the lowest ranking Hindu castes in a schedule appended
to the Government of IndiaAct for the purpose of statutory safeguards and other benefits. Only
marginalized Hindu communities can be deemed SC in India according to the Constitution
(Schedule Caste) Order, 1950.
ST Scheduled Tribe. STs are classified as marginalized communities under the Indian Constitution
due to geographical isolation and not social or economic isolation like the SCs.
xxiii
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam. ULFA is a violent extremist organization formed in 1979,
in Assam. The goal of ULFA is to establish a sovereign state of Assam by seceding from the
Indian federation.
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Sundori
Beloved Sundori,1
Yesterday one of my people
Killed one of your people
And one of your people
Killed one of my people.
Today they have both sworn
To kill on sight.
But this is neither you nor I,
Shall we meet by the Umkhrah River
And empty this madness
Into its angry summer floods?
I send this message
Through a fearful night breeze,
Please leave your window open.
Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih2 in The Yearning of seeds, 2011
1 Literally translates to ‘a beautiful woman’.
2 Kynpham Sing Nongkynrih is a modern poet from Shillong, Meghalaya. His rooted yet critical verses uncover the
unsaid of Khasi society, being a khasi himself. Sundori was written during the troubles of 1990s when the local
nationalist anger and resentment was at its peak in Meghalaya and other north-eastern states like Manipur, Nagaland
and Assam.
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The Peace Bird
Let the peace bird fly to me
After the dark smoke of the blast
Let the gentle breezes blow
After the animal brutality of merciless killing
Let innocent smiles bloom on the lips of children
And usher in the new born Sun
To transform a dying generation
Who pretend to wear a steel heart
A heart made of machines.
Dr. Anil Boro3 in Delphi and other Poems, 2015 (translated from Bodo by the poet)
3 Dr. Anil Boro is a Bodo poet and awarded Sahitya Akademi Award in the year 2013 for “Delphini Onthai Mwdai
Arw Gubun Gubun Khonthai”.
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1 Introduction
“nijer baap kharaap hoileo ki keu kharap koi?”1
(If your own father is evil, would you still call him evil?)
1.1 The Personal Shall Always be Political
I wanted to foreground in the introduction to this dissertation what impelled me to work on conflict
in northeast India and that story unfortunately is one of brutality and sadness. In fact there are three
life events, which remain as a guiding force in this doctoral journey. I grew up in a Assam that was
affected by separatist and self-determination movements in the nineties. The first event that caste
an indelible impression on my mind is one of the first stories that date back to my childhood. It is a
narrative I heard from my mother about an incident concerning my grandparent’s neighbors. Every
summer I visited my grandparents in the town of Tinsukia in upper Assam, the hub of the United
Liberation Font of Assam (henceforth ULFA) in the state. My mother told me this story when I was
about ten years old.
My grandparents and these neighbors shared a common wall. My mother narrated, how in the
year 1990 the neighbor’s nephew went missing. After about a month a gunny bag was found outside
their house early in the morning. When they opened the gunny bag, they found the body of their
nephew chopped into little pieces.
This is an event I kept re-visiting through various stages in my life. This story is one of the
accounts that drove me to explore the nature of violent conflict in northeast India. This also instilled
in me the curiosity to fathom how people cope with everyday forms and processes of violent conflict.
The second life event derives from my growing up years in various turbulent districts of Assam,
owing to my father’s profession. Words like bomb blasts, military, ULFA, curfew, kidnappings
and so on informed the quotidian existence of most of us living in northeast India. Narratives and
sites of violence sprung up all around me and one of these takes me back to the day I returned from
school, when I was studying in the second grade and my grandmother, most evidently disturbed,
1 Interview with a Muslim women before the AssamAssembly elections in April 2016. She was a resident of a project
called the Ajmal model village, run by the Ajmal foundation under the patronage of perfume baron, philanthropist
and leader of the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), whose vote bank is primarily composed of Muslim
voters.
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asked me to get ready. Not wanting to leave me alone in the house, she asked me to accompany
her to a neighbor’s whose newly wed son had been shot dead by suspected militants for refusing
to pay ransom. I remember the sight of his dead-body, his wailing wife and mother and the large
presence of police personnel. The atmosphere was imbued with a sense of unnatural death, which
would probably take years for the family to reconcile with. I remember the sheer chaos surrounding
the incident and also the realization that life had almost become easily dispensable, which even my
eight-year-old self could comprehend. This extended to family conversations, which centered on
allegiances that even close family, acquaintances and friends owed to the insurgent groups, leading
to a general feeling of suspicion and distrust.
From a couple of years later, when I was in fourth grade, I recall this instance when we had an
early dinner and had to observe complete darkness for two hours or so as part of a protest call by
the ULFA. I remember the whole family huddled together around the flickering light of a candle
and the deafening silence all around, solely punctuated by the soldier’s boots patrolling the streets.
Ultimately these incidents of bomb blasts, violence and abductions became part of our everyday
existence, which did not merit questioning. Subsequently my bachelor’s education took me to New
Delhi, where I was often asked questions like, “in northeast, do you live on trees?’ or “what currency
do you use?’ and there was absolutely no awareness of the socio-political situation in the northeast.
I realized how peripheral this conflict was in/to the national consciousness, which both infuriated
and amused me, but also provoked me to bring these stories to a larger audience. What began as a
thought finally began to take shape in form of the final life event, when I opted to go to the Bodoland
Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) in 2008 for two months, one of the most turbulent regions
in India after Kashmir as part of my master’s education in Social Work. The tension surrounding
the conflict, which I shall speak about later, was palpable and we were constantly asked to exercise
great caution by the NGO that hosted us, as we went to interior villages for our fieldwork. Stories
about abductions, sighting of corpses and occasional bomb blasts were commonplace coupled with
abject poverty and destitution. This also coincided with a spate of serial bomb blasts across Assam,
which killed sixty-eight people and injured over three hundred2.
At this juncture, as a young social scientist and a social worker in training, I felt extremely troubled
by the lack of public awareness, media coverage and academic scholarship on the region. As usual
the national media paid scant attention to this occurrence. This is when I arrived at a decision to
continue my academic engagement with Assam, focusing on the BTAD. I shall now embed this
thesis within the larger debates on the political ecology of resource extraction, conservation and
livelihoods and also highlight the general contribution this PhD makes to the field of northeastern
2See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-assam-blast-idUSTRE49T1UW20081031
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studies by focusing on the notion of everyday. I shall return to my reflexive ethnographic approaches
navigating the boundaries of the insider-outsider dichotomy in my section on methodology.
1.2 Whose (forest) land is it, anyway?
Contextualizing Conflict — Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts
(BTAD) and Northeast India
At the very onset, I ought to mention that this dissertation is not a classical A–to–B work but a
collection of five articles, each constituting its corresponding theoretical framing. This introductory
chapter should be treated as the meta-layer, which establishes linkages and fits into the broader
research traditions that have been dealt with in the respective articles. To analyze this multi-scalar
political ecology of extraction, conservation and livelihoods with a special focus on the Reserved
Forests (RF), I have divided my PhD dissertation into three parts, which are of course interconnected.
The first part, which consists of one article, introduces the political landscape of Assam and the
BTAD by situating it within the complex web of recurring inter-ethnic conflicts that the region is
enmeshed in. I also emphasize that in order to get a grasp over the contemporary socio-political
landscape of Assam, it is pertinent to look back at its complex pre- and postcolonial history. I situate
this within the context of Sanjib Baruah’s significant book, India Against Itself, where Baruah
(2009) argues that the history of conflicts in Assam began with its incorporation into British India
and continued after independence in the form of an ‘unresolved national question’ due to India’s
formally federal but actually centralized government structure. Moreover, this article also considers
the complexities of both relative structural autonomy, for a region within a federated polity like
India, and the difficulties of aligning the promise of such autonomy with favorable outcomes for
those who have fought for it. In this case, BTAD constituted as a result of recurring violent struggles
against the ethnic Assamese, Bengalis, Adivasis, and Muslim immigrants (from Bangladesh) seem
to have achieved little for the ordinary Bodo. An emergent Bodo elite though continues to profit
economically and politically. Gorkhaland, and even the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, are
other examples of similar processes in nearby areas to Bodoland within the Indian federation. These
everyday forms of struggles and confrontations among the various ethnic groups become apparent
in the subsequent articles especially in relation to (forest)land.
Drawing on the above article, the second part consists of three further articles and the dissertation
is guided by the following research questions, which I arrived at in course of my empirical sojourn,
as well as by delving into the existing literature on political ecology, violent environments and
conflict studies.
• How has the Reserved Forest in Assam (particularly in BTAD) emerged as lived geographies
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of violent inter-ethnic conflict, cooperation and competition?
• How these complex web of inter-ethnic relationships among the three major ethnic groups (as
explained in the first article) and actors further operate in the (il)legal extractive economy
and within forms of encroachment(s) and/or dokhol?
• How conflict and forms of domination, feed into (or not) the conservation- counterinsurgency
nexus, eventually encompassing therein the notions of everyday?
In the subsequent sections, I begin by addressing these questions, which guide the course of
this PhD thesis by referring to the relevant academic debates, and also situate the contribution of
this thesis within those debates. The third part of this dissertation, consisting of the final article,
follows from the question(s) above and deals with the notions of the everyday as posited vis-e-vis
the increasing overemphasis on the spectacle of resistance especially in the context of northeastern
studies.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first draw upon the broader scholarship in the
domain of political ecology particularly focusing on aspects of resource extraction and conservation
on war footing. Thereafter, I flesh out and link the ‘spatial’ focus, dominant in the above debates more
explicitly, by engaging with emerging literature(s) in the field of legal geography. I subsequently
tie in the debates surrounding the political ecology of livelihoods with the political economy of
livelihoods literature and argue for a more ecological livelihoods perspective within the framework
of this PhD. Additionally, in such fragile environments, it is difficult to operationalize livelihoods as
separate from the notion of ‘everyday’. By also placing the notion of everyday into the larger field
of northeastern studies as it stands now, this PhD eventually emerges as a much-needed intervention
since the field has largely been repeating historical or empirical analyses of identity, ethnicity,
security and violence. I also argue the reasons as to why this literature does not fully expand our
understanding of the dynamics of conflict and extraction in an extremely pluralistic and complex
violent socio-political environment, as was observed in the RFs, and arguably, about the complexity
of conservation on war-footing imbibed within counter-insurgency efforts in conflict areas more
broadly.
Yet, the more specific contribution this thesis makes to these debates is discussed more explicitly
in the separate articles and the concluding chapter. My intent here is to carve out the silhouette of
such a layered theoretical and analytical framework that embraces the versatility of the reserved
forests in time of violent conflict. I conclude this introductory chapter with an outline of the PhD
thesis.
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1.3 Historicizing the Conflict Context in BTAD
Most studies on state, economy and society in India have focused on structural accumulation: labor,
capital, caste (Harris-White 2003); or political economy- the linkages between corruption, state
formation, collective action and identity (Eckert 2014; Gooptu 2014; Orjuela 2014). Important to
note is that, while this thesis can draw on this literature, most of the above studies have been carried
out in relatively stable and peaceful Indian states with some periodic episodes of communal/electoral
violence or ‘big man’ ‘muscle power’ politics (Witsoe 2013; Berenschot 2012; Hansen 2001).
Moreover the predominant work on violent conflict in the context of India has focused on ethnic,
communal and electoral forms of violence mainly in the context of states like Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat,
Delhi, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Punjab among others (see Brass 1997, 2011; Varshney 2003;
Wilkinson 2006; Berenschot 2012; Spencer 2007; Staniland 2015). There has also been some
phenomenal yet limited (ethnographic) work on the Maoist and/or naxalite violence (see Shah 2010;
Ahuja and Ganguly 2007; Suykens 2010). However, most of this scholarship has barely concentrated
on the main conflict theaters in the nation, specifically Jammu & Kashmir and the more violent
states in the northeast of India. Additionally, for too long now Northeast Indian Studies has been
caught within the cul-de-sac of greed and grievance debates. Rebel movements and insurgency
have generally been studied from a causal perspective. Studies that go beyond issues of ethnicity
and identity, material culture, security and exceptionalism continue to remain ethnographically thin
and theoretically limited.
BTAD in the context of northeast India therefore presents a militarized society with ongoing
low-intensity ethnic violence including an important illegal extractive economy. Although similar
(il)legal extractive economies exist in other north and central Indian states with regard to sand
mining as well as logging, here these practices are nestled within a milieu of recurring violent
conflict, insurgency, displacement, conservation and counter-insurgency operations. The region
consequently offers a vast potential for theoretical and empirical knowledge generation, which has
been barely explored in existing scholarly works on northeast and India.
The conflict situation in BTAD has to be situated both geographically and politically within the
larger framework of insurgent and self-determination movements more specifically in Assam and
the northeastern region of India, in general. The Northeast refers to the wedge of land situated on
the far-eastern periphery of India (McDuie-Ra 2009). The Northeastern region consists of eight
federal states around the Brahmaputra and Barak river valleys. It is joined to the rest of India, only
by a narrow tract of land at Siliguri in West Bengal, commonly referred to as the chicken’s neck.
The region shares international borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China (Tibet), and Nepal,
and the majority of the population has ethnic and linguistic links to Southeast Asia and the greater
Himalayas. The expanse has been governed as an exception to the rule-of-law in India. Although
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talk of conflict resolution has been looming large, emergency laws that deal with this disturbed area
are still in place. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), for example, was extended in
the state of Assam for six months on Feb 28, 2018 (Baisya 2018). The AFSPA is a reworking of
the Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance promulgated by the British in 1942 to suppress the
nationalist Quit India Movement—a colonial law that has had an afterlife in post-colonial times
(Baisya 2015). Northeastern states like Nagaland and Manipur have been administered under the
ambit of such military laws almost continuously since India’s independence, with the likes ofAssam,
Tripura and Mizoram also facing the brunt of such operations. Akoijam in Baisya (2015) succinctly
notes, “AFSPA, rather than being a response to the “armed revolt” in the North East, is…a reified
expression of the militarism that characterizes the policy of the Indian government towards the
region from the foundational years of the Republic of India.”
Historically, in the colonial era, these hill tracts were administered under special provisions
and were classified as excluded or partially excluded areas, restricting access to populates from
other parts of India and also creating a differentiated system of rule accompanied by high levels
of violence directed at hill communities (Robb 1997). In the post colonial era, as Udayon Misra
writes, “mainland India and the Indo-Hindu heartland represented in India’s power structure did not
seem much concerned about the region as long as the ‘colorful’ tribes of the northeast were fixed in
their exotic locales providing the occasional excitement to the eco-tourist or the anthropological
researcher” (Misra 2014:5). Attempts by the Indian nation-state in the years after independence, to
almost forcibly integrate the northeast into the Indian mainstreamwere met with hostility, particularly
by the hill areas. What ensued are violent struggles to secede from the Indian federation across
several northeastern states, including Assam. As Karlsson (2011) further notes, the entire political
map of northeast India is fraught with competing national imageries and contested state boundaries.
Heterogeneity is what characterizes the northeast of India through the existence of numerous
languages, livelihood practices, ethnicity, religion and politics of ecology. Attempts at shoving all
this under a common label can be visualized as erasure of critical distinctions and imposition of
mistaken and enforced homogeneity. As it stands, there exists a plethora of occurrences of such
simplifications in both media reports and scholarly publications. The Mizo poet Cherry L. Chhangte
(2011) has neatly summed up this apparent production of us versus them in the following lines:
You look at me, and you see
My eyes, my skin, my language, my faith
You dissect my past, analyze my present
Predict my future and build my profile.
I am curiosity, an ‘ethnic’ specimen.
Politics, history, anthropology, you impressive learning.
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All unable to answer the fundamental question —
“What does an Indian look like?”
—An India looks like me, an Indian is Me.
Therefore, a more systematized study of political, economic and social processes in these pe-
ripheries of the Indian nation state is not just indispensable for cultivating better insights into the
organization of everyday lives in these borderlands but also to comprehend how exactly political
processes in the margin “affect the formation and territorialization of states” (Baud and Van Schendel
1997:212). Since this PhD thesis centers on BTAD as the primary geographical focus, I would like
to position the BTAD within these margins given its history of discontentment with the Indian state
and the movement for a separate state of Bodoland.
Revisiting the conflict context in BTAD and the more recent events that led to the Bodo agitation
can be traced back to 1967, when the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) and an All Bodo
Students’ Union (ABSU) were set up to fight for better status for the plains tribals. Later the PTCA
mitigated its demands; but the ABSU became increasingly committed towards a more radical stand.
Simultaneously the anti-foreigner’s movement led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) was
aimed towards more autonomy for the Assamese in order to protect Assam’s natural resources
and demographics by keeping out foreign nationals, mainly from Bangladesh, who were exerting
severe pressure on local land and resources. The Bodo leadership anticipated that an eventual peace
agreement between the Indian government and the AASU would assist the Bodo community to
escape from its entrapment (Vandekerckhove and Suykens 2010; Baruah 2003). However, the
AssamAccord of 1985 between the Indian state and AASU was far from satisfactory for the latter.
Moreover, the AASU, which had now launched a political party called the Ahom Gana Parishad
(AGP), appeared hesitant in helping the Bodo case for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland.
For the ABSU leaders, this was a clear sign that the time had come to take up arms. In 1987,
under the umbrella of the Bodo People’s Action Committee, the ABSU staged huge rallies and
demonstrations against Assamese supremacy (George 1994). This was also the time when the
movement became violent with the launch of the Border Security Force (BSF), which later changed
its name to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). A failed Bodo accord in 1993
led to further intensification of the violence with the entrance of another rebel group called the
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLT) along with the NDFB. Eventually, a tripartite agreement was
arrived at amongst the Government of India, the Government of Assam and the BLT that led to the
amendment of the Sixth Schedule3 of the Indian Constitution and the creation of the BTAD with
3 The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides for the creation and management of autonomous districts
and provinces within the Indian federation. For more information see :
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Sixth%20Schedule%201/bill164_20080318164_SIXTH_SCHEDULE-
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electoral reservations for the Bodo community in the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC), along with
sharing of power between the state government of Assam and the council. Although, in principle
the Accord safeguarded the land rights of the non-tribals residing in BTAD and did not bar any
citizen from acquiring land by way of inheritance, settlement or transfer if such persons were already
residents of BTAD and were eligible for such bona fide acquisition of land. However, this clause was
viewed by the Bodos as a strategy for continued appropriation of tribal land, while the non-Bodos
felt that the Bodo leadership was violating this clause.
At this juncture, it requisites mention that scholars from the region like Udayon Misra (2012)
deem that control over land lies at the heart of inter-ethnic contestation. Recurrent clashes on
ethno-religious lines in the BTAD is the outcome of flawed and inconsistent (forest) policies being
pursued since the colonial times, resulting in the marginalization of the plains tribal communities
and the dispossession of their rights to land. Conversely, the current land policies in the state has to
be situated in a historical context, especially given that the British colonial rule has been described
as a ’crucial watershed’ in the ecological history of India (Gadgil and Guha, 1993: 5). As Baruah
(2001) notes, it was colonial rule that enabled the global expansion of the resource base of industrial
societies as land and natural resources formerly managed by peasant societies was regulated by new
rules of property that created the legal foundation for the industrial mode of resource use.
The colonial land settlement policy was to incorporate Assam into this new global resource use
regime. Drawing on this, it must be stated that a major cause of the conflict has to be situated within
the uneven demographics. Bodos constitute not more than thirty percent of the total population.
Moreover, according to the Census of 2011, the tribal or Scheduled Tribe (ST) population of BTAD
is around thirty-four percent of which ninety percent are Bodos. The non-tribals constitute the
remaining sixty-three percent of the population, which includes Muslims (mostly of immigrant
origin), Adivasis, Koch Rajbongshis, Assamese and Bengali Hindus. The Bodo accord of 2003
created a forty-six members council with thirty reserved seats for STs, five seats for non-STs, five
seats for those belonging to unreserved categories and the remaining six seats to be nominated by
the Governor of Assam. This means that nearly seventy-five percent of the seats are reserved for
thirty percent of the citizens. However, as Misra (2012) notes that even after securing a measure of
political autonomy, the Bodos realized that the demographic equation and, particularly, the land
factor were not in their favor. More importantly there was discontentment in the way in which
the land question was addressed in the Bodo Accord and encroachment in forest areas continued
unabated post 2003. The desperation of the Bodo movement for a separate state was heightened by
the fact that the notion of a homogeneous homeland within an extremely heterogeneous polity was
_with_amendments.pdf
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virtually unlikely, thus violence has been integral to the Bodo narrative for a separate homeland. As
such this PhD dissertation intends to contribute to a better and nuanced understanding of the Bodo
area conflict by focusing on forms of collective actions initiated by the ethnic others i.e. non-Bodo
groups and also situating this conflict within a history of grievance pertaining to flawed colonial
policies of immigration and eventual land alienation.
Furthermore, within the BTAD, this PhD dissertation specifically focuses on land allocated as
Reserved Forests (RF). According to the Forest Survey of India (FSI), an organization under the
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, the term Forest Area (FA) generally
refers to all the geographic areas recorded as forest in government records and includes Reserved
Forests (RF) and Protected Forests (PF), which have been constituted under the provisions of Indian
Forest Act, 1927.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the history of forest policy and conservation in Assam is
directly related to the growth and development of forest administration under the British colonial
government (Tamuli and Choudhury 2009). As can be gathered from the above discussion, when
several ethnic groups exist in a contiguous area where allocation and ownership of resources are
rooted in contentious forms of politics and history, it becomes almost predictable that certain myths
of origin, or historical claims (of sorts) become an arena of contestation for these social groups
as has been the case in BTAD. Fascinatingly, it is the RF that emerged as the predominant site of
conflict and contestation, counter insurgency operations, illegal forms of resource extraction and
post-conflict rehabilitation of internally displaced persons. Moreover, more than one-third4 of the
total landmass of BTAD is covered by forest. In Kokrajhar district, the headquarters of the BTAD,
out of a total area of 3296 sq.km5, approximately 1719 sq. km6 is covered by RF and the notified
forest area is comprised of six RF, namely Guma, Chirang-Riphu, Kachugaon, Ultapani, Bengtal
and Manas. Considering that, the RFs are more than just vast stretches of forestland that have a
historically important role in shaping the current conflict landscape, following an initial phase of
exploratory fieldwork in the region in early 2014, I decided to focus on the Chirang-Riphu and
Ultapani RF under the Haltugaon forest division in Kokrajhar district as my prime ethnographic
site(s) of investigation.
Undoubtedly, a number of approaches could have been used to describe the intricate nature-society
and the complex inter-ethnic relationships at play within the RF in postcolonial Assam. However,
as I shall show, this dissertation has tried to refrain from using a framework focusing on classical
environmental conservation or the much-used concepts of ethnicity and identity that have shaped
4 https://www.telegraphindia.com/1130818/jsp/7days/17243027.jsp
5 Census 2011
6 http://kokrajhar.gov.in/district_profile.html
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most of the scholarship on northeast India. I situate this PhD at the interstices of the broader literature
on political ecology of extraction, crisis conservation, livelihoods and violent conflict; intersection
of the fields of studies that share similar epistemological and ontological underpinnings as seen
through the works of Le Billon 2001; Peluso and Watts 2001; Benjaminsen, 2008; Cramer and
Richards 2011; Richards 1996; Tania Li 1998, among others. Eventually my intent is to bring the
material, political and social realities of everyday life in the RF characterized by conflict, (counter)
insurgency, displacement and extraction within the same framework of analysis as the gradual
processes that have led to the production and sustenance of these myriad forms of inter-ethnic
relationships, illegal smuggling of forest commodities and encroachment. This PhD thesis shall
underline the appropriation of RFs as sites of conflict and resettlement and also contribute to the
overall debate around ‘violent environment’ (Peluso and Watts 2001). In their work on violent
environments, Peluso andWatts bring back ecology into discussions of contemporary violence. They
uphold the political relevance of environment that often gets reduced through a focus on resources.
The environmental discourse within political ecology therefore should encompass processes of
resistance, local cultures and political change, thereby moving away from discussions around neo-
Malthusianisms in various forms. The authors view, “ violence as a site specific phenomenon, rooted
in local histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation
and power relations” (2001: 5). This thesis takes the above discussion forward by applying it
to a peripheral and sensitive space like that of the RF in which the politics of conservation and
management of forest itself is embedded in a larger context of authority, autonomy, ethnic politics
and a history of colonial policies into forest making. I further the political ecological aspects of
the violent environment debate by examining how practices like forest management and nature
conservation are introduced into these areas fraught with violence and forms of ethnic contestations
and are carried out alongside counter-insurgency operations and other measures to restore rule
of law and environmental protections. This shall further aid in advancing and strengthening the
conceptual debates in political ecology dealing with conservation, counter-insurgency and violent
conflict, through the addition of novel empirical insights.
1.4 Political Ecology: Of Extraction, Conservation and Counter-Insurgency
“…meanwhile India’s Northeast remains buffeted by ecological, economic and demographic pres-
sures, with social inequities worsened by global commodity capitalism and migration and rivalries
between the nation-states whose frontier it demarcates” (Sharma 2011,16).
Following the contextualization of conflict context in the previous section, I shift my gaze to the
more pertinent inquiries relating to the theoretical and analytical framing and conceptualization of
this PhD dissertation and the academic debates it engages with, augments to and builds on.
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Certainly in line with the work of Donald Moore (2005), especially in the context of Assam and
the BTAD it is an important exercise to observe how exactly the political and ecological landscape
ofAssam is being “sedimented with environmental resources, human livelihood practices and power
relations” (Moore 2005: 2). The apprehensions over immigration and the ensuing competition
between numerous ethnic groups for resources and political power has driven politics inAssam since
the late 1970s, but have been exacerbated in recent years following the creation of BTAD in 2003.
The establishment of BTAD brought in state and federal funding—the biggest source of revenue in a
place with almost no industry—and Kokrajhar, became relatively prosperous. Paved roads replaced
dirt tracks and cars became a more frequent sight; a state-funded National Institute of Technology
came to town along with Bodoland University and other infrastructures like multi-storied hotels,
supermarkets and multi-cuisine restaurants. However, as mentioned before, more than one-third of
all land area in Kokrajhar district is covered by RF and the RF area starts soon after one leaves the
town of Kokrajhar and gets onto the highway leading to Karigaon. On both sides of the highway,
almost all land is protected forestland. A further two and a half hours drive north, through dirt roads
leads to the Chirang-Riphu and Ultapani RF. The forestland is a contiguous area and lies along the
northern tract of Kokrajhar district in the foothills of the Kingdom of Bhutan. These RF along the
northern tract occupy an ancient alluvial plateau jutting out south from the Himalayan foothills. It
is in these forests that I ground this dissertation, using a political ecology framework.
However, by doing so I stand the risk of finding myself in Piers Blaikie’s bandwagon of political
ecology, as he argued in the nineties “[t]he notion of political ecology and the wheel share a similar
characteristic. Both keep on being re-invented. The whole political ecology show is firmly on
the road, and has become something of a band wagon” (Blaikie 1994: 1). Nevertheless, political
ecology has emerged as a prodigious field especially since the early 1990s and political ecologists
have in recent times taken convergences of power, culture and political economy as analytical entry
points and have endeavored to incorporate discourse (meaning and practice) with the historical
geography of material practice (Peluso and Watts 2001). Moreover, over the last two decades
political ecology has tried to establish linkages between environment and politics and transform
into some sort of an unified field, by providing tools for thinking about conflicts produced by forms
of access to and control over (forest) resources. Engaging in this conversation by establishing
theoretical and empirical linkages between violence, resource extraction, environment (read forest)
and counter-insurgency especially taking into account the interplay of a variety of conflicting and
competing actors (state and non-state) within the RFs, I believe I have done more than just climb
into Blaikie’s bandwagon.
Now, political ecology is largely perceived as the study of nature-society relations, and as humans
coproduce nature, political ecologists stress the importance to analyze the power processes imbibed
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in these productions (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Political ecology consequently also focuses on
the relational ties between natural resources (management) and violent conflict, and has advanced
approaches that go for instance beyond the idea of the existence of a resource curse. Political
ecology emerged as a radical critique of apolitical analyses of development and environmental
interventions, their depoliticizing tendencies and dominance over the production of knowledge
(Perreault, Bridge and McCarthy 2015). It aspires to recognize power structures in the knowledge
production and reveal the structures of inequality and power hierarchies within these constructions
(Peet and Watts 1996; Fairhead and Leach 1996). Hence, political ecology emphasizes “the means
by which control and access of resources and property rights are defined, negotiated and contested
within the political arenas of the household, the workplace, and the state” (Peet and Watts 1996:
239). However, according to Blaikie if political ecology were to make a difference in people’s
lives “it would involve an examination and re-working of existing scientific information and local
knowledge to include local values, economic exigencies and culture, policy reform, political strategy,
media and public relations and networking among many others” (Blaikie 1994: 2).
Conversely, this PhD thesis draws more from the poststructuralist shift in political ecology which
began in the 1990s with increased attention to local and micro studies of environmental movements,
discursive and symbolic politics, and the institutional nexus of power, knowledge and practice
(Watts 1998). However some scholars have criticized this new and increased focus of political
ecology on politics, since this has relegated the position of ecology to the margins. Peter Walker
(2005), for instance, jibed at these criticisms in a much anecdotal manner, “Mark Twain reportedly
once responded to news reports of his demise by quipping that ’rumors of my death have been
greatly exaggerated”. The much-discussed demise of ecology in political ecology is likewise greatly
exaggerated”. I consider this shift to be a necessary addition to the field by which political ecologists
have emphasized on the political dimension of political ecology to explain the co-constitution of
violence and conservation. This can be seen in the works of (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011; Le
Billon 2008; Gregory and Pred 2007, among others). Rather than construing violence as coincident
to conservation, or a necessary response in defense of nature, political ecologists nowadays analyze
securitized conservation practices and rhetoric as strategies of state and subject formations. While
establishing linkages between forest and resource conflicts, Watts and Le Billon study forests and
other natural resources predominantly in terms of their exchange and strategic values, even where
they examine these in terms of the making of “governable spaces” or the commodity-specific
geographies of extraction (Le Billon 2001; Watts 2004). This is in line with a dynamic literature
on resource wars that deliberates how the need to access strategic resources or the presence of
extractable resources can generate or shape violent conflict (Klare 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Ross 2004). Le Billon used a political ecology approach explicitly to frame war and postwar social
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relations in forests. Using the case of Cambodia, Le Billon has revealed how shifting political
conditions in and around a troubled but re-emergent nation-state led to the creation of a “new frontier
of capitalism” (Le Billon 2001: 791) in the nation’s hitherto unexploited, timber-producing, forest
areas.
Drawing from the above discussion it must be noted that political ecology is not one thing and
there is no one theory or an analytical framework to which every political ecologist would adhere
to. Paulson, Gezon and Watts (2003) note that in the past two decades, a basic notion of political
ecology has been the piecing together of political economy and cultural ecology and its application
across disciplines such as anthropology, biology, geography, and political science through research,
analysis, and practice. Political Ecology could be considered as a multi-disciplinary field consisting
of shared perspectives and common research agendas, sharing a number of basic assumptions,
modes of explanations and theoretical orientations (Karlsson 2011). Nancy Li Peluso and Michael
Watts have succinctly summed up the field as
Political ecology provide[s] the tools for thinking about conflicts and struggles engen-
dered by the forms of access to and control over resources. Its attentiveness to power
relations inherent in defining controlling and managing nature suggests an alternative
way of viewing the link between environment and political action” (Peluso and Watts
2001: 24—25).
Therefore, this PhD thesis draws from and expands on the broader literature on the political
ecology of extraction, conflict and conservation. Over the past decade there have been an increasing
amount of political ecology studies centered on nature conservation and protected areas (particularly
national parks in Africa) (for overviews see Adams and Hutton 2007; Neumann 2005; Robbins
2004). These scholarships have problematized the social constructiveness of nature and related
environmental narratives or myths (see Cronon 1995), the displacement and exclusion of local
people from national parks (Brockington, 2002), the disruption of livelihoods due to imposed
restrictions of resource use (Ghimire 1991; Sodhi et al. 2007) and resulting conflicts between state
authorities and local communities (e.g., Kull 2002; Neumann 1998).
Steering the above discussion towards a more regional focus of this PhD, it deserves mention
that in the wider context of northeast Indian studies, the nature-society relationship has not really
featured in major scholarship on the region. Moreover, there has hardly been any work on political
ecology of northeast India in general, and barely any focusing on the political ecology literature that
brings together extraction, conservation and conflict. Indeed the field is indebted to and can use
as an entry point some very significant historical work on the ecological history of the region by
Saikia (2008, 2011) and earlier works of Amalendu Guha (1972, 1977, 1980, 1983) focusing on
the colonial processes of forest making in the state. Worth mentioning are recent work by Bengt
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Karlsson on the political ecology of resource frontier (2011) using the case of forests in Meghalaya
and Mitul Baruah’s analyses of the political ecology of hazardscapes in Majuli in Assam (2016)7.
The broader and emergent literature on the political ecology of conservation indicates that conser-
vation efforts can induce, or is implemented through, various forms of violence and contestations,
and perpetrate structures of inequality (Brockington 2002; 2004; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015;
Lunstrum 2013, 2014; Neumann 1998; Ohja et. al. 2009). In this PhD, I explicitly draw from a
rising interest in political ecology that sutures linkages between conservation, violence and conflict
over contested resources that include wildlife parks and sanctuaries, especially where local, state-
led conservation efforts rely on eviction of marginalized peasant communities while promoting
tourism as a form of capital accumulation (Brockington and Wilkie 2015; Craven 2016; Duffy 2016;
Lunstrum 2014; Massé and Lunstrum 2016; Peluso and Watts 2001). I apply this framework in the
context of the RF where a vast array of actors and power relations operate, compete and conflate
over access to forestland and resources. Such an approach further supplements the limitations
associated with a linear political ecological framework of analysis. This holds particularly true since
the larger notions of ethnic violence, conservation by the armed forces and livelihoods embedded in
the timber commodity network looms large in understanding forms of inter-ethnic interactions and
negotiations with state authorities while encroaching on forestland.
1.5 Illegal Timber Extraction and Conservation on War-footing
I use the political ecology of extraction framework to highlight and comprehend the ways in which
the different state and non-state actors operate in the (non) level playing field within the RF. This
also draws in many ways from Donald Moore’s (1998a, 1998b, 1999) work that illustrates this
latter approach by situating studies of micro politics within historicized state and colonial contexts.
Moore’s investigation into frictions between rural actors and representatives of the state in a protected
area along a river in Zimbabwe exhibits how competing considerations of the landscape (pertaining
to gender, education and the nature of one’s authority) play a formative part in struggles that are
simultaneously material and symbolic and that shape the dispersal of resource rights (Moore 1998a).
Gezon (1995, 1997) likewise studied ecological politics in conflicts that occurred between villagers
on the periphery of a protected area in Madagascar. Her analysis of transcripts of local trials
administered by village elders uncovered the complex ways people use to establish and challenge
rights to land access. People center their claims on a gamut of authority sources, ranging from
norms of extended family rights to indigenous ethnic politics to state regulations and the moral and
7 Dr. Mitul Baruah has kindly shared his unpublished manuscript titled Suffering for Land: Environmental Hazards
and Popular Struggles in the Brahmaputra Valley (Assam), India with me which he is in the process of turning into
a book.
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financial authority of international conservation organizations (Paulson, Gezon and Watts 2003).
I examine the above in the second article of this thesis, which depicts the myriad ways in which
the different state and non-state actors operate in the (non) level playing field within the extractive
timber economy, operating in a context of violent conflict and counter-insurgency. While this is
not remarkable given the proliferation of literature on the linkages between resource extraction and
conflict (Le Billon 2005, Snyder 2006, Goodhand 2005, Woods 2011) this has been often linked to
conflict financing by armed groups. However, what I along with Bert Suykens, highlight is the way
in which state, rebel and non-armed actors integrate in this extraction network. We also underline
the way an ethnically segregated labor force has been integrated into the illegal timber economy,
thereby illustrating the ways in which multiple ethnic groups (Bodo, Adivasi, Bengali Muslim)
who are in the larger narrative of the conflict considered to be hostile with each other, liaise in the
illegal timber economy. These are the local forms of engagement in the political ecological spheres
within specific contexts in which power and politics operate, together with related discourses and
representations of the environment through which people communicate, especially within the South
Asian context of multiple ethnic groups on lines of caste, class and gender.
Adding to the scholarship on political ecology of conservation focused on protected areas and
park is a growing body of research addressing what Büscher and Ramutsindela have termed ‘green
violence,’ outlined as ‘the deployment of violent instruments and tactics towards the protection of
nature’ (2016: 2). The predominant focus of this discussion has been the application of such violence
by representatives of nation-state regimes that frequently include forest guards, para-military forces
and national armed forces. Using the case of increasing militarization of the Kruger National Park
in South Africa, Lunstrum (2014) argues that this is not an isolated instance of such violent form
of conservation by the military; rather it reflects a wider and deepening pattern of militarization
altering conservation practice around the world. National armed forces, for instance, have performed
important roles in establishing conservation measures, often forcibly across South America, Asia
and countries across Africa. This has been seen in Guatemala, Colombia, Nepal, Indonesia, Congo,
Cameroon, South Africa, among many others and in case of Botswana, the protection of it’s national
parks is one of its Defense Force’s primary responsibilities (Peluso 1993; Henk 2006; Ojeda 2012;
Ybarra 2012; Ethirajan 2013; Piombo 2013). In the case of India, drones have recently been
introduced in the Kaziranga National Park (KNP) in Assam where around twenty-four persons
(allegedly poachers) were killed in and around the core area of KNP in the year 2014 (Barbora 2017).
The death toll has risen since then with the arming of forest guards with sophisticated arms and
ammunition and shoot at sight operations. Similarly, the RF in BTAD has surfaced simultaneously
as a site of conservation and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations (by the Indian Armed Forces
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and the Para-militaries) as well as inter-institutional competition between the Ecological Task Force8
(ETF), of the Indian Army (set up through the mandate of the central government) and the state
forest department. By focusing on conservation on war footing in actual conflict zones by a wing
of the Indian Army, this thesis also seeks to address the intersection between important themes in
political ecology and debates about violence and conflict within the peripheral zones of the RFs.
By empirically studying the case of the ETF, in the fourth article I explain how a range of different
actors, operating at different scales, react to the specific challenges of conservation in ‘violent
environments’ and co-constitute each other. Within the BTAD both the forest department, which
comes under the state government and the ETF that has been constituted under federal jurisdiction
are in charge of conservation. This of course leads to occasional inter-institutional friction and
blame game. Moreover, my approach and analysis here digresses from the literature on the structural
and symbolical forms of violence associated with ‘green violence’ (Büscher and Ramutsindela
2015) ‘green wars’ (Ybarra 2012; Büscher and Fletcher 2018), and ‘green militarisation’ (Lunstrum
2014; Duffy 2014). Rather I focus on how wider geographies of violent conflict and forms of
domination, feed into conservation efforts, in a situation with multiple agencies entrusted with the
task of conservation. I also explore how armed forms of conservation practices are caught up in
local conflict contexts. Although existing literature suggests a merging of counter-insurgency and
conservation practices (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018), using an inter-institutional and multilayered
approach to conservation, my case demonstrates that counter-insurgency prevails over conservation
within the RF. In this way, the thesis further contributes to the larger body of political ecological
literature by also addressing the gap wherein conflict and conservation have been so far seen as
disjoint processes. By emphasizing on place and site-specific studies of militarization (Bernazzoli
and Flint 2009) and by empirically situating the working of the ETF within the larger micro political
context of the region, I show that despite the ETF’s best efforts to buffer itself from local violent
politics, events and incidents of a political nature seeps into its operations.
1.6 “We are encroachers in the forest” — Of Space and Legal Geography
“For legal geographers, as for socio-legal scholars more generally, law is less a thing – like a
giraffe, say, than a dynamic, shifting, often contradictory, multi-point process – like the movements
of a swarm of hornets”. (Deanley 2013: 98).
From the above discussion it is now clear that the RF over time have emerged as a site of violent
contestation, conservation and (il)legal forms of extraction and encroachment. The focus of this
8The 135 Infantry Battalion of the ETF, also it’s most recent, was set up in 2007 in the Haltugaon forest division
within the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) of Assam
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thesis on space and illegal and/or informal practices requisites me to propose a common frame
of analysis using legal geography to better comprehend how “law and space actively shape and
constitute society, while being themselves continuously socially produced” (Blandy and Sibley
2010: 278). Space here more specifically refers to the RFs, the production of which has been a saga
of colonial and post-colonial legal processes.
Therefore, it is important to understand this spatial dimension of the RF and its conceptualization
within political ecology of extraction and conservation, especially focusing on the legal aspects
of forest making and access. Forest making and access to forest resources in India has been a
colonial process hedged in several legal restrictions on the utilization of these resources. It was
from the 1870s that the newly established provincial forest department in Assam began to affirm
its sole right over the provincial forest resources (Saikia 2008). Therefore, the end goal of the
project of land settlement in Assam culminated towards shifting of large amounts of Assam’s land
and forest resources from the control of the peasantry - both settled and shifting cultivators - and
hunter gatherers to the colonial state. However, not much changed in the post-colonial process of
management of forestlands. As Cederlöf and Sivaramakrishnan write (in particular reference to
Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision of developing post-colonial India): “… portraying romantic visions of
landscapes while transforming it profoundly— the colonial and postcolonial states converge in their
relationship to nature” (Cederlöf and Sivaramakrishnan 2006: 31).
Not surprisingly, the issue of land has emerged at the heart of recurring ethno-political conflict
in the region (See Mishra 1999, 2012, 2013; Barbora 2002, 2008; Hazarika 2000; Baruah 1999;
Vandekerckhove 2009). Given that in India’s Northeast ethnicity has always been a very fluid and
often socially constructed reality, the identification, classification, and geographical ascription of
certain ethnic groups to (forest)land, in combination with the selective attribution of rights along
such lines, set the stage for endless disputes about who belonged and who did not or rather who
possessed a legal right over land and who did not(Vandekerckhove 2009).
Although, studies have shown that forest policies and acts claim to conserve and provide equi-
table distribution of forest resources among the human population (Gadgil and Guha 1992, 1994;
Bandopadhyay 2010; Rangarajan and Sivaramkrisnan 2012), there are ample instances of state(s)
using its power to exclude forest-dependent communities from their rights to livelihood (Khanna
2005 and Kumar 2012). In India, the administration of ‘reserved’ and ‘protected’ forests lies with the
state forest department. However, in case of BTAD, the Bodoland Territorial Council’s department
of forest administers these areas, since ‘forest’ is a transferred subject according to the second Bodo
Accord of 2003. Therefore, the Bodo movement for autonomy was a struggle to regain control over
their traditional territory, which also included the RF. These forests are called Kachari9 Dooars,
9 An old name for the Bodo
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regarded as ancestral land and was used as a trade route to Bhutan by the Bodos and other tribes in
the pre-colonial era (Kimura 2018). In the colonial period, these lands were declared as wasteland
and brought under the British administration excluding all rights of usage, entry and access to the
local tribal population. Those who continue to dwell inside the RF are considered as encroachers.
This notion of encroachment entered the administrative vocabulary approximately in the 1940s,
when peasants from East Bengal cleared forestlands in contravention of the Revenue Department
directive (Saikia 2008). The RF has always been the worst hit in the region and have not only
emerged as the center of conflict (Kimura 2018) but also as a gray zone of informal economies and
practices.
Therefore, RF exists as a space that is supposedly (read legally) fully under the control of state
administration, specifically the forest department, but in effect only partially controlled by it. Such
areas are not new, but have history. Consequently, the political ecology of extractive practices
including forms of encroachment and retaliatory eviction and conservation cannot be separated from
the nature of legal dimensions embedded in the access to and management of forest land, which
necessitates taking the ‘legal’ into account. I use spatiality as a concept in the sense that space and
place can be viewed not as given entities existing outside of social practice and human experience,
but as the product of social practice (see for example, Gregory 1994a; Pile and Thrift 1992; Soja
1989).
It is this centrality of space and forms of (il)legalities that operate in the RF that determines the
relationship between state and (il)legal practices (Heyman and Smart 1999). Therefore, the use
of a framework drawing on legal geography complements the political ecological structures of
analysis owing to the dissertation’s crucial focus on the relationship between people, space and law.
Moreover, the RF are de facto owned and controlled by the state. So, by adding the component of
how law operates (or not) in these spaces pertaining to processes of land occupation and resource
extraction, also aids in discerning how everyday rules and regulations are being (re)constructed,
de-constructed and negotiated among the various authority structures as well as competing ethnic
groups. I deliberate on this in more detail in article three where I discuss forms of (il)legal practices
using the notion of dokhol10.
Dovetailing the above, it warrants mention that in the late 1990s a spurt of research was published
on the roles and relationships of differentiated actors in multiple sites of inquiry and ‘spaces’ of
environmental negotiation (for an overview see Gezon 1997, 1999; Harvey 1996; Li 1999; Guha
and Martinez-Alier 1997; Paulson 2000). In recent times, there has been a growing interest among
political ecologists in engaging theorizations of the social production of space to investigate the
co-constitution of nature, space, and society (e.g., Neumann 2001; Perreault 2003; Whitehead et
10 ABengali/Assamese word which translates to occupy by force
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al. 2007; Roth 2008; Rangan and Kull 2008). Moreover, political ecology as a framework by
itself doesn’t help in developing an in-depth understanding of local socio political engagements by
these forest dwellers with the state since these negotiations go beyond institutions of governance to
encompass struggles over human practice, meaning, and representation in relation to the environment
and livelihoods.
This is where legal geography comes in handy, since spatiality is the state of existing within
or having some relationship with space, and legal geographers seek to investigate spatiality by
showing how legal provisions and practices relate to space”(Bennet and Layard 2015). Legal
geography itself is a relatively new field of inquiry, which can be traced back to the edition of
the Legal Geographies Reader (Blomley et al. 2001). As Delaney (2014: 96) points out in the
project that brought the disciplines of law and geography together, “suffice it to say that one of
the principal aims of the project is bringing the insights and resources associated with one field
to bear on the interests and concerns of the other.” He further adds that yet another goal has been
“bringing the sensibilities of a now distinctive legal geographic mode of inquiry to broader social
and social-theoretic questions”(ibid.97). Moreover, legal geography’s engagement with time and
historicity and with materialities and affect (Bennet and Layard 2015; Hatcher 2017) also enhances
the discourse on how forestland is being gradually encroached upon while being legally administered,
monitored and managed by the state forest officials.
Analysis of legal geographers like Davina Cooper (1999) assumes prominence in this context. She
notes that investigating the production of illegality confronts the idea that laws are unambiguously
enacted by states. Instead, a “symbiotic relationship” exists between state and illegal practices and,
especially, the “varied actors inside and around states who maneuver actual legality and illegality
in complex ways” (Heyman and Smart 1999: 11). This also ties in with Schendel and Abraham’s
(2005) ‘illegal but licit’ framework which further broadens and forces these forms of spatial-legal
analysis to include flows and actions that are located in a zone where a mismatch exists between the
state’s formal political authority and non-formal social authority of the non-state actors.
Winnowing this in the RF, the categorization of encroachment of forest land and by that logic of
the entire forest squatter settlements and the practice of extraction of resources as illegal is, therefore,
muddied by addressing their entangled and reciprocal association with a disaggregated state (like the
forest officials, army and paramilitary among others) and consequently how this relation develops
over time within specific historical and geographical trajectories, pertaining to environmental
protection, management and conservation. While most work in legal geography adheres to distinctive
practices associated with statist institutions (legislatures, international organizations, administrative
agencies, courts, the police, and so on) “interest has also surfaced in other non-state actors, events,
and expressions of the legal such as forms of ordinary legal consciousness, customs (Nagarajan and
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Parashar 2013); norms (Konzen 2013), and even the house rules of an English pub” (Delaney 2013:
97). These environmental aspect of the RF as a site in which conflict occurs must be constructed
in a “broader sense to contain within it a panoply of environmental uses, and forms of extraction,
conservation and rehabilitation” (Peluso and Watts 2001: 5).
Methodologically, ethnography is one of legal geography’s favored methods and a political
ecological analysis working in that vein can build up a site and situation’s story working upward
and outward from the local, towards more abstract, thus shaping forces and delineating their actual
localized effects. “Such site or spatially focused ethnographically inclined studies also often have
an attentiveness to the materiality of law, showing how it exists embodied within things (documents,
buildings, street layouts and signs, habitats and creatures) and people upon the site” (Bennett
and Layard: 67). This is how I believe, that political ecological discourses centering on (il)legal
extraction, forms of occupation and conservation; and legal geography’s notion of spatial-legal
relations which ratify that dominant constructions of law and space are actively performed in a
sense of “becoming” (c.f. Massey: 2005; Blomley: 2013), come together in a common frame of
analysis to advance theorization of a political ecological analysis of extraction and conflict in spaces
of statist legal institutions and objects.
1.7 Political Ecology (and Economy) of Livelihoods
“In short, to say that someone has a right to land is to summarize in one word a complex and highly
conditional state of affairs which depends on the social, political and economic context. The place,
the setting, the history, the moment, all matter”. (Sally Falk Moore 1998: 33)
The RFs in BTAD are sites for livelihood generation. The forest dwellers (termed encroachers)
engage in practices pertaining to cutting, collecting and selling firewood, hunting and fishing,
gathering medicinal herbs and plants and subsistence agricultural activities on the land encroached.
As already discussed, these activities are not necessarily deemed legal by the forest department
and these encroachers are either reprimanded or eventually (often temporarily) evicted. The forest
as a site for subsistence livelihood production is embedded in conditions where the daily routines
of making a living in the midst of violence are often considered illegal acts in the eyes of the
government.
I also mentioned how the forests and ensuing wastelands in the colonial times were brought
under state administration with the aim of profit generation through the sale of timber. Additionally,
timber requirements for railway were the first and the most formidable forces resulting in thinning
of the Indian forests (Sarma 2012). This coupled with the conversion of so-called ‘wastelands’ into
tea plantations further alienated the forest dwellers from accessing the forest. As Jayeeta Sharma
(2011:20) writes in Empire’s Garden, “Imperial capital and enterprise transformed Assam into a
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plantation economy characterized as much by rapid demographic change as by the visible emergence
of ordered tea-gardens and rice-fields in place of forested, riverine and commons lands.”
Therefore, the second, third and to some extent the fourth article in this dissertation can be situated
within the framework of rural livelihoods or the political ecology (and economy) of livelihoods which
is of course closely connected with the political ecology of resource extraction and encroachment,
as already discussed. The rural livelihood crises in the RF is multi-faceted, rooted predominantly in
restricted or no access to land, loss of the land and make-shift houses built on it due to eviction,
natural disasters like flood, erosion and earthquakes, attack by wild animals and conflict. Although
most of the policy and academic debates (as shall be clear from the discussion) has focused more
on the economic angle of sustainable livelihood, notwithstanding the importance of an economic
perspective, I lean more towards an ecological conceptualization of livelihoods, which I discuss
below.
Topics that could be categorized under livelihood studies have been studied for a long time
within a range of varied disciplines in both natural and social sciences, including “village studies,
household economics and gender analyses, farming systems research, agro-ecosystem analysis,
rapid and participatory appraisal, studies of socio-environmental change, political ecology, sus-
tainability science and resilience studies (and many other strands and variants)” (Scoones 2009:
174). However, it was with the emergence of the idea of sustainable livelihoods in the late-1980s
that livelihood studies became a more formalized area of inquiry. Analysis of the relationships
between forests and economic opportunity fits well with the concept of sustainable livelihoods
that a number of development agencies are adopting. Chambers and Conway (1991) made the
foremost contributions towards the conceptualization and implementation of sustainable livelihoods,
which is the integration of capability, equity and sustainability. Their primary focus was on the rural
populations in developing nations. For them sustainability falls under two groups—environmentally
in its effects on local and global resources and socially whether it can cope with shocks and stress
and still retain the capability to continue and improve. Chambers and Conway’s (1992: 6) paper
has become foundational in livelihoods studies. They defined livelihoods as:
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social
resources) and activities for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can
cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities
and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.
Chambers and Conway’s was a much broader framing of livelihoods that encompassed varied
concerns. In the 1990s, this idea of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ gained salience particularly with DfID,
the UK Department for International Development Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF).
Drawing on the work of Chambers and Conway (1992), DfID defines “livelihood” as comprising
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“the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living”. Care International defines
livelihoods as the way people access resources, what gets in the way of access, how resources are
used to build assets and crucially how assets reduce people’s vulnerability to poverty and disasters.
Therefore, the RFs in BTAD with all its resources ranging from land to trees seem to be playing a
key role in livelihood opportunities.
Nonetheless, as I hinted at above, the dominant livelihoods scholarship and approaches have
largely been narrow and economistic in focus (Scoones 2009; Carr 2015). This is also apparent
in Chambers and Conway’s (1991) emphases on availability of security for rural communities,
especially since assets (economic) are vulnerable, grains and homes can be set on fire (during
conflict) or lost in floods, and claims may be lost post the death of the head of the household. This
is indicative of how sustainable livelihood practices have to transcend above economistic goals
of wage generation, savings and wealth creation, especially on the fact of environmental disasters
like floods, erosion and earthquakes and political events like conflicts and evictions (in the context
of the RF). Carr points out that this distinctive focus on capitals in the sustainable livelihoods
approach presumes an economizing logic, which adheres to the idea that “livelihoods are principally
about the maintenance and improvement of the material conditions of life.” (Carr 2013: 80).
Conversely, a political ecological and not merely economical understanding of livelihoods helps us
envision livelihoods in a more holistic way moving beyond the narrow econocentrism of traditional
livelihoods frameworks and approaches. Carr (2015: 332) explains political ecology and livelihoods
studies as “natural partners” – as both must take into account the local environmental/agricultural
decision-making processes within the broader/extra-local, political, social, economic practices and
discourses and pay due attention to questions of power as well as biophysical nature. Bebbington
(1999), for example, has noted how assets are not merely means of living for people, but they
also give meaning to people’s life. Carr (2013: 103) further adds that this framing of livelihoods
“urges us to engage with the complex, differentiated desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs held
by different actors who come together in the projects of rule we call livelihoods strategies”. In a
similar vein, for Bebbington, livelihood is much more than the material conditions for mere survival.
Scholars engaged in the political ecological analysis of livelihoods have posited livelihoods within
the conceptual frameworks of “capabilities”11 (Bebbington 1999), “environmental entitlements”
(Leach et al. 1997; cf. Sen 1984; Dreze and Sen 1989), “spatiality” of livelihoods (King 2011), and
the broad concerns of environmental conservation (Batterbury 2001; Bebbington and Batterbury
2001; De Haan and Zoomers 2005; Goldman 2011; McCusker and Carr 2006).
11 The word capability was used by the development economistAmartya Sen (1984,1987; Dreze and Sen 1989) referring
to the ability to perform certain basic functioning in relation to what a person is capable of doing and being. It
includes, among other things, to be adequately nourished, avoid escapable morbidity, to lead a life without shame
and to keep a track of what is going on).
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My examination of the various forms and ways of what would constitute as precarious livelihoods
within the RFs, given the prevalence of unequal rights in terms of access to forest resources,
recurring episodes of conflict resulting in loss of lives and possessions, natural disasters like floods
and destruction of homes and crops owing to attacks from wild animals like elephants, draws on
these political ecological approaches. It brings together the questions of scale, power, authority
and role of natural (forest) resources in rural livelihoods. The access to resources and opportunities
within the RFs is differential in nature and is decided by several factors as, belonging to a certain
ethnic group (for example Bodos and Muslims seem to have an upper hand in the timber trade as
compared to Adivasis), ways of negotiating and deliberating with forest officials (as highlighted
in the third article on ways in which Adivasi populations construct temporary forms of housing
and prefer going deeper into the forest to hide from the gaze of the state), social and economic
networks within the RFs (the whole process of encroaching land through brokers), patronage and
clientelistic forms of political accommodation as witnessed in times of elections, among others.
Involvement in the timber trade, farming on forestland and resisting evictions is not mere survival
rather a way of life and the connection with the RFs is intimate rather than just material. Therefore,
the rural populations are far from being mere subjects to the violent power struggle and exercise
agency (again not rooted in material forms of income) by opposing, coping with and overcoming
environmental and political distresses.
At this juncture I would also like to clarify what I mean by agency in this specific context as I
have taken the liberty of ascribing agency to my interlocutors and the local population living in an
environment characterized by precarity and uncertainty. Agency here is more in line with Veena
Das’s usage of the term in her book Life and Words (2007). Das talks about how our theoretical
impulse “is often to think of agency in terms of escaping the ordinary rather than as a descent into
it” (2007:7).
This picture of descending into the minutiae of the everyday and finding resources for survival
enables us, as Cavell notes in his foreword to Life and Words, to observe how “life…knit(s) itself
back into some viable rhythm pair by pair” (2007:xiv). Therefore, I view exercising of agency as a
descend into the minutiae of the everyday and finding resources for survival either through everyday
forms of negotiations with the state (the way communities continue to encroach and negotiate with
the different state actors), fending for livelihoods opportunities through engaging in the timber trade
or participating in democratic processes and forms of collective action which I enumerate in chapter
three. Agency therein contains the ability to not just endure and survive but also in making everyday
decisions on the face of extreme economic and political crisis. Within this thesis I limit agency to its
human form and do not take into consideration agency of the nonhuman and its co-constitutiveness
with the contingent category of the human. The quality of bodily or human agency is expressed
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through awareness, mobility and liveness.
Additionally, at the heart of (il)legal and (in)formal livelihood practices and approaches lie the
incidences of recurring conflict, displacement and resettlement, factors that topple this notion of
livelihoods being sustainable. Rural livelihoods in these contexts remain highly vulnerable and
uncertain owing to the larger turbulent political landscape of the region. However, Bebbington
(1999) is right in cautioning us against focusing too narrowly on just natural resources and agriculture
in rural livelihoods studies, since rural livelihoods need to diversify, especially when faced with fast
and unpredictable depletion of natural resources. Tania Li (2011: 295) made a similar observation in
noting that instead of wanting to stick to their “locally oriented production on small family farms”,
rural populations actually like to escape such livelihoods in favor of new forms of livelihoods and
labor regimes. I agree with the above authors that in the quest to lean towards a more political
‘ecological’ framing of livelihoods, rural livelihoods should not be essentialized as natural resources
centric. However, as my study in the RF and other protected forest areas of BTAD revealed, the
absence of alternative resources, and due to the growing phenomenon of what Li (2011: 281), in
a different context, calls the “educated unemployed,” rural livelihoods in the BTAD continue to
be heavily dependent on natural resources extracted from the forest. However, recurring violent
conflict and displacement coupled with adverse environmental factors and differential access to
land and other forest resources has caused much distress to the livelihood systems.
With this discussion, I hoped to have advanced and contributed to the critical debate in rural
livelihoods, often submerged in precarious forms of existence.
1.8 The Notion of ‘Everyday’ and Northeast Indian Studies
So far I have focused on the theoretical debates this PhD engaged with and seeks to advance
on. Yet another concept that I have dealt with in this PhD thesis is the notion of everyday and
how that operates in the RF within a context of recurring conflict, suffering and displacement.
Expanding on this notion of everyday and/or ordinary through the lens of lived-experiences of
conflict in my fifth and final article, I aim to bring the material, political and social realities of
everyday-life in these fragile spaces. This assumes further significance since for scholars within
the Agambenian (explained below) trajectory especially within the framework of Northeast Indian
studies, the question of survival beyond emergency and the move beyond incapacitation is often
equated with the notion of (spectacular) bodily resistance. This analysis more often than not also
tends to dwell on some major and iconic points of reference—the killing of Thangjam Manorama
resulting in the subsequent “naked protest” by the Manipuri Imas and the (now suspended) hunger
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strike by Sharmila Irom.12 I situate the notion of everyday in the face of such forms of spectacular
bodily resistance to show that this is not the only way in which survival can be imagined. My idea
has been to capture the uneventful as the locus of survival, which becomes the everyday. My goal
here has been to operationalize everyday through the examination of how ordinary lives unfold
under a specific set of conditions (violent or not) that eventually normalizes or neutralizes uneven
and enforced forms of legality. A case in point is the eviction of forest dwellers in the RF. The notion
of everyday encompasses within it the recognition of violence as a ubiquitous way of interaction for
economic and political negotiations. This notion of everyday, aids in slowing down the vertiginous
and oftentimes incapacitating scale of the rushed encounters with forms of terror and physical
violence.
I shall now steer the discussion towards the specific contribution this thesis makes to the broader
field of Northeast Indian studies.
As can be gathered from the discussion until now, rather than focusing directly on the causes
and affects of the recurring episodes of ethnic violence, I have shifted my gaze to understand the
local physical environment in which the conflict occurs and the social, political and economic
processes that operate within the realms of everyday spaces. I have also taken into account the
demographic heterogeneity and studied how the various actors (state and non-state) are embedded
within these processes. The actors, particularly those who continue to suffer through and from the
effects of recurring conflict assume extreme significance in the way they exercise agency and decent
into and navigate through the quotidian, the mundane and the ordinary transcending the domains
of the symbolic and the spectacular choreographies of violence and death. In the overt emphasis
on deciphering the causes of violence and the conceptualization of such spaces as exceptional or
spectacular, what gets lost in the process is the minutiae of the everyday and a contention with
ordinariness, as has been found in the works of Veena Das 2008; Linda Green 2010; Daniel 1996;
Vigh 2008; Finnstrom 2008.
Therefore, when it comes to situating this study within the larger body of scholarly work on
northeast India, an underlying concern has been to interrogate the theoretical limitations of the
Agambenian framing of the region as a zone or “state of exception” or “bare life”13 through a
12The naked protest was conducted by a group of elderly women collectively named Imas (mothers) in front of the
Indian army cantonment to protest the rape and murder of Thangjam Manorama. Sharmila Irom ended her 16-year
long hunger strike against the AFSPA in August 2016. For discussions of Irom’s hunger strike, see Mehrotra 2009;
Bhonsle 2016. For readings of the naked protest see Papori Bora 2012; and Vajpeyi 2009.
13 Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, urges a reconsideration of theories of sovereignty
as put forward ‘from Hobbes to Rousseau’ (1998: 109). The theory of sovereign power offered by the book is based
on the state of exception (drawn from Carl Schmitt who established the contiguity between the state of exception
and sovereignty by defining the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception”, in Political Theology 1922)
and the production of a bare, human life caught in the sovereign ban, which constitutes the threshold of the political
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consideration of the categories of the everyday, the ordinary, survival and endurance. As Duncan
McDuie-Ra writes referring mainly to the prevalence of the AFSPA, “The Northeast is exceptional
and the rest of India is normal” (McDuie-Ra 2009,262). He further adds that this binary is bridged
through events in which particular individuals migrate to the rest of India to live and work, and
vice versa, as well as through networks like that of women’s organizations, environmentalists and
human rights activists. “Yet in the majority of interactions this binary is constant” (McDuie-Ra
2009: 262). Besides, scholars like Sanjib Baruah has also identified AFSPA in the northeast of India
as a permanent regime of exception to the law that is supposed to be the default all across the Indian
Union (Baruah 2007). This rubric of exceptionality is what Vajpayee (2009) accustoms to think
about the northeast and Jammu and Kashmir. Singh however argues that exceptional contexts only
gain impetus when placed beside normal contexts, and thus “the normal…stands outside and parallel
to the exception, and yet is integrally related to it …the exception cannot have any meaning unless
there is a normal situation that offsets it” (2007: 19). In fact McDuie-Ra also makes a digression on
his theory of exceptionalism in the case of northeast in his book Northeast Migrants in Delhi: Race,
Refuge and Retail by critiquing the predominance of “greed and grievance” scholarship on this
region and argues that academic and policy studies on the “Northeast tend to focus on the causes of
violence rather than its effects on everyday life” (McDuie-Ra 2013: 17).
In the final article of this dissertation using a phenomenology of lived experience framework,
this underlying concern surfaces, as I pay closer attention to the distinctly ordinary ways through
which populations survive and endure states of dispossession, displacement and abandonment. As
ethnographies of war torn societies demonstrate, life under conditions in which violence is naturalized
is marked by a form of collective nervousness, embodied fear or ontological insecurity that permeates
every sphere of society (see Feldman 1991;Aretxaga 1997). Violence then is understood as producing
its own social order within which everyday forms of social, economic and political processes are
embedded.
I have used the notion of everyday in two senses in the second and fifth article, respectively,
which do overlap. It is used as a rupture in the life worlds caused by the extreme anxieties of the
terrifying event(s), and as a more dispersed, diffused and mundane form where the event and the
quotidian cannot be separated clearly (this is more apparent in the case of forest encroachers and
their everyday forms of (informal) negotiations with the state). Veena Das (2012) in this context,
entreaties for a closer attention to localized narrative formations of existence and belief that in
the immediate surroundings, and that persist and provide resources for the remaking of worlds.
Therefore, what I show through this PhD is that one does not necessarily have to abjure the exception
community.
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to reach the everyday rather I push my case towards rethinking and reimagining the quotidian within
states of emergency.
If Political Ecology as a discipline seeks to study the relationships between nature and society
within a context of violent conflict, then this framework would have to include within it those
societal actors who endure and survive through conflict and what constitutes their everyday forms
of survival and coping. This echoes with what Jonathan Spencer (2003: 12) writes, “those who live
in the war zone both adapt themselves to the social and spatial contexts, and transform space to suit
their own needs and practices”, I have shown these processes in the context of the RF and how it
emerges as a space of conflict, competition, suffering, encroachment and livelihood generation. Of
course there are limitations to adaptation in such precarious space and it is often determined by as
far as the geography of risk and uncertainty allows the populations to do so. This further resonates
with Benedikt Korf’s writing in the context of Sri Lankan civil war (Korf 2014). He notes that in
contrast to a widespread perception, civilian life does not cease in war-affected areas. In fact wars
and/or violent conflict do not create a vacuum — rather the local population has to devise ways of
surviving and coping in the context of a dramatic increase in risk and uncertainty, political instability,
violence and economic decline. Moreover, in this thesis I have tried to go beyond the framing of
resistance both in its spectacular bodily forms as well as collective forms of action (I have illustrated
this in my third and fifth articles respectively) My focus rather has been on resistance through which
one transcends the everyday, since the more physical and collective forms are not the only form
through which survival can be encountered or imagined. As Veena Das writes in Life and Words
(2006, 7) about how our theoretical impetus, “is often to think of agency in terms of escaping the
ordinary rather than as a descent into it”. Finally, in the zeal to qualify the exceptional, Northeast
Indian studies have often lost sight of the quotidian. Focusing on material practices and discursive
constructions of the ordinary in the spectacular, I view this thesis as some sort of a course-correction.
1.9 Organization of the PhD Thesis
As should be clear by now, this PhD is a collection of five separate articles, of which some have
been published, others are forthcoming or have been submitted to a journal and are currently under
review. At the beginning of each article, I furnish the requisite background information and the
details of the original publication. I decided to regard the formats in which I published or submitted
the articles. Therefore, in terms of style, some are written in American English, while others keep
the British spelling.
Below I provide a brief summary of each of the articles.
Part I comprises of one article, which sets the tone of this PhD by providing the socio-political
context and also describing the research site. Using the Lok Sabha or the national Parliamentary
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elections of 2014 as a nodal point, in this article I explain how ‘contentious politics’ unfurled by
means of collective political action by non-Bodos and had an impact in BTAD. The mobilization and
political realignments that took place are indicative of a larger discourse about identity and ethnic
politics in BTAD that coincides with a history of ethno-social, cultural and political subjugation
faced by the non-Bodo community against a background of questionable policies, including ethnic
delimitation and arbitrary appeasements that resulted in the drawing of boundaries along ethnic
and religious lines. I further argue that it is the politicization of identity, mistrust and long-term
grievances that led to the political mobilization of the non-Bodo population. I also examine the
intimate association between electoral politics and the production of collective ethnic identities. The
central idea of this article is to provide an understanding of the intricacies of the 2014 parliamentary
elections by focusing on the shift in ethno-political alliances, the mobilization of non-Bodos, ethnic
competition, and co-operation for political gains.
Part II consists of three articles. In the second article along with Bert Suykens, we interrogate
the ways in which state, rebel, and non-armed actors integrate in the timber extraction network. We
further argue that the multiple authority structures are not integrating on a level-playing field and
there are important limits to the negotiated character of their interactions. Their individual capacity
for violence—what some might consider their de facto sovereign qualities —and connection to a
greatly disaggregated state, as well as the spatial logic of the timber extraction chain itself allows
different forms of authority to claim differentiated access to rents. We also underline the manner in
which an ethnically differentiated labor force has been integrated into the illegal timber economy. We
illustrate the way in which multiple ethnic groups (Bodo, Adivasi, Bengali Muslim), who are in the
larger narrative of the conflict considered at odds with each other, are deployed in the illegal timber
economy. While this points toward inter-ethnic collaboration across conflict lines in order to make
trees into marketable hardwood product, our case does not corroborate liberal peace assumptions
about potential transformations of economic collaboration into political appeasement. Not only is
the deployment of labor spatially divided, the relations of exchange in the labor chain are highly
unequal, mediated as they are by violence and political and social exclusion. While focusing on an
illegal timber economy, we also seek to emphasize on the functioning of the authority structure or
“constellation of power” in BTAD and the way populations relate to it in a combination of coercion
(power) and consent (authority).
Using the politics of dokhol (“to grab or occupy by force”) as an entry point, in the third article,
I examine the comparative epistemologies of squatting and informality in urban and rural contexts.
My intent is to unpack the everyday practice, maintenance, and sustenance of dokhol within the
RF of BTAD. This entails an extension of existing scholarship on formal-informal dichotomies in
relation to rural squatters, in particular those on forestland. I do so by combining an ethnographic
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study of dokhol by rural squatters with three influential strands of critical scholarship on urban
squatting, namely Partha Chatterjee’s “political society,” Asaf Bayat’s “quiet encroachment,” and
Ananya Roy’s take on planning and deregulation. I conclude the article by advancing the case of
rural informalities and call for a dialogue between the two forms of informalities – rural and urban,
especially in the context of South Asia.
In the fourth article, I draw on the Ecological Task Force (ETF) of the Indian Army, more
specifically the 135 Battalion of the Territorial Army posted in Kokrajhar district. By expanding
on existing conceptual and theoretical views on ‘green militarization’ and ‘violent environments’
in the context of poaching and national parks within the critical conservation literature, I apply
it to the RF in the BTAD. I explain how the politics that surround conservation in these RFs is
immersed within a context of ethno-religious conflict. I further recourse to regional environmental
history, to analyze how ethno-religious conflict influences modes of conservation exemplified by
continuing inter-institutional competition between the forest department and the ETF. Drawing
from the emerging literature on the nexus between conservation and counter-insurgency, I argue
that in fragile and violent political contexts like the RF in BTAD, counter-insurgency prevails
over conservation. Additionally, I highlight that despite ETF’s efforts to buffer from local politics,
incidents of a political nature seep into its operations, e.g. ambushed by militants during conservation
activities.
Part III consists of the fifth article, where I propose a phenomenological inquiry into the lived
experiences of those living through these chronic crisis contexts in the BTAD. Such an exploration
feeds into the need for what I term an intimate ethnography of the region and of those who have
suffered – my interlocutors, especially since the past decade forms of non-traditional and humanistic
ethnography with a goal of reaching out has been gaining momentum in anthropology. Drawing
on two empirical cases – the first being a post conflict relief camp at the immediate aftermath of
conflict in 2014 and the second being a village that I visited two years after the violence of 2012. I
show how these sites reveal, within the immediate context of a temporary relief camp, the abject loss
and magnitude of suffering is visible through imageries of physical destruction of property, bullet
injuries on bodies and extreme emotions either through hysterical outburst or haunting silences.
Whereas within the gradual context of a village, two years after the episode of conflict it is the
memories that begin to take shape and everyday chores are exercised with caution and imposition of
restricted mobility in social interactions. Although the material culture of violence lingers, physical
violence ceases to be the centrifugal part of life, at least temporarily. The ongoing conflict here is
comprehended as an embodied accommodation of imminent and ever-present danger.
In the concluding chapter, I bring together and expand on the arguments presented in the different
articles included in this PhD thesis to transcend the more narrow geographic and thematic focus. I
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cluster the concluding remarks into three leading scholarly and socio-political debates each closely
intertwined with the research framework as outlined in this introductory chapter — the first remark
relates to the discussion on political ecology of extraction and encroachment in an area of conflict;
the second debate draws from and relates to the notion of conservation on war footing by national
armed forces in actual areas of conflict and the final point of the conclusion carries forward the
notion of everyday and the ordinary. Additionally I also provide three avenues for further research
pertaining to borderlands, post-colonial democracy and gender.
Before turning to the five articles, in the next chapter I explain the methodological framework
of this PhD by outlining the various research methods and approaches I used while conducting
fieldwork at various scales. As the research for this PhD is based on a reflexive epistemology and
relational ontology, I also reflect on the multiple challenges of ethnographic (field) research, and
my own positionality within ‘the field’ and the overall research project.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Personal Intimacies of Conflict in the Everyday — Field Notes from
Beyond the Chicken’s Neck
Vignette I
It was a late afternoon in the middle of May in 2016, humid yet pleasant, because it had been raining
heavily. I was sitting with my friend J, after a day of fieldwork, in the canteen of an engineering
college in the outskirts of Kokrajhar town. J is a Bodo and grew up in Udalguri district in BTAD
at the height of the Bodoland movement from 1980s till 2003. After studying in Pondicherry and
Mumbai, he returned to his homeland, in Kokrajhar to work as a professor. This canteen is run by a
group of local Bodo women. We sat there, chatting leisurely. As usual we discussed the political
situation of the town and the upcoming elections to the Assam State Assembly and the possibility
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coming to power in the state and its alliance with the local
Bodoland People’s Party (BPF). J, being the chief hostel warden of the men’s hostel, he always has
a lot of stories to narrate like the ongoing student strike at the engineering college, and how the
blue whale game had found it’s way into the campus (one of the students was found with a tattoo
of a whale on his arms). As we continued speaking, suddenly we heard a really loud noise, which
interrupted our conversation. It startled us all for a few moments and then as the activities at the
canteen resumed, I turned to J and asked, “what do you think that was?’, J who is usually calm and
unperturbed by such incidents said in his characteristic humorous tone, “Look, this is Bodoland.
When you hear a noise here it can only be two things— a bomb blast or an earthquake…” and we
both broke into laughter.
That is when I recalled a related incident, which happened a year ago, at a local market next to the
engineering college, which centered on the possibility of an actual explosion. During my fieldwork
I usually alternate between staying with my host family in Kokrajhar town and the guesthouse of
the engineering college. Last year during my research visit, I was staying at the latter place and I
was taking a break from field visits to do some writing. I suddenly got a call from J, asking whether
I was at the market and he was relieved to know that I was not at the site where a few minutes ago,
two men on a motorbike threw a hand-made grenade into a shop and sped away. The shopkeeper
not knowing what to do picked it up and threw it into a neighboring shop. Subsequently, it was
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kicked out onto the main road. It was then that the police intervened and the bomb squad carried it
away to be detonated later. After a few hours, I heard a loud explosion and over dinner, J told me
that it was the bomb being defused.
Vignette II
In February 2015, during the early days of my fieldwork, after a long day at the reserved forest in
Saralpara (RF), my research assistant, R, a local Bodo person recommended we go to this famous
joint called Hanuman Mistanna Bhandar or HMB for the best chai (tea) and singara (samosa) in
town. HMB is situated in the main town square of Kokrajhar, across the road from the local police
station. It is a family owned business and managed by twoMarwari1 brothers. We went in and R
ordered for special chai and samosas. As I was sipping my tea, R revealed to me that the owner of
HMB was shot dead at point blank range on a busy afternoon, by suspected NDFB militants a few
years ago.
Vignette III
Muslim Student Leader Lafiqul IslamAhmed Shot Dead in Assam
Kokrajhar, Assam: Lafiqul Islam Ahmed, a well-known minority students’ leader
in Assam, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen on August 1 in the violence-torn
Kokrajhar district. Ahmed, 30, was the president of All Bodoland Minority Students’
Union (ABMSU), a powerful students’ body in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts
(BTAD)” (The Wire 2017).
This is how events unfolded before me when I arrived for my final round of fieldwork in August
2017. Lafiqul was one of my interlocutors who helped me connect with several other local politicians
and student leaders. We were regularly in touch on social media and had written to each other only
a week before he was brutally killed. We had planned to meet each other again in a couple of weeks
for lunch at his home.
2.2 The Landscape and I: Context and Description of the Setting
I want to start with a confession: my research is the product of circumstance, of serendipity and
co-incidence, of contingency, of interpretations and being interpreted (Wilkinson 2008:47).
The vignettes above trace the trajectory of my fieldwork over the years where episodes of violence,
instability and terror are embedded in the everyday social and political structures. During the course
1 An ethnic minority community living in BTAD. They are not STs.
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of my ethnographic fieldwork, a total of twelve months, spanning from May 2014 to October 2017,
BTAD witnessed two episodes of (large-scale) violence on ethno-religious lines, two incidents of
massive flooding and occasional earthquakes. The physical and psychological scars and destruction
of infrastructure and lives were ever visible on the landscape. Thus, my fieldwork, which was geared
towards understanding of the conflict landscape of BTAD, was timely to say the least. Moreover
when one lives, works and researches a conflict setting, such stories and sites are all too common,
and I could have been able to draw similar ones from Kashmir, naxal affected areas of Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh andWest Bengal in the Indian context and during the civil war in Nepal or the LTTEwar
in Sri Lanka in the larger South Asian context. As Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius Robben (1995)
note, in what is one of the most significant edited volumes on conducting ethnography in conflict
contexts: Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Stories of Violence and Survival, these incidents
or stories evoke everyday experiences of violence in its myriad manifestations, in the context of
northeast India and BTAD, ranging from rape to (sometimes violent) contestations surrounding
rumors of violence, from moral dimensions of conflict to incidents of tragic brutalities. My focus in
this PhD thesis has been this experiential dimension of conflict; the ways and strategies people use
to live their lives in contexts marked by inescapable forms of violence.
As discussed in the introduction, I locate my PhD dissertation at the intersection of critical
approaches to conflict studies, political ecology of extraction and livelihoods within additional
layers of legal geography and notions of the everyday. In this methodology chapter, I begin by
discussing the methodological framework that is based on insights from this literature. Thereafter, I
draw on the larger corpus of anthropological work on conflict ethnography and the ethical challenges
such research posits. I situate this further within the insider-outsider debate while critically reflecting
on conducting field research in a conflict area not too far from ‘home’ and my positionality as a
researcher ‘in the field’ and in the overall research project.
It is worth mentioning that in this period of twelve months, I conducted fieldwork across Kokrajhar
district mainly focusing on the villages inside the RF of Chirang-Riphu and Ultapaani (see map)
as well as several temporary relief camps set up both inside and outside the RFs after the clashes
between Bodos and Muslims in May 2014 and Bodos and Adivasis in December 2014. Beside the
RFs, Misalmaari2, a Muslim village, about twenty kilometers from Kokrajhar town, where five
persons were killed and the entire village was charred to ashes during an episode of conflict in
2012 between the Bodos and Muslims, was also my fieldwork site. Working in a highly ethnically
segregated society like the BTAD, requires that I take into account the narratives that cut across and
through ethnic lines. This made my ethnographic approach multi-sited, largely because my focus
2 All names, including names of villages and people are pseudonyms (with the exception of Kokrajhar and the forest
ranges)
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is as much on a geographical place as on people who are from different ethnic groups. Especially
since villages and post conflict relief camps in BTAD are highly segregated on ethnic lines.
Marcus (1998) argues that it is generally a method of data collection that follows a topic or a
social problem through different field sites geographically and/or socially. Multi-sited ethnography
allows researchers to embrace multiplicity of perceptions involved within a specific idea or process.
He further notes that multi-sited ethnography provides a more complex understanding of a topic
since it allows a researcher to trace populations, ideas, and material objects through time and space.
Important to this discussion is the very notion of the field itself, which James Ferguson and Akhil
Gupta (1997) strove to scrutinize, problematize and reflect on in their collection of essays called
Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science. One of the major reasons
that resulted in this deliberation leaped out of the concern “about the lack of fit between the problems
raised by a mobile, changing, globalizing world, on the one hand, and the resources provided by a
method originally developed for studying supposedly small-scale societies, on the other’ (ibid. 1997:
3). These discussions had begun to surface in anthropological circles for some time and needed
to be addressed. In the collection of essays, some of the authors investigate how “the field” itself
became part of the commonsense and professional practice of anthropology, and they look at this
development “in the contexts both of wider social and political developments and of the academy’s
micro politics” (ibid.: 4). Some others, whose own work stretches the conventional boundaries of
what had so far been constituted as fieldwork, reflected on how the idea of the field has bounded
and normalized the practice of anthropology by enabling certain kinds of knowledge while blocking
off others and on a similar vein authorizing some objects of study and methods of analysis while
being exclusionary of others. The purpose of this monumental volume was to interrogate the idea
of ‘the field’ and critically reflect on how it helps to “define and patrol the boundaries of what is
often knowingly referred to as ‘real anthropology”’ (ibid. 1997: 6).
My desire to accomplish the above, resulted in choosing my interlocutors not only across ethnic
groups but also those belonging to different social, economic and political classes and statures within
those groups, i.e. ranging from those living in relief camps in extreme poverty to local political
leaders dwelling in mansion like houses. I also supplemented these interviews by speaking with
academics and policy experts on the region who resided outside of the BTAD in Guwahati and New
Delhi.
I mentioned my ethnography as multi-sited. I should clarify that sites in this case are not
always places but also positions. To comprehend differential perspectives on the issue of violent
conflict, extraction and gauge the notion of everyday, I chose diverse fields and positions of people.
Conducting fieldwork with the three major ethnic groups in the BTAD soon revealed that contrary
to media reporting and academic analysis, it is not all Bodos who have gained both politically and
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socially in stature after the creation of the BTAD. Moreover it was not a set of clearly defined
opposing principles or issues that governed the assumed dominant notion of Bodos annihilating
non-Bodos in the region. The majority of the Bodos have also been victims to episodes of violent
clashes with retaliation by the Muslims and Adivasis. Of course, one can always argue in terms
of the degree and scale of suffering based on the number of lives lost, villages burnt and people
displaced from these various ethnic groups. In which case, the Adivasis come off as one of the
most vulnerable groups within this conflict, as opposed to their Bodo and Muslim counterparts.
Therefore, my attempt throughout this ethnography has been to be as neutral as possible in order to
present a nuanced and realistic picture of this complex landscape.
2.3 Weaving Ethnography — Political Ecology and Conflict Studies in a
Fragile Context
The discipline of conflict studies, in particular the stream focusing on the political economy of
‘violent conflict’ (Cramer 2002, 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Richards 2006; Korf 2004) and the political
ecology literature focusing on the political economy of conservation encompassing within it the
discussions on ‘resource wars’, are arenas to which both fields of inquiry form similar critiques
(Le Billon 2001; Peluso and Watts 2001; Cramer 2006; Cuvelier et al. 2014). The larger body of
literature around what has come to be known as ‘resource wars’ exists out of two main ‘hypotheses’.
The first, spearheaded by Paul Collier, is the idea that ‘greed’ drives violent conflict, arguing
specifically that (potential) rebels are driven by greed. Easily exploitable and abundant resources
present a ‘window of opportunity’ to start looting them through the barrel of a gun (Collier 2000).
The second hypothesis proposed by Hommer-Dixon (1999) notes that on the contrary, it is not
abundance rather scarcity that initiates conflict. This proposition goes beyond the notion of greed
to argue that scarcity compels people to fight for ‘their piece of the cake’. Focusing especially
on renewable resources such as arable farmland, it is understood from a Malthusian standpoint
that when populations are expanding, pressure on these resources invariably intensifies, leading
to aggravation of tensions among and within the population, explaining the eventual outbreak of
violence (Hommer-Dixon 1999). While these two notions of ‘resource wars’ differ considerably,
they are both grounded on economic and rational logic of reasoning. Nevertheless, both notions
have been subject to severe criticism by both the scholars of conflict studies and political ecology,
who outright reject this framing of emergence of violent conflict through a rational choice approach
and economical rationalization.
According to Cramer (2002), Collier’s greed thesis is based on rather thin data generated by
establishing proxy indicators for greed and grievances. This clearly negates the role and existence
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of social and political grievances as motivations of (future) violence by rebels. Moreover, Collier
and Hoeffler only consider “objective grievances” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 570). However, from
an ontological perspective it is clear that social problems cannot be adequately mirrored through
raw quantitative data, rather has to be estimated by qualitative research and ethnographic methods.
Especially Collier and Hoeffler’s cross-country study approach can be seen as the very reason, why
their grievance proxies do not show any significance.
Political ecology thus also focuses on the relation between natural resources (management)
and violent conflict, and advanced approaches that go beyond the idea of the resource ‘curse’.
Consequently, political ecology emphasizes on “the means by which control and access of resources
and property rights are defined, negotiated and contested within the political arenas of the household,
the workplace, and the state” (Peet andWatts 1996: 239). Contrary to the rational choice approach to
analyzing conflict, scholars of political ecology and conflict studies use a more situational approach
guided more by social, political and cultural factors focusing on the entrenchment of multiple actors
within the political economy of war (Korf 2004; Peluso andWatts 2001). Having said this, given the
multi-disciplinary approach of political ecology as a field, what it does not do is resort to a purely
ethnographic approach towards field research. In the process of engaging and investigating the
roles of the multiple actors embedded in differential forms of power relations, political ecological
approaches tend to ignore the notions of everyday that are an integral process of these relationships
especially in a conflict setting.
In the context of this thesis which studies the RFs and the populations inhabiting it in all its
manifestations and forms of power relations, the expansion of a political ecological framework that
encompasses within it the relational aspects of law and space as formulated within legal geography
assumes momentousness. In keeping with this view, as Bennett and Layard (2015) note, ethnography
is one of legal geography’s most favored methodologies. Such an approach within legal geography
is used to depict how analysis working in that vein builds up a site and situation’s story working
upward and outward from the local, moving towards more abstract shaping forces and delineating
their actual localized effects. Such site-focused ethnographically inclined studies especially in the
contexts of political forests also often adhere attention to the materiality of law, exhibiting how its
existence is contained not just within inanimate objects (documents, buildings, street layouts and
signs, habitats and creatures) but also people residing on these sites, and beyond.
I have made an attempt to root my methods within critical conflict studies, which in my case
relates to working an unstable and highly volatile political situation characterized by a “precarious
security of most residents, the general unpredictability of the events and the traumatization through
violence of combatants and civilians” (Wood 2006: 373). While, carrying out ethnography in
exotic contexts may be deemed as having a holiday of sorts (Vandekerckhove 2010), in violent
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political landscapes the reality is quite different. Even one of the basic techniques of ethnography
like simply hanging around with the locals—which is a popular misconception about ethnography
to begin with—is also a challenging task. Therefore, as an ethnographer to make sense of such a
complex situation, which the violence unfurls, given the fact that “violence itself is confusing and
inconclusive”(Nordstrom and Robben 1995: 3), is even more daunting. The emotional intensity of
these events and the people who are being studied coupled with the arbitrariness of the circumstances
under which fieldwork is conducted, entwines ethnography and fieldwork (Nordstrom 1997). This
relates to Michael Taussig’s (1987) notion of violence as being slippery and that, which escapes an
easy definition and yet enters the most fundamental features of people’s lives. Given this messy
base associated in defining what constitutes violence, scholars studying conflict like Nordstrom and
Robben (1995), or Feldman (1991) have refused to provide any overarching theory of violence. As
Nordstrom and Robben (1995) note violence is an intricately layered phenomenon with each victim,
participant and perpetrator bringing in their own perspective. For Feldman (1991), theory emerges
from experience.
The researcher has to navigate amongst the numerous realities she is presented with ranging from
the political reality consisting of doctrines and deeds as well as behind closed doors maneuverings
of entrepreneurs of power and conflict; the military reality which could consist of strategies and
tactics of soldiers and police personnel. Then there are intellectual realities forged in cafes and halls
of academia as well as the policy and journalistic domain of natter and tales from the frontline. Also
present is the psychological reality of fear, terror and uncertainty among the Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs). Finally, there exists the reality of life within these volatile contexts consisting of
stories of casualties and the varied actors involved within this landscape of terror.
For most scholars working on situations of war and violent conflict, like Green (1999), Feldman
(1991), Nordstrom (1997), Sluka (1995) the most pressing reality amongst those stated above is
ethnography of sociopolitical violence centered on civilian populations, social processes and cultural
life. Conducting fieldwork in such spheres invariably necessitates the assurance of full anonymity
of interlocutors, the creation of pseudonyms for places and persons and careful storage of field
notes are standard practices for the ethnographer, to avoid additional security risks for all parties
involved. However, it is often the social and political circumstances in the ground to go beyond the
traditional ideas in ethnographic research. While a political ethnography of conflict requires one “to
look microscopically at the foundations of political institutions and their attendant set of practices”
(Auyero 2006: 258), in some situations due to frequent spurts of violence, renders an empirical
study that embraces, “close association with, and often participation in this setting”, unfeasible. For
example, in her work A Different Kind of War Story, Nordstrom (1997: 78), concedes to shift her
initial focus from ethnography of place to one that embraces topic and process in order to keep
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up with the rapidly altering political context. As regard to my own fieldwork, the fragile political
context along with natural disasters like flood in western Assam shaped my research choices and
design in several ways, which I discuss below. Such a methodological approach is what I applied
during my fieldwork, which helped in going beyond the complex nature-society relationship but
also understanding how the various actors navigate through these fragile terrains of uncertainty.
2.4 Living with the Rich while Researching the Poor —
Traversing through Challenging Terrains: the Insider-Outsider
Conundrum
“You might be an Indian citizen with an Indian passport and by that logic, in principle
you could go3 anywhere …. however you could still be picked up and questioned about
your research on the pretext of national security”.
Accessibility always poses as an issue while doing ethnography in remote rural areas (see
Vandekerckhove 2010), yet in tenuous political settings like that of Assam, accessibility has to be
understood in terms of security. First off, I would have liked to live inside these RFs either in a
forest guesthouse or with a host family. However, all the forest guesthouses had been taken over
by the Army and paramilitary and converted into military bases. The attack on Adivasis by the
NDFB rebels in December 2014 led to about fifty causalities including eighteen children and close
to 300,000 Bodos and Adivasis getting displaced. This created an aura of fear and uncertainty all
around and when I visited BTAD in January 2015, the villagers were not comfortable hosting me
especially in these remote rural areas as that posited a threat to both their and my own safety. So, I
ended up being hosted by a friend who ran a local NGO, but that entailed mostly visiting those sites
where this NGO was working and it was difficult to detach myself from the politics therein. After
accepting their hospitality for about a month, I moved into the home of a local Bodo government
officer that was arranged by an acquaintance. When I first arrived, I was startled to find that it was
almost a huge mansion and I was given a whole floor with five bedrooms and three toilets for my
own use. This came with several people working in the house – a cook, a cleaner, someone that did
the washing and several others I saw running chores from time to time. I soon found out that this
was the home of a high-level officer who came from one of the most influential Bodo families in the
region. His brother was a local lawmaker. They were often referred to as the royal family of BTAD.
My host family was extremely kind to me and I tried my best to refrain from having any political
conversations with them. My hosts, who I will refer to as Uncle and Aunty, however seemed a little
3 In conversation with the Major and Colonial of the Indian Army posted in the BTAD, during my fieldwork on 2nd
April 2016
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concerned about my going to interior villages in the RFs, but they soon realized there was not much
he could do to stop me. I was always asked to be careful and at least keep them informed of my
movements and if possible return home latest by twenty-one hours.
I struggled to come to terms with the ethical dilemmas that came with navigating between these
two worlds —one of this affluent lives being led by Bodo elites, where for each meal they had
fish and pork curries, their children were sent out of the state to expensive boarding schools and
each year they travelled abroad for holidays—and that of my interlocutors in the RFs and outside
whose houses had been charred to dust, the relief ration often not arriving on time, their hungry
children whose scars from the conflict were still healing, with no access to water, sanitation or
health facilities. From being extremely grateful for a cup of salted tea without milk in a relief camp
to relishing wild venison meat (which is illegal), a gift from Aunty’s colleague, on the same day
only added fuel to this predicament. Of course, the focus of this PhD is not to understand the place
and relationship of these elites in the society or their experiences of conflict which did not affect
them or their families in any direct manner, but in the process of staying with my host family I did
learn a lot about the lives of Bodo elites and how buffered they tend to be from the externalities of
recurring conflict and suffering. This also goes on to show how only a handful of politicians and
elites in the Bodo society have benefitted from the creation of BTAD and recurring conflict, and
that this does not in any way trickle down to the larger Bodo society.
At this junction I ought to mention that in the discipline of anthropology, from which I liberally
draw throughout the PhD dissertation, has a long history of addressing what we should do when we
research less powerful or subordinate groups. Therefore the literature on studying elites is small
especially in anthropology and most of the work has been done in the discipline of Political Science
(Hughes and Cormode, 1998). Good fieldwork, and production of decent ethnographic texts, should
be embedded in some kind of empathy, or even solidarity, with the groups we study. This is because
these groups are considered to be subaltern in some way (Sampson 2013). The quest for scientific
data should yield to the needs and sensitivity of the groups we study, so in my case, my solidarity
should obviously rest with the vulnerable communities living in the remote rural spaces, while also
being grateful to my elite Uncle andAunty. To use Graeber’s (2011) terminology: we have a debt. In
the course of my interaction with my generous host family, I arrived at two possible ways of dealing
with this – that the ethical obligation which emerges from whether living or working with elites in
the course of fieldwork should not be any different from the standard set of ethics in researching
any other group of people. They should also be treated with empathy and respect and that I make an
attempt to try to understand their world and in the process argue that theirWeltanschauung is in fact
the most pragmatic alternative available to them in the context of the fragile society they live in. The
second approach resonates more with Shurmer-Smith’s (1998) work with the Indian Administrative
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Services (IAS) where she discusses concerns related to the occasional unexpected ways in which she
connected with the elites whose practices she was critically researching. In so doing, she challenged
the notion that it might be less problematical for the ethnographer to critique the powerful than to
generate research on the comparatively powerless. This also feeds into the notion of power, for the
elites have power and the objective of the anthropological project is to reveal, to lay bare how power
operates. That revealing power may conflict with the ethical imperatives of research itself. In my
case, staying with my powerful host family entailed that I was often told about how corrupt my host
Uncle is (or other such details about his family I choose not to revel here) by my local friends and
acquaintances.
The ethics of anthropological fieldwork requires to have a special relationship with research
object (in our case, people in their daily lives), connected to this is the ethics of disseminating
knowledge about how people pursue their agendas. This always presents the risk that these people
with whom the researcher shared a relationship of trust could regard the latter of betraying that trust.
This makes social science, and particularly anthropology that relies on a personal relationship with
informants, vulnerable.
So, in my case I decided to treat my host family with respect and not let their world views get in
the way of my work with those affected by recurring conflict. Staying with an influential family also
came with benefits, like it was much easier for me to have access to other governmental and state
officials. I confess to having exploited my host family’s networks for access to exclusive interviews
or documents that helped my research. Given that my host family was also politically aligned
with a certain local party, during elections it posed to be a problem, especially when I was openly
accused of supporting a particular political party. This is when I decided to move to the guesthouse
of an engineering college, facilitated by my friend J. This was also the time when I needed to be
detached from them. Robben (1995) states that ethnographic understanding through empathy and
detachment has been generally accepted as a common dialectic in fieldwork. Although we should
build a good rapport with the people we study and live with in the process of our fieldwork to grasp
the world from their perspective, a simultaneous reflective detachment as observers is also necessary
to objectify our perceptions and enhance our analytical insight. I should add that I still continue
to share a good relationship with my host family and I am extremely grateful to them for all the
support and in this dissertation I have chosen to not be overtly critical of the way they live and view
those around them. Rather, I use my association with them as an opportunity that was presented
to me to reflect about the intricacies and contradictions of a social process through which I found
myself caught up in practices, which I neither fully perceive, understand, nor control (see Radway
1989). Since, this PhD thesis’s goal is not to study elites, rather engaging with them in the process
of using a snowball sampling technique among other ethnographic methods, I have not employed
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the dominant conceptual tool of ‘studying up’ as that is beyond the focus of this PhD.
2.5 “Why are you going to these Bodo villages? They have weapons in every
house and they burnt our villages and killed our sons” — Research
Site(s), Restrictions on Access and the Everyday
As already mentioned it was important for me to traverse across ethnic lines in order to build trust
and make a space for myself within all the three major ethnic groups. Selection of villages was not
an easy task, especially given the fact that due to recurring episodes of conflict people continued to
move in and out of relief camps. In my second visit to the field in January 2015, right after an episode
of conflict in 2014, the villages I had visited in 2014 had been burnt and the population displaced.
My selection strategy was guided by three factors, namely, ethnic composition, accessibility in terms
of geographical terrain (I was not able to visit certain areas in summer due to floods and erosion) and
incidence of violence. Usually a relief camp was set up with populations from four to five villages
and not all the families returned to their villages at the same time. Tracing my interlocutors from the
relief camp(s) back to the villages was not an easy task. I began by visiting relief camps and villages
on the basis of incidence of violence, i.e. a village that had been witness to at least one episode
of ethnic violence since 1996. I then selected similar villages based on ethnic composition (since
over the years villages have remained ethnically segregated owing to ethnic strife). Eventually I
was able to narrow down to one Muslim village, a Bodo village that I traced from the relief camp
to when they were back in their original village and an Adivasi relief camp that I visited several
times in 2015 and 2016, and later followed a few families from the camp to back to their villages
which was nearby. So, this selection was in no way linear processes and necessitated a lot of back
and forth on my part. However, by my third visit to the field in 2016, I had managed to narrow
down on the villages and the families I worked with till the end of my fieldwork. This was also due
to the much-needed assistance from gatekeepers who were influential, well known and respected
within the respective communities. They mostly consisted of local student leaders, teachers of local
schools and NGO workers.
Given the complex conflict context, I also had to pay special attention to my own safety as a
researcher. This was also due to the fact that to some extent I preferred to be more adventurous
and chose to work in remote villages instead of those closer to the town. This also entailed that
I inform the local police since kidnapping by insurgents was a common phenomenon. The head
of the Department of Police for BTAD was extremely supportive but insisted that he provides me
with a few police personnel to accompany me to these remote villages. This put me in a difficult
situation but I firmly turned down his request. To this he insisted that I keep him posted regarding
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my whereabouts. In terms of key safety strategies, being alert, maintaining confidentiality and
data safety, contextualizing research, and communicating well about my role and objective as a
researcher were important in building trust, along with listening to the advice of my gatekeepers,
host families and local people in planning everyday fieldwork. Understanding local and national
political dynamics and patterns of conflict (Goodhand 2000) was also important in avoiding potential
risk.
Of course there were situations where I did not manage too well with potential risks and I describe
one such incident pertaining to my research assistant below.
The rapport-building process in ethnography usually follows the stages of apprehension–explo-
ration–cooperation–participation (Bohannan cited in Spradely 1979: 79). In my fieldwork the
process did progress according to the stages described. In the beginning, there was apprehension
about the purpose of these regular visits and uncertainty about the types of questions I was going to
ask. It could also be termed as the liminal phase of embarking on the fieldwork ritual (Ellen 1993).
This phase was expected due to my being a researcher from a foreign university, the prevailing
conflict context and the cultural differences and existing power relations among the different ethnic
groups. To illustrate this, while most respondents were willing to have conversations and reached
the level of ‘co-operation’ (Spradley 1979), there were also a few who did not overcome it and
expressed their apprehension of me being an undercover journalist, or some kind of informer. Also
the Muslim communities usually were more suspicious than the Bodos. This also owes to the history
of conflict in the region where the Muslims have burnt the blame of infiltrating on land belonging to
Bodos and indigenous Assamese. I tried to address this by reiterating that they could withdraw from
the conversation at any point (since I did not take notes or record any of these interviews owing to
the sensitive nature of information being discussed) and could ask for clarifications and explanations.
This assurance, about which I was sincere, mostly worked in making them feel comfortable and in
gaining trust.
At this juncture, I should also mention that since I worked with three different ethnic groups that
were often hostile to each other, I had to rely on respective ethnic networks to get into the communities.
This was done through local NGOs that worked with these communities, student leaders of the
communities and since most local NGOs employed people from across the communities, these
employees also helped me get access to the communities. Since I had to constantly navigate across
these ethnically different communities, I let my research participants know that I was talking and
mixing with people across ethnic groups. I explained to my gatekeepers and respondents within
these networks why my research topic required me to carry out fieldwork across these communities
and at various institutions. I explained to reassure them, so that they did not feel vulnerable sharing
information with me, or feel suspicious towards me for navigating not only among the ethnic groups
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but also state institutions as well as the police and armed forces. From a methodological perspective,
the behavior, actions and responses of people needed to be understood in the historical and political
context of war and internal conflict. Keeping a low profile and ‘minding your own business’ is often
considered to be a survival strategy in conflict areas (Goodhand 2000). Moreover, categories, such
as victims–perpetrators, dominant–dominated and powerful–subordinated, are often not distinct in
conflict areas. People’s memories and experiences suggest violence is not only embedded in state
practices within these societies I worked in or directed by one community against another. Rather
violence as well as the probability of violence shapes villagers’ actions in myriad ways. There
is a sense of unity among people across communities for the collective memory of having faced
ethnically induced episodes of violence.
These everyday forms of fieldwork encounters to a large extent also shaped my own embodied
identity. My own everyday within the fieldwork consisted in navigating across ethnic, institutional
and class boundaries on a single day. On some days I started with a visit to the local political
party office or the office of the forest officer followed by visits to a Muslim and Adivasi village,
respectively. I had to be constantly aware that the conditions under which I was conducting fieldwork
were ‘disturbed’ especially since the ‘political’ was not only clearly marked but became implicit in
my movements due to the very nature of my research. (Longkumar 2009). I had to be aware that
I did not consciously or unconsciously carry over my personal feelings attached to narratives of
violence and suffering from one village to another. For example, if my first visit was to a Muslim
village where I was being narrated to about the ‘evil’ Bodos, I made sure that if the following village
was a Bodo village I did not let my previous encounters seep in anyway into my conversations.
This obviously took sometime since passion ran deep in these interviews and being trained as a
professional social worker I usually practiced empathy rather than sympathy. What also helped were
conversations with my friends and research assistants at the end of the day. However, what I also
realized upon much reflection was how getting involved in the field and listening to people’s stories
of atrocities, could make empathy turn into identification (Nordstrom and Robben 1995:14). The
more I reflected upon these, the more I realized that the nuances of the interactions that occurred
in the fieldwork depended on the subtlety of one’s own identity, that is, how one’s position is
constructed when viewed as a native or foreigner researcher. Often on the same day I would have
to work through different identities while being aware of my self-identity. I discuss the issue of
positionality in the subsequent sections.
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2.6 “So you are an Assamese? Or Bengali? Are you a Bangladeshi?”— In
pursuit of my positionality while doing ethnography at home, or is it
home?
Undoubtedly my personal ontological and epistemological position influenced this research project
from its inception to the end, making it important to be reflective on the choices that I have made
during the research (Bourdieu 2004). While in the field, my identity could be constructed as that of
both an outsider and an insider due to my ethnic background. Although the area of study is a part of
Assam, my language and culture rendered me as an outsider there (although I spoke languages that
could be easily used for conversing with my respondents). Nonetheless being an insider-outsider
also created difficulties (Mookherjee 2001) so I tried my best to be accepted by the community so
that they would trust me. Born and raised in Assam by (Hindu) Bengali parents of East Pakistani
origin, I am fluent in Bengali (including its various dialects like Sylheti, Dhakaya and Borishal),
Assamese and Hindi. My association with BTAD goes back to the year 2009 when I spent over a
month conducting fieldwork on IDPs for a master’s degree in Social Work. Moreover, several of
my Bodo peers from the university where I got my Master’s degree have returned to BTAD and
now run NGOs or work in the academic institutions that have come up over the years.
Therefore, I had a wide network of people and the requisite language skills benefited my ethnog-
raphy. While interacting with the Bodos, I was a Bengali who spoke Assamese and this worked in
my favor since politically it was the dominant Assamese that the Bodos were at loggerheads with.
With my Muslim interlocutors I spoke in various dialects of Bengali and also shared a common
trajectory in terms of my grandparents who immigrated to Barak Valley in 1949 after India became
independent. In case of the Adivasis, I interacted in Assamese and Hindi. I had to practice the skills
of maneuvering my language and identity according to whom I was interacting with.
Shao (2013) points out that trust is very important while conducting sensitive research even
though it takes place in the researcher’s own country. Given that I was conducting interviews on
topics that were extremely sensitive and the information that I received was also often confidential
(while conducting ethnography with timber smugglers and Army personnel), the circumstances did
not allow me to even carry a notebook. I shifted my approach to one using participant observation
and informal conversations. However, participant observation in conflict areas must transcend
it traditional approaches. As Robben (1995: 84) points out, an anthropologist who wishes to
understand a major armed conflict from the perspective of its principal protagonists cannot resort to
participant observation in its traditional sense but is restricted to account interviews.
I took long walks with villagers affected by conflict who lived in temporary relief camps to their
villages, paddy fields and former village markets and back to the relief camps, to be confronted with
50
the charred remains and stories about how life was before the attack. This in some ways relates to
what has now emerged in anthropology as the method known as walking ethnography —the practice
of conducting ethnographic research on foot. Unlike ethnography undertaken at established sites,
the practice of walking the talking enables chance encounters with myriad objects, people and spaces
unpremeditated at the inception of the research. As Tim Edensor argues, walking exposes rhythms
that intersect, ‘adding to the complex polyrhythmy of place’ (Edensor 2010: 12). Amobile sense
of place can be produced (and identified) ‘through longer immersion by the walking body across
a more extended space’ (ibid.: 13) In their introduction to a collection on walking ethnography
titled Ways of Walking: Ethnography and Practice on Foot, Ingold and Vergunst reason, ‘It is
along the ground, and not in some ethereal realm of discursively constructed significance, over and
above the material world, that lives are paced out in their mutual relations’ (Ingold and Vergunst
2008: 14). As Yi’En Cheng further notes, the custom of walking itself is a ‘mobile and embodied
practice’ and ‘inherently a rhythmic experience and potentially offer[s] insights to the multiple
splices of time-space narratives’ (Cheng 2014: 15). Thus walking emphasizes relational moments of
ethnographic practice in ways that are difficult to generate using other forms of mobility. It is also a
multi-sensory practice and ‘brings to the fore the interrelatedness of the visual and the other senses’
(2014: 16). Therefore, by walking both with and without my interlocutors, inside and outside of the
RF, inside villages and even in the town of Kokrajhar, I placed specific importance on the found, the
discovered and the inadvertent. It also provided me with a sense of how people and matter move
through the same landscapes as well as opportunities for conversations with locals in the RF.
This exercise was supplemented with the more traditional method of sitting down and engaging
in (in) formal conversations over tea and paan.
My research assistant(s) and me would sit around and converse for hours and at the end of the
day rush to the car or motorbike and note down the main remarks and key observations on core
themes and issues. However, most of these informal chats were supplemented with more detailed
interviews with the forest officers, the officers of the Indian/AssamAdministrative Services (IAS)
and Indian/Assam Police Services (IPS), NGO professionals and aid workers, local leaders belonging
to different political parties and officers of the paramilitary forces. I also spent a lot of time at
the office of the local newspaper, hanging out with local journalists, which also was extremely
informative especially while faced with a society— in— flux. This also helped in dealing with
rumours which Nordstrom and Robben (1995) consider one of the most common and complicated
problems of fieldwork in conflict settings, under rapidly changing circumstances.
In conducting (in) formal interviews I attempted an approach applied by some feminist scholars,
that of being collaborative, interactive, non-hierarchical, reflective, responsive, sensitive and bottom
up instead of top down (Laslett and Rapport 1975; Oakley 1981, Parr 1998). Unstructured, informal
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interviews are useful in an ethnographic study as they help the researcher understand what people
think and how one person’s beliefs and perceptions contrasts with another’s (Fetterman 1998: 129
and Kvale 2006). Since memory is not unmediated, conversations necessitated enhanced attention
in relation to time, space, socio-political reality and the nature of experience, all of which affect
in varying degrees the perceptions of the past. Traumatic experience, fear of reprisal, a desire to
protect self and family and a sense of insecurity may lead someone to deliberately conceal some
facts or express them in a different way (Bell 1998). Remembering and recounting violent events of
loss, abduction and torture can be traumatic and terrorising, both when the wounds are fresh (in
case of the December 2014 conflict) as well as when the memory is stale (the conflicts on 1998,
1999 and 2012). Lapse of time is sometime responsible for memory loss and the distortion of the
facts. Moreover memory is not the only factor that influences the contour of the narratives. The
intimate nature of the ‘interlocutor’s encounters with violence often results in identity dislocation
(Bouka 2013). The power of trauma has the capacity to disorient the survivor and make her lose her
bearings and points of reference. Consequently, I had to accept and embrace the vagueness of facts
as was recounted to me by my respondents. I soon realized that the value of data does not dwell in
its factual accuracy. It rests on discerning the range of individual narrative strategies and unfolding
how people present their experiences within a specific context (Holstein and Gubrium 2005; Linde
1993; Bouka 2013). Therefore in the end, for example, the value of Malati’s account does not rest on
whether the militants shot them on a cold December evening or if her brother was the only one who
was shot at. The intrinsic value in terms of my research on Malati’s lived experiences of violence
rested in how she recollected her personal truth and the associations she made between the events
of that day and her current situation.
Thomson, Ansom and Murison (2013) note that it is the silent stories at the war’s epicentre, which
are generally the most authentic. Using (participatory) observation, I paid due attention to the use
of symbols, verbal and non-verbal expressions, special body language, silence and the sequence of
narration, all of which provide deeper insight into the personal experience of the participant (Parr
1998). Yet another research tool, which proved to be very helpful, was Focused Group Discussions
(FGD). I carried out several FGD in Misalmaari and within the RFs in Lung Sung and Saralpara as
well as in the relief camps. In Misalmaari the discussions revolved around recounting the violence
of 2012, returning back to the village and building of lives. We also discussed elections and the
conflict of December 2014. In the relief camp the topic was again centred on violence as well as
feelings of fear and anxiety that came with the experiences of residing in a relief camp and the
uncertain political context. The process required me to be extremely self aware and reflexive while
asking survivors of violence to recount their own stories, keeping in mind the point made by Olujic
(1995) that we should be careful when we are unable to relieve their traumas and cannot restore
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their lives. Indeed as Veena Das (1990) had found in course of her work on the anti-Sikh riots in
India and the same was in my case as well, that people often felt the need to just speak about the
events. In the RFs, the topics centred more on processes of land encroachment, negotiation with
the forest department and other land-related matters ranging from land disputes to mortgage issues
etc. In the context of the FGD in Misalmaari, it was interesting to observe that men and women
helped one another to recall events, corrected others where it was needed and in this way weaved a
collective memory. They contested, confronted and acknowledged each other’s memories.
I eventually found that the narrative analysis method worked well while recounting their stories. I
highlighted the context of narration and the role of the listener in the construction of these accounts
as highlighted by scholars (Bernstein 1997 ; Gubrium and Holstein 1998; Holmes 1998; Mishler
1986). To expand this further, using narrative as method implies a general approach that views
the individual within their social environments as actively conferring meaning onto objects in the
world, including others and onto themselves; the way this occurs in everyday conditions, as well
as in interviews and FGDs, is essentially subjective and interpretive. If narrative is elevated into
“the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful” (Polkinghorne 1988: 1), then
it makes sense to argue that the stories we tell are such because they reflect the stories we are
(McAdams1993; Randall1995).
2.7 Risks and Ethics
“What… you went to LungSung that too with your Bodo research assistant? Did he manage to come
back alive?”4
Mertus (2009) relates to researchers working in difficult terrains as often being self-sacrificing
and even reckless. I have tried my best to uphold the imperative of do no harm to the local population
including my research assistants and host family. However, less acknowledged in the literature is the
responsibility of researchers to anticipate and counteract the potential harm to self. On one instance
during the course of my twelve months of ethnography, I have been guilty to both the above. It was
a result of me trying to push my boundaries and also wrong assessment of the political situation by
my research assistant, R and me. I should mention that, so far I have worked with four research
assistants and they have all been from the Bodo community. Given that the local administration
including the police, forest guards are mostly Bodos, it only helped with the ethnographic process.
Coming back to this incident, it was in February 2015, barely a month after the clashes between
Bodos and Adivasis, we decided to go deep inside LungSung, which was affected by the conflict.
4 This is what my friend D asked me after my first visit to LungSung with my Bodo research assistant in February
2015. Lung Sung is primarily inhabited by Adivasis and after the clashes of December 2014, it was a no-go zone
for the Bodos.
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As we traversed the distance in R’s old Alto through muddy unpaved roads, we noticed residuals of
the conflict in form of charred villages that lined the fields. R is usually well dressed but on that day
he wore rather a shabby t-shirt, a pair of ragged jeans and discoloured chappals. I soon understood
why, as when we were about to reach the village, R directed me to tell the villagers that he was
my driver. I must say I was puzzled but decided to do as R said. After we reached the village, I
introduced myself and presented the reasons for my visit. The gao bura (village headmen) was
called and began to recount the episode of violence, which occurred barely a month ago. Soon we
shifted to a tea-stall where some of the local youths joined in the conversation. They took us to a
nearby village where there were more relief camps set up told us about how they were neglected by
the district administration and had not received relief aid. They also took us to a school, which they
had constructed themselves through the help of the community. After spending about five hours in
total, they asked us to leave when it was getting dark as we had a long way to go and there was no
real road to Kokrajhar. However, as we were getting into the car, an Adivasi youth said to me, “how
did you manage to get a Bodo into our area? Do you know even the chief of BTAD is scared to
come here”.
As we were driving back to Kokrajhar, that is when it dawned on me just how much of a risk
both R and I had taken and that we should not have gone to LungSung on a whim, just the two of
us. We eventually found out that just a week ago a Bodo youth was captured and beaten up in that
village. R later recounted to me that they interrogated him while I was having tea with the headman
and wanted to know what was he doing here with me. He explained to them that he was a driver by
profession, based out of Kokrajhar and was just driving me to LungSung for some money. In real
life, R has a master’s degree and hails from an affluent Bodo family. So, when I shared this with my
friend D who runs an NGO in BTAD, he introduced me to Satyanath, the district president of All
Adivasi Students Union and since then I have travelled to LungSung and other Adivasi areas with
Satyanath who eventually became a good friend.
Before, going further I should mention here the roles of my research assistants and also clarify
the reasons as to why I worked with four research assistants in course of my fieldwork. As, already
mentioned the Bodos continue to yield more political power in the region and have surfaced as a
dominant ethnic group. Bodo individuals run most local NGOs, while almost all the local bureaucrats
and law makers at the BTC are ethnic Bodo. Therefore, it made sense for me to have a Bodo research
assistant. Moreover, since the terrain required for me to have a motorbike to travel in, the research
assistant had to be a male. I first went to the field without a research assistant. A friend was supposed
to help me with the fieldwork but a week before my fieldwork he got offered a position in Hyderabad
and had to move. Once in the field through some of my existing contact I was introduced to R who
was a recent graduate in folklore studies and had grown up in the region. R was looking for a job
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and a common friend requested him to help me for two or three months. When I went back to the
field in the following year, R had personal commitments and could not help me any more. Once
again through a common friend I found another research assistant, I shall call him U, who happened
to be a law student. U helped me for a few months and soon after I left, he got admission in Delhi
University and moved to Delhi. So, once again I was left with no research assistant. During my
final fieldwork, a friend who is also a local journalist asked one of his friends to help me with my
fieldwork. This person, who I shall call K, worked as a journalist part time and so he often was not
very regular with the fieldwork. After assisting me for about a month he realized that he was not
able to give me enough time, so he asked G, a recent law graduate to help me. Thereafter G became
my research assistant for the last months of fieldwork. Working with four research assistants over
the course of four years was not easy since each time I had to build rapport, explain my research to
them and of course I connected differently with the different assistants. However, since I spoke the
languages and already had a network of people I knew due to my previous work in the region, I
did not have to rely too much on the research assistant to know about the region or help me with
contacts.
Given my work inside the RFs and Muslim villages, which continue to be extremely sensitive
areas, I usually have to inform the local police of my presence in the region. I must say they have
never been happy with the idea of me traversing these remote terrains, zones of counter insurgency,
but over time I believe I have been able to gain trust of the villagers and village headmen as well
as local student leaders of Bodo, Adivasi and Muslim communities. As Thomson, Ansoms and
Murison (2013) note, research puts ethnographers in situations where they have to manage risks
to minimise the chance of real danger, while at the same time dealing with the emotion it entails.
I have tried to achieve this by forging good working relationship with forest rangers and guards
as well as local student leaders who yield a lot of support in the community. As Meyer (2007)
highlights, current research ethnics focuses on the risks to which interlocutors are exposed, while
negating the risks encountered by the researcher herself. Sluka (1995: 277), reflecting on similar
dilemmas denotes that to some extent, ‘dangers can be mediated through foresight, planning and
skilful manoeuvre.’
Undeniably one of the most traumatizing experience for me was when one of my friends and
interlocutors who helped with my access in the field over the years was shot dead a week before I
were to meet him for a lunch cooked by his mother. It took me a long time to come to terms with
the shock and distress this caused me. As Meyer (2007) observes, very little attention is given to
the emotions of researchers in the set-up of a research project. After having witnessed suffering
and abject forms of poverty, dejection and vulnerability that the conflict unleashes, from very close
quarters, the death of a friend was extremely overwhelming to cope with. As Wood, notes, in
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extreme cases these events have the potential to harm the researcher and evoke trauma (Wood 2006).
In line with Thomson (2009), and with the support of friends, family and colleagues I have been
able to acknowledge my personal emotions over time and have focused on self-protection.
The final conundrum is of trying to find the genre of ethnography into which this research
methodology fits. As already mentioned I use a political ecology and economy approach and use
qualitative methods mostly using ethnography. It would be wise to position this methodology within
political ethnography in which case it is to be viewed as a broader framework of qualitative research
that enables researchers to advance a better familiarity with processes of power and dynamics of
conflict and the ways in which these curate everyday life of the forest dwellers and those affected by
violent conflict. Thenceforth this research methodology can be described as a political ethnography,
conclusively.
Going beyond finding a fit for my methodology, I have also argued for advancing the case of
self-protection and ways to deal with complex emotions which fieldwork in such settings can
evoke in the literature on methodology. I have also shown using my own experiential learning that
achieving trust and transforming the researcher’s identity from outsider to insider is not a one-sided
effort and neither is it constant; it is a slow and placid process of cultural negotiation between
both parties. While not directly speaking to the literature on studying up, I have highlighted the
complexities that come with having a powerful and influential host family, which is also an issue
less discussed in the larger body of methodological work.
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Abstract
The 2014 Lok Sabha elections witnessed a significant shift in the political spectrum of the
Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) in Assam, with non-Bodos voting en masse for
an independent candidate, a former United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militant who was
backed by a collective of non-Bodo organisations. Using the elections as a focal point, this paper
aims to explore the larger political dynamics, political mobilisation and shifting alliances within
a framework of contentious politics and collective action that unfurled during the elections and
eventually led to an episode of targeted violence against the Muslim community in BTAD.
Keywords: elections, collective action, political identity, contentious politics, mobilisation, ethnic
violence, ethnic groups, BTAD, ULFA, Bodos, Muslims.
3.1 Introduction
‘Our candidate has won, but by too many votes’, said Ashrafuddin, a school teacher,
describing independent candidate and former militant, Naba Kumar Sarania’s presumed
landslide victory from Assam’s Kokrajhar constituency…. ‘People are happy, but
nervous’. A fortnight ago, a senior leader from the Bodoland People’s Front, the
political face of the former militant group called the Bodoland Liberation Tigers,
blamed Assam’s Muslim population for the likely defeat of her party’s candidate in
Kokrajhar. The very next day unidentified gunmen killed at least 45 Muslims.1
1 Business Standard (16 May 2014) [http://www.business-standard.com/article/elections-2014/in-assam-a-thumping-
victory-means-more-uncertainty-114051601629_1.html, accessed 10 Nov. 2015].
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The newspaper excerpt above speaks of the phenomenal victory of a reformed militant in the
2014 Lok Sabha elections2 in the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) inAssam. This win,
as well as its aftermath, were both remarkable and historical. It was the result of a shift in political
and ethnic alliances in an electorate in BTAD. For the first time since its creation, a non-Bodo
candidate had emerged victorious in the Kokrajhar constituency. The victory was the outcome of
both polarisation among the Bodos and the mobilisation of a heterogeneous group of non-Bodos,
including minority Muslims. With as many as six candidates in the ring, the multi-cornered fight in
Kokrajhar highlighted the sharp divide between the Bodo and non-Bodo voters and also exhibited
the fissures within the Bodo community itself. The candidates ranged from the one-time militant
to a former governor of Assam, a powerful state minister, the sitting member of parliament, an
independent candidate backed by the regional party, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), and a social
activist.3
The elections created concern among Bodos that for the first time in over two decades, there
was a strong possibility that a Bodo candidate might not win the Kokrajhar seat.4 This fear gave
way to a sudden burst of attacks on and killings of Muslims in Kokrajhar soon after the elections,
for it was presumed that Muslims had not voted in support of a Bodo candidate. However, this
fear could have triggered only part of the violence because supporters of the ruling elite, political
entrepreneurs and an armed faction were involved in inciting violence too. The landslide triumph
by the non-Bodo candidate only created more Bodo hatred of Muslims because their large minority
support was deemed responsible for the success of a non-Bodo. According to the same newspaper
article, this election was special:
The Kokrajhar district of Assam is experiencing a change. Hoardings exhorting voters
to choose ‘ballot over bullet’ on every street corner has been one of the indicators of
this change. The 24 April Lok Sabha polls in this reserved tribal constituency could
well set the tone for the future of Kokrajhar and Assam.5
Against this backdrop, and using the Lok Sabha elections as a nodal point, the paper explains how
‘contentious politics’ unfurled by means of collective political action by non-Bodos, and had an
impact in BTAD. BTAD can be described as a ‘conflict cocktail’ since various levels of conflict occur
2 The Indian general election of 2014 was held to constitute the 16th Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian
parliament), electing members for all 543 parliamentary constituencies in India.
3 Ratnadip Choudhury, ‘Ballots, Bullets and Six Men’, Tehelka (3 May 2014) [http://www.tehelka.com/ballots-bullets-
and-six-men/, accessed 12 Nov. 2015].
4 TheHindu ( 26 Dec. 2014) [http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ndfb-rebels-without-a-cause/article6725372.ece,
accessed 10 Nov. 2015].
5 Ibid.
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along lines of inter- and intra-ethnic and religious dissent and often lead to an escalation of violence.6
The mobilisation and political re-alignments that took place are indicative of a larger discourse
about identity and ethnic politics in BTAD that coincides with a history of ethno-social, cultural
and political subjugation faced by the non-Bodo community against a background of questionable
policies,7 including ethnic delimitation and arbitrary appeasements that resulted in the drawing of
boundaries on ethnic and religious lines. The paper further argues that it is the politicisation of
identity, mistrust and long-term grievances that led to the political mobilisation of the non-Bodo
population. It also examines the intimate association between electoral politics and the production
of collective ethnic identities. In the case of a plural society such as that which exists in Northeast
India, ethnic politics can often create new boundaries that cut across ethnic identities, re-drawing
them to meet electoral and political goals. Understanding the fluidity of ethnic identities in divided
societies is important since it indicates a dynamic situation of contact, conflict and competition, but
also mutual accommodation within groups.8
The central idea of the paper is to provide an understanding of the intricacies of the 2014
parliamentary elections by focusing on the shift in ethno-political alliances, the mobilisation of non-
Bodos, ethnic competition, and co-operation for political gains. Tracing the historical, contextual
and political elements that came together along ethnic lines in BTAD after its inception can provide a
deeper understanding of the underlying causes of post-poll violence. Beginning with local narratives
collected through ethnographic fieldwork carried out in four villages in Kokrajhar and Chirang
districts in May and June 2014, the paper also draws from existing literature on ethnicity and
electoral politics in South Asia and Assam. Local historical narratives often provide the means to
circumvent the homogenising effects of regional stories, especially those that deal with outcomes
rather than processes.9 Macro-political accounts often make assumptions without acknowledging the
6 Benedikt Korf, ‘War, Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Sri Lanka’, in Development and Change, Vol. 35, no. 2 (13
April 2004), pp. 275–95.
7 The policies refer to the way the BTAD was created and managed by the state. The BTC districts throw up a
contradiction to the concept and practice of democracy in which majorities win elections and rule areas. Although
the physical majority is constituted by non-Bodo communities (mentioned below), the Bodo Accord confers on
the Bodos political power, including representation in the local Council or Assembly, access to funds and the use
of weapons (the place is awash with illegal small arms which have never been surrendered by various ‘Accordist’
armed bands). See The Hindu (26 Dec. 2014) [http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ndfb-rebels-without-a-
cause/article6725372.ece, accessed 10 Nov. 2015]. Moreover, the Accord is unrepresentative and created an
unbridgeable gap between the Bodos and non-Bodos who include the Adivasis, the Bengali Muslims, the Koch-
Rajbanshis, the Rabhas and the Assamese. The very nature of ‘hegemonic peace’ as conceptualised by the Indian
state is objectionable. See N.G. Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’, in Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol. XLVIII, no. 23 (8 June 2013), pp. 49–58.
8 T.H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), pp. 5–7.
9 Ibid., p. 63.
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existence of historical differences along linguistic, cultural, political-economic and gender lines.10
Field observations, historical narratives and informal interviews provided a micro-perspective on
the prevailing ethno-political contentions, the shaping of identities in everyday lives, and the role of
political entrepreneurs, and unveiled the dynamics of contention prevailing in areas like BTAD.
Ethnic identities, as noted by Brubaker, come with standard set of qualifiers, indicating that these
identities are often unstable, multiple, contingent, contested, fragmented, negotiated and so on.11
The Adivasis, Bodos and Muslims in BTAD have undergone similar processes of identity formation,
both on religious and ethnic lines, and an event like an election further helps in the construction and
transformation of these already-fluid identities. Therefore this election should not simply be viewed
as a ‘brief interlude’ in the politics of BTAD, but can be used to extend our understanding of how
contemporary ethnic conflicts are often characterised by the politicisation of collective identities
that have formed around ethnic, political, linguistic and/or religious elements. This is almost true
of the whole of Northeast India where identity- and ethnicity-based politics have taken on violent
expression, often realised through inter-ethnic clashes.12 However what makes this particular case
unique was the use by non-Bodo political entrepreneurs of the democratic space provided by the
elections to politically mobilise marginalised various ethnic groups on the basis of a shared identity.
3.2 Background: Creation of BTAD, Contentious Politics, Ethnic Identity
and Identity-Based Violence
Approximately 135,000 people, about 5 percent of Assam’s population, consider themselves Bodo
and claim to be the autochthons of the region. They belong to the group of tribes that dwells in
the plains between the Brahmaputra river and the Himalayan foothills of Bhutan.13 The Bodos
constitute the largest tribal community out of a total of 34 tribal communities in Assam. According
to the 2001 Census, the Scheduled Tribe (ST) population of Assam was 12.41 percent, of which
the Bodos are about 40 percent. Although within BTAD the Bodos constitute a little less than 30
percent of the population, each of the other ethnic groups (e.g. Assamese speakers, Bengali Muslims,
Bengali Hindus, Koch-Rajbongshis) is less than 30 percent.
10 Nancy Lee Peluso, ‘A Political Ecology of Violence and Territory in West Kalimantan’, in Asia Pacific Viewpoint,
Vol. 49, no. 1 (April 2008), pp. 48–67.
11 Roger Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006), pp. 7–15.
12 Some prominent ones are the Naga-Kuki (1992–96) and the Kuki-Paite (1997–99) clashes in Manipur; Hmar-Dimasa
violence in Assam (2003); tribal–non-tribal violence in Tripura (1979–80 and subsequently) and the ongoing
inter-tribal conflicts in Nagaland.
13 Nel Vandekerckhove and Bert Suykens, ‘The Liberation of Bodoland: Tea, Forestry and Tribal Entrapment in
Western Assam’, in South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. XXXI, no. 3 (Dec. 2008), pp. 450–71.
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Down to hereMahanta attributes the alienation of the Bodos and construction of a separate Bodo
identity to three factors: domination by Assamese caste Hindus; the continued influx of immigrants
from Bangladesh; and the systematic and gradual encroachment on Bodo land and habitat by
non-tribals, primarily Muslim immigrants.14 The Bodos have been fighting for greater political
autonomy since the early decades following India’s independence in 1947. This struggle gathered
momentum with the founding of the Plain Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA) in the 1960s. After
two decades of low-intensity struggle, the Bodos’ quest for a separate identity was emboldened by
their participation from 1979 to 1984 in the anti-foreigner Assam Movement under the banner of
the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU). The Bodo movement matured in 1987 with the demand by
the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) for a separate state, with the ABSU and the Bodo People’s
Action Committee (BPAC) launching their demand to ‘divide Assam 50-50’. The 92-point charter
of demands marked a distinct phase in the Bodo identity movement. The charter demanded the
creation of a separate state of Bodoland, the creation of two district councils on the southern bank
of the Brahmaputra and inclusion of the Bodo-Kachari of Karbi Anglong into the government’s
ST (Hills) list. The period from February to August 1989 was the first violent phase in the Bodo
agitation, with Bodo activists embarking on a series of killings, kidnappings, bomb attacks and
killings. About 350 people died.15 Following the death of Upendra Nath Brahma, one of the first
Bodo revolutionaries, a more violent group of predominantly Christian Bodos called the Bodo
Security Force (BrSF or BdSF) came to the fore.16
With the Bodo movement slipping out of the hands of the ABSU, a Memorandum of Settlement
(MoS) was signed in 1993 between the ABSU and BPAC and the Indian government by the then
Union minister of state for home affairs and the chief minister of Assam. It is known as the Bodo
Accord. In all, 2,570 villages situated in a vast and contiguous area extending from the western
border of Kokrajhar up to the eastern border of Darrang district were included in the Bodoland
Autonomous Council (BAC).17 Even villages with less than 50 percent Bodo population were added
to the BAC area. However the territory controlled by BAC was not precisely demarcated; nor
was the Council granted financial autonomy. The Assam state government continued to meddle
in subjects that were supposed to be handled by the Council. This led to what is referred to as the
‘Bodo Territorial confusion’.18
The creation of BAC had satisfied neither non-Bodos nor a section of Bodos. The Council
continued to exist despite in-house rivalry, but those holding the reins of power in Assam’s capital,
14 Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’, pp. 49–58.
15 Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflict in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), p. 264.
16 Anuradha Dutta and Urmimala Sengupta, Disturbing Silence—A Look into Conflict Profile of BTAD (New Delhi:
Akansha Publishing House, 2011), pp. 23–9.
17 Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’, pp. 49–58.
18 The North East Times (6 Jan. 2002), pp. 2–4.
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Dispur, used the disarray to their advantage, meaning elections for the Council were never held.19
By 1996 the militant organisation Bodoland Liberation Tigers (BLT) or Bodoland Liberation Tiger
Force (BLTF) had come into being, which ushered in a phase of continuous violent activity aimed
at creating a separate state of Bodoland.20
To understand this continuing violence in BTAD, it is useful to trace the genesis of conflict and
insurgency in the region that erupted soon after 1993. The notion of ‘contentious politics’ can
be used to elucidate the growing resentment felt by the other ethnic groups against the Bodos by
expanding on Tilly and Tarrow’s initial definition of the concept. They define ‘contentious politics’
as interactions in which actors make ‘claims’ that bear on others’ interests, leading to co-ordinated
efforts by those with shared interests in which governments become the targets, the objects of claims,
or third parties.21 This extends to a pluralistic society such as Assam, in which the Bodos organised
themselves to fight together for a separate state of Bodoland. They wanted to assert Bodo identity
through a politics of domination over other ethnic groups. This politics was based on identity and
acted as a boundary, both territorial and cultural, between Bodos and non-Bodos. Identity politics
can be understood as the manifestation and use of cultural traits in political projects; it can be a
claim to power through the articulation and mobilisation of a particular group identity.22
Contentious politics in most ethnically-fractured societies is therefore the result of a sustained
interaction between groups with authority and those without, via collective activity in the name of ‘a
populace whose interlocutors declare it to be unjustly suffering harm or threatened with…harm’.23
Identity-based violence by separatist groups like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
or the BLT that joined in the struggle for a separate state of Bodoland can be seen as part of this
contentious politics which actually represents a continuum with non-violent social movements,
political parties and interest groups in the area. The idea of contentious politics can be applied
to other identity-based movements too, including the secessionist movements against the Indian
state led by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) or the Nationalist Socialist Council of
Nagaland (NSCN), or even the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which led to the separation of Ireland
from the United Kingdom. The ABSU and the Bodo Sahitya Sabha or Bodo Literary Organisation
led non-violent social movements that advocated a common Bodo linguistic and cultural identity
within the state of Assam.
19 Dutta and Sengupta, Disturbing Silence—A Look into Conflict Profile of BTAD, p. 4.
20 Uddipana Goswami, Conflict and Reconciliation—The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014),
p. 4.
21 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, rev. ed. 2015), pp. 4_9.
22 Camilla Orjuela, ‘Corruption and Identity Politics in Divided Societies’, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, no. 5
(July 2014), pp. 753–69.
23 Sanjib Baruah, ‘Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India: The Limits of Counterinsurgency’, in
Asian Survey, Vol. 49, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2009), pp. 951–74.
66
The ULFAbecame the reference point for various Bodo armed groups, particularly the NDFB that
believed that Delhi would not respond to the voice of non-violence. Unlike the NDFB, separation
was never an option for the BLT and the ABSU, and their vocabulary was restricted to making
constitutionally-sanctioned demands.24 Soon, however, the NDFB and BLT decided to adopt violent
means against not only immigrant Muslims, but also other ethnic groups like the Rabhas, Santhals,
Koch-Rajbongshis, Nepalis, Bengalis and Assamese-speaking people.25
Eventually, in 2003, negotiations between the Government of Assam, the Indian government
and the former militants of the now-disbanded BLT led to the signing of the second Bodo Accord
through the MoS of February 2003. This Accord created the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) under
modified provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.26 Unlike the first Accord, it
only allowed minimal interference by the Assam government in the Council’s functioning and it
received constitutional status. The BTC comprises four districts: Kokrajhar, Baksa, Chirang, and
Udalguri, created by re-organising the existing districts of Assam. These four districts are otherwise
known as BTAD.27
Decades later, however, the Bodo leadership continues to demand statehood. It feels it was
betrayed by the Assam government because the latter continued to retain control of the home
and finance ministries even after the second Accord. Most Bodo intellectuals and civil society
organisations feel that the autonomous Bodo Territorial Council was forced on them as a temporary
solution to pacify the BLT.28 The three-decade-long rule by BPF (Bodoland People’s Front) has also
failed to meet the aspirations of the Bodos. The ABSU revived its campaign for a Bodo homeland
in 2010 and this has gained further momentum in recent times.
3.3 Political and Cultural (Non)Representation, Ethnic Subjugation,
Contention: Bodos and the Ethnic ‘Others’
The Bodos seek to transform BTAD into the homeland of the Bodos, although some prominent Bodo
leaders argue that non-Bodos are welcome to live in Bodoland too, and that Bodos and non-Bodos
24 Goswami, Conflict and Reconciliation—The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam, p. 9.
25 Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’, pp. 51–8.
26 For more details refer to http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss(34).pdf , ac-
cessed 10 Nov. 2015.
27 Jaikhlong Basumatary, ‘Quest for Peace in Assam—A Study of the Bodoland Movement’, Paper No.
44, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi (2014), pp. 15-16 [http://www.claws.in/images/publica-
tion_pdf/324891001_MP44Inside28-03-14.pdf, accessed 10 Nov. 2015].
28 This was told to me during informal interviews with members and leaders ofABSU, who were also active participants
in the movement for Bodoland.
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will co-exist peacefully as long as the latter accept it as Bodo territory.29 The overlap between
inequality and ethnic identity is a key problem behind contention in divided societies. It involves
a pattern of the marginalisation of certain regions, which extends to certain ethnic groups living
there. The Indian state, following the legacy of the colonial administration, drew up the BTC in
such a way that resources have been distributed to favour the Bodo ruling minority. This has created
ethno-political contention and a boundary between the Bodos and the other ethnic groups in BTAD.
This experience of subjugated ethnicity was widely structured by the foundational political
inequality30 which was intrinsic to the way the BTC was created, and in turn became the basis
of contentious politics, which is at the heart of the recurring conflict in BTAD. The politicisation
of ethnic identity, contention over resources, and political representation and ethnic polarisation
have come together to transform Bodoland into what Brubaker described elsewhere as a ‘seething
cauldron’ on the verge of boiling over, or a ‘tinderbox’ that a single spark could ignite.31 As a result
the Accord has been criticised by scholars and policy-makers alike. The possible repercussions of
the Accord were been summed up by M.S. Prabhakar in 2003:32
This ‘ethnic mix’ comprises the caste Hindu Assamese who historically belong to the
same ‘ethnic’ stock as the Bodos, the Adivasis and the immigrant Muslim communities,
who are apprehensive of the political and economic consequences of a formal acknowl-
edgement of Bodo hegemony in areas which they view, equally, as their home. The
setting up of the BTC without clarifying these issues is likely to be one of the most
problematic aspects of the functioning of the BTC.
Udayon Misra thinks similarly about the Accord. In 2012 he explained how the creation of a
particular ethnic homeland that had not ensured the constitutional rights of the other ethnic groups
living in the region was at the root of a series of extremely violent instances of identity-based
ethno-religious violence.33
The BTC has failed to allay the anxieties of the Bodos, barely 28 percent of the total population,
who fear erosion of their identity, language and cultural hegemony, and their domination of the
political processes; and it has as well been unable to protect the rights and lives of the non-Bodo
population. There have been repeated attacks by Bodos on Muslims (in 1993, 2008, 2012 and
29 This information emerged during informal discussions with development practitioners from NGOs and some local
Bodo leaders.
30 Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, pp. 5–11.
31 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
32M.S. Prabhakar,‘Territories of Fear’, in Frontline, Vol. 20, no. 24 (Nov./Dec. 2003) [http://www.front-
line.in/static/html/fl2024/stories/20031205003103900.htm , accessed 10 Nov. 2015].
33 Udayon Misra, ‘Bodoland: The Burden of History’, in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLVII, no. 37 (15 Sept.
2012), pp. 36–42.
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2014), resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of displacements. Similar attacks on Adivasis
and Santhals occurred in 1996, 1998 and most recently in December 2014.34 In turn, somewhat
limited retaliation by these aggrieved ethnic groups has further threatene the Bodos’ sense of security.
However these events cannot merely be viewed as sporadic instances of violence, since almost every
occurrence has been preceded by politicisation of the population on ethnic lines and polarisation on
political ones. This then has fostered the creation of separate collective identities by the non-Bodo
groups that have each experienced marginalisation, restricted mobility and targeted violence.
According to Namrata Goswami, ‘The Bodo Accord of 2003 guarantee[d] that the BTC will
fulfill the economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and preserve land-rights, socio-cultural
and ethnic identity of the Bodos’.35 However these guarantees continue to exist only on paper,
or have been poorly implemented owing to weak and corrupt administrative institutions, thereby
failing to mitigate the levels of insecurity felt by the Bodos vis-a-vis the other ethnic communities.
In addition, the practice by members of the BTC of introducing divisive politics in order to further
personal agendas has worsened the problems: ‘[I]n May 2012, the BTC Chief Hagrama Mohilary
had accused the minority representative in the BTC, Kalilur Rehman of the Indian National Congress
(INC) of instigating the minority community against the Bodos…without offering concrete evidence
to back up his claims’.36 These types of allegations by Bodo leaders have the potential to spark
violence; following Hagrama Mohilary’ accusations, fighting broke out ‘which had led to the death
of nearly 96 people (both Bodo and non-Bodo)’.37
In terms of the composition of the BTC, 30 out of 46 seats are reserved for STs (including, of
course, Bodos), five for non-tribals, five are open to all communities and the remaining six are
nominated by the governor of Assam from among the unrepresented communities (e.g. Nepalis,
Rabhas, Garos etc.). Clearly the Bodos view this Accord as a historical opportunity to fulfill their
long-standing ethno-political demands. In the Council policy decisions related to development
funds, land revenue, business taxes and welfare schemes are based on a majority vote; unsurprisingly
the Bodos are considered the main beneficiaries. The Accord also vests the council with power
under the Panchayati Raj system.38 While the Accord explicitly states that non-Bodos should not
34 The Tribune (28 Dec. 2014) [http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/kaleidoscope/the-killing-fields-of-
assam/23325.html, accessed 10 Nov. 2015].
35 Namrata Goswami,‘Why Bodo Violence Continues to Recur?’, Idsa (29 Dec. 2014) [http://www.idsa.in/idsacom-
ments/WhyBodoViolenceContinuestoRecur_ngoswami_291214, accessed 10 Nov. 2014]. For more information on
the Accord, see ‘Memorandum of Settlement on BTC’ [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/-
documents/papers/memorandum_feb02.htm, accessed 11 Nov. 2015].
36 Goswami,‘Why Bodo Violence Continues to Recur?’.
37 Ibid.
38 Panchayati Raj is a system of governance in which village panchayats or councils are the basic unit of local
administration. The system has three levels: gram panchayat (village level), mandal parishad or block samiti or
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be disadvantaged, in reality their rights are not fully acknowledged by the BTC. This has given
rise to a situation where, due to the changings demographics in BTAD, the Bodos are apprehensive
of being reduced to an ethnic and cultural minority in hitherto Bodo-dominated areas; and where
non-Bodos believe that Bodos should no longer have the right to rule over the other three-quarters
of the population.39
Collective myths and fears shared by ethnic groups often lead to mass or elite-driven mobilisations
that incite inter-ethnic conflict.40 As well, there is invariably the imagining of a common homeland,
symbolic or otherwise, and a sense of solidarity among some groups.41 This is true of BTAD,
where each ethnic group is trying to establish its roots, fiercely guard its ethnic identity, and make
claims over resources. Contentious politics also refers to this collective political struggle. In this
sense, the term can be extended to cover other less-sustained forms of conflict like waves of strikes
and riots, and more ongoing ones such as civil wars, revolutions, and episodes of democratisation.
Moreover it intersects with routine political processes like elections and interest group politics.42
These collective identities of marginalisation were exploited by numerous non-Bodo leaders (who
are referred to here as political entrepreneurs) in order to mobilise the Muslims, Santhals, Rajbonshis
and other communities to vote together against the Bodo candidates in the 2014 parliamentary
elections.
3.4 Parliamentary Elections: Collective Action, Mobilisation, and Shifts in
Alliances
The Kokrajhar seat has been a stronghold of either the BPF or held by an independent Bodo candidate
since the first Lok Sabha polls held in 1952. The majority of Bodos consider the seat a platform
for political expression of their demands at the centre. However in recent times the BPF has been
blamed for failing to realise a separate state for the Bodo community which has led to friction
between the party and ABSU. Because of its failure to get a separate Bodo state, the BPF in 2014
refused to endorse the sitting member, Sansuma Khunggur Bwismuthiary, as its candidate even
though he had already won the Kokrajhar seat four times in a row. Having lost the BPF’s support,
he contested the seat as an independent, thereby weaning a substantial chunk of his supporters away
from the BPF to campaign for him. Bwismuthiary had acquired a reputation as a fiery politician due
panchayat samiti (block level), and zila parishad (district level).
39 Goswami,‘Why Bodo Violence Continues to Recur?’.
40 S.J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001),
pp. 9–12.
41 John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, Ethnicity (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 6–7.
42 Sidney Tarrow, ‘Contentious Politics’, The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements (2013)
[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm051/abstract, accessed 10 July 2015].
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to his uncharitable remarks about non-Bodos. Given that the Bodos are not a numerical majority in
Kokrajhar, the BPF probably also withdrew its support for Bwismuthiary to avoid consolidating
the non-Bodo vote, and instead chose another prominent Bodo leader, Chandan Brahma.43 The
Kokrajhar electorate at first sight emerges as a reflection of Bodo politics, with multiple high-profile
candidates from the Bodo community. In the end, however, the Bodo votes were divided between
the BPF candidate, Chandan Brahma, and Urkha Brahma who was supported byABSU, the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland–P (NDFB Progressive, a pro-talks faction), and other Bodo civil
society organisations.
The concept of contentious politics in the context of electoral politics in societies like BTAD helps
us to better understand the processes of mobilisation of non-Bodos, using the historical repertoire
of Bodo domination. The co-ordinated claims made by non-Bodo groups generated a political
re-alignment that culminated in the collective action of voting en masse for a non-Bodo candidate.
The Bodos retaliated by instigating post-poll violence. The elections had brought out some main
axes of contention that explain the shifts in ethnic boundaries and political alliances, the processes
and nature of such alliances—how they were formed and towards what end. However it is important
to look beyond the shifting alliances to grasp what this fluid nature of ethno-political alliances seeks
to represent in a multi-ethnic society characterised by competition for and access to political power
and resources. Discussed below are some of the dynamics that were identified during and after the
elections that are significant in explaining the nature of contentious politics in BTAD in particular,
and multi-ethnic contentious societies in general.
3.5 Collective Action through Ethnic Mobilisation and Subsequent
Retaliation
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections about twenty non-Bodo ethnic and linguistic groups
under the banner of Sanmilita Janagostiya Aikkyamancha (SJA) united to support an independent
non-Bodo candidate and former militant, Naba Sarania. Sanjib Baruah finds this particular choice of
a consensus candidate by the non-Bodos of Kokrajhar quite significant, especially given Sarania’s
past association with the ULFA and his popular reputation as a feared militant known for his combat
skills against the Indian armed forces.44 Baruah adds that the non-Bodos had found a candidate
whose reputed military prowess equaled that of the current Bodo leadership, which consists of
43 Bhasker Pegu, ‘The Real Story of the Conflict in Western Assam, Live Mint (8 May 2014)
[http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/DkmMauJSK8Wtcxy5F82o7H/The-real-story-of-the-conflict-in-western-
Assam.html, accessed 5 Nov. 2015].
44 Sanjib Baruah, ‘The Politics of Electoral Violence’, Outlook (9 May 2014) [http://www.outlookindia.com/article/the-
politics-of-electoral-violence/290704, accessed 8 Nov. 2015].
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former BLT militants. These trends reveal the dangerous crisis of state capacity in Assam.45 The
way in which one former militant was pitted against a political party formed by rebels who had
surrendered was nicely summed up in an interview with a local leader of the All Bodo Minority
Student Union (ABMSU). He played an active part in mobilising votes for Sarania within the scope
of the SJA or the ‘A-Bodo’ or non-Bodo Surakshya Samiti (ABSS),46 and declared with some
pride that ‘if the Bodos have their tiger (hinting at the chief of BTAD and ex-BLT leader Hagrama
Mohillary) we have our lion too’. In much of the conversation he identified himself and most of his
friends from the Muslim or Adivasi communities as ‘us: a-Bodos’.47
This long drawn-out struggle of the non-Bodo ethnic groups for assertion of their non-Bodo
identity and political representation finally led to an ethno-political re-alignment through ethnic
co-operation among an otherwise heterogeneous electorate to unite behind Naba Sarania. This
new political alliance could be perceived as a collective response to a history of ethno-political
subjugation. The selection of a former ULFAmilitant as candidate is at the same time symbolic,
since the non-Bodos wanted to challenge the existing status quo through the politics of collective
identity. So it was important to project someone who could implicitly challenge the Bodos, by force
if needed. Moreover, Sarania was able to harness the growing resentment and shared grievances of
the non-Bodos, and secured the backing of several influential political entrepreneurs. The ABMSU,
dominated largely by Bengali-speaking Muslims, together with a faction of theAll Koch Rajbongshi
Students’Union (AKRSU), came out during the campaign to mobilise collective support for Sarania,
who was represented as an insider who would uphold the cause of non-Bodos.48 Muslims constitute
about 33 percent of the total population, followed by Bodos who are around 28 percent; Rajbonshis
and Santhals make up 15 percent and 6 percent respectively.49 This played on existing Bodo
trepidation that they would now be represented in parliament by a non-Bodo who was against the
45 Ibid.
46 Most Bodos I spoke to, including members of civil society, development practitioners and service holders like
teachers, government officials, writers, doctors and lawyers, consider this concept of ‘a-bodo’ as unconstitutional
because it seeks to mobilise one community against another community (read Bodos). However according to the
above-mentioned ABMU leader, this is not merely a political strategy, but is felt by the minority communities that
dwell in BTAD as a necessity in order to protect their rights and preserve their identities, and also to safeguard
themselves against recurring conflict in the area.
47 This comes across as a process of collective identity assertion by non-Bodo ethnic groups (‘a-Bodos’) such as
Muslims, Santhals, Rajbonshis etc., who clearly are trying to position themselves collectively as non-Bodos first,
and who only use their particular ethnic identities later and if required. Being a ‘non-Bodo’ here comes before being
a Muslim, Santhal or Rajbonshi.
48 The Hindu (22 April 2014) [http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/bodoland-the-key-
issue-in-kokrajhar-battle/article5935881.ece , accessed 3 Nov. 2015].
49 ‘The Current crisis in Bodoland’, The Milli Gazette (14 Oct. 2012) [http://www.milligazette.com/news/4211-the-
current-crisis-in-Bodoland , accessed 8 Oct. 2015].
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creation of a separate state of Bodoland and who also stood up to protect non-Bodo identities.
Immediately after the polls, a former Assam government minister and BPF leader, Promila Rani
Barhma, blamed the Muslims for not voting for the Bodo candidates.50 Amid tight security on the
ground, barely a week after the elections of 24 April 2014, post-poll violence broke out, mainly
targeted against the Muslim community. In the first week of May 45 people were killed in Kokrajhar
and Baksa districts of BTAD, yet again mainly from the minority Muslim community. Several
houses were torched and hundreds of people (mostly Muslims) were displaced and fled out of fear.
People from other communities like the Adivasis and Rajbonshis also fled in anticipation of further
violence.51 This immediate retaliation is both reflective of the prevailing contention felt by the
Bodos, and an attempt to reinforce sharp boundaries between the Bodos and the ethnic ‘others’52.
3.6 The Bodo–Muslim Contention: Changing Demographics and Fear of
Land Alienation
Frequently labelled as Bangladeshis, Muslims have historically been a soft target in the region.
The Bodos feel that Muslim immigrants are swamping the area and altering its demographics.
The immigration issue assumes further importance because Bodos believe that Muslim settlers
lend support to illegal immigrants from Bangladesh by helping them cross the border into India
and settling them on their lands. As well there have been reports of rampant encroachment on
state-owned forest land by Muslim settlers.53 Recently a political consensus has been reached in
Assam for the need to update the National Register of Citizens (NRC) 1951 by including the names
of all persons who were on the 1971 electoral rolls, and their descendants. An update of the NRC
1951 has been a longstanding demand of various socio-political organisations including the AASU,
which led the Assam Agitation in 1979–85 against illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Delhi,
Dispur and AASU reached an agreement in 2005 to make midnight on 24 March 1971 the new
cut-off date for detection of foreigners and listing citizens on an updated NRC. The BPF, Axom
50 Nazimuddin Siddique, ‘Massacre in Assam’, in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLIX, no. 22 (31 May 2014), pp.
16-18.
51 For more information about the violence see ‘Report of Fact-Finding Team from Centre for Policy Analysis, New
Delhi’ [http://www.iosworld.org/download/fact-%20finding_Baska_Assam.pdf, accessed 2 Dec. 2015]. Also
see The Guardian (3 May 2014) [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/dozens-muslims-killed-ethnic-
violence-north-east-india-assam, accessed 2Dec. 2015]; and KaustubhDeka, ‘TheViolence inAssam is about neither
“Hindu-Muslim” nor “Illegal Bangladeshi Immigrants”’, Scroll.in (4 May 2014) [http://scroll.in/article/663524/the-
violence-in-assam-is-neither-hindu-muslim-nor-about-illegal-bangladeshi-immigrants, accessed 2 Dec. 2015].
52 Baruah, ‘The Politics of Electoral Violence’.
53 ‘Assam Violence: 5 Key Facts about the Bodo–Muslim Conflict’, Firstpost India (4 May 2014) [http://www.first-
post.com/india/assam-violence-5-key-facts-about-the-bodo-muslim-conflict-1507865.html, accessed 10Nov. 2015].
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Gana Parishad, ABSU, All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) and AASU have welcomed the
update which has already begun in several districts of Assam.
3.7 Making ‘Claims’: Retaliation Through the Use of Electoral Politics
It was observed that the prelude to the Lok Sahba elections was characterised positively by campaign
strategies that urged the different ethnic groups to choose the ballot over the bullet. For the first time
since 1952, the people in this troubled periphery realised the importance of this message. In the end,
though, the bullet prevailed, with revenge by Bodos against Muslims. This was initially manifested
in the form of clashes on polling day in Gossaigaon, a Kokrajhar sub-division predominantly
inhabited by Bengali Muslims. The immediate cause was a rumour that the Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) in numerous polling stations across the constituency were being tampered with
so that all votes would go to the BPF candidate. As a result several minority voters attacked the
polling booths, killing a policeman and injuring another. In return the paramilitary forces opened
fire to disperse the crowd.54 Post-poll violence ensued a week later in the form of targeted killing of
Bengali-speaking Muslims, mostly women and children, and the burning down of over one hundred
houses, leading to hundreds of people being displaced in Kokrajhar and Baksa districts.
The Bodos had used violence to undermine possible collective action by non-Bodos. The Bodo
leadership had not anticipated such large-scale collective defiance and identity-based mobilisation
against the Bodo candidates.55 The collective mobilisation of the non-Bodos can also be described
using the term ethnic solidarity, which can be further substantiated by Barth’s theory about the
situational nature of ethnic groups and the importance of the drawing of boundaries delineating
insiders and outsiders.56 This ethnic solidarity, realised through shared grievances, binds certain
groups together and ‘entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signaling membership
54 Mail Online India (4 May 2014) [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2619741/Toll-Assam-
violence-rises-32-Omar-accuses-Modi-poisoning-hearts-people-against-Muslims.html, accessed 2 Dec. 2015].
55 Nani Gopal Mahanta, ‘Lok Sabha Elections in Assam: Shifting of Traditional Vote Bases to BJP’, in Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol. XlIX, no. 35 (30 Aug. 2014), pp. 19–22.
56 I refer here to Fredrik Barth’s work on ethnic groups and boundaries. Barth’s theoretical framework sets out the
subtle and sinuous frontiers of ethnic boundaries, the interconnectedness of ethnic identities and the continuity of
ethnic groups. Ethnic groups can, as he wrote, ‘promote their own, new cultural identity, even as their old identity
is eroded’. Ethnic groups have come to assert and affirm themselves more often in recent decades, utilising an
international discourse of human rights (for instance Bretons, Basques, Tamils, Palestinians, Sikhs, Quebequois, etc.).
Rather than groups disappearing into one big indistinct ‘pot’ of muddled and diluted traditions, symbols, practices,
languages, and so on, ethnic groups spring forth, are revived and/or created (or can be selectively destroyed). See
Eugeen Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1989), pp.
14–22; and ethnic identities are asserted and maintained all over the world. See Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 1969), pp. 9–21.
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and exclusion’.57 While it was not exactly the ethnic boundaries that were re-drawn in the case of
the parliamentary elections, the political boundaries of ethnic organisation were re-drawn, leading
to the successful mobilisation of non-Bodos in a political backlash against the dominant Bodos.
The non-Bodos were actively trying to engineer a split in the already re-drawn electorate between
the Bodos and the non-Bodos, and the Bodos retaliated in order to maintain the existing ethnic
boundaries.58
Considering that ethnic groups in general are transitional and situational, essentially characterised
by instances of competition and co-operation, yet having their personal and group identities intimately
linked to political processes, a new round of ethnic mobilisation could well be on the cards. This
could fracture the current non-Bodo political mobilisation and divide it again on ethnic or religious
lines according to political calculations. In such a situation, the election of Sarania stands out as a
very significant episode. Tilly and Tarrow define episodes in the framework of contentious politics
as ‘bounded sequences of continuous interaction, usually produced by an investigator’s chopping
up longer streams of contention into segments’;59 in this case it could well refer to the production
and expression of collective identities and their mobilisation for political gains. The process of
producing a collective identity combined with the grievances felt by non-Bodos, and with discourses
produced by political entrepreneurs such as ABMU, SJA and others in pursuit of political objectives.
Ethnic and religious identities appeal to the needs of minority communities for belonging, meaning
and recognition.60
The means and processes of production and manifestation of collective identities are rooted in
a wider identity assertion process that has been bolstered by the recognition of a Bodo homeland
under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.61 This was evident from the polarisation patterns
that emerged in BTAD politics and which were in sharp contrast to the rest of Assam. In the 13
other parliamentary constituencies in the state there was a distinct polarisation between Muslim and
non-Muslim voters. Non-Muslim votes went largely to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Muslim
votes to theAIUDF,62 and to a lesser extent the INC. By contrast, the Kokrajhar constituency emerged
57 Barth, ‘Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, pp. 15–16.
58 Goswami, Conflict and Reconciliation—The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam, pp. 6–10.
59 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, pp. 4–10.
60 Orjuela, ‘Corruption and Identity Politics in Divided Societies’, pp. 753–69.
61 Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’, pp. 50–8.
62 The AIUDF is a political party that was established in 2005 to mainly represent the rights of the minorities and
the Muslims in Assam. The AIUDF managed to gain 18 seats in the Assembly polls in 2011 and emerged as the
single largest opposition party in Assam. In the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, the AIUDF won two of the 14 seats from
Assam. Moreover, the AIUDF has actively supported the ABMSU to emerge as a powerful body representing
Muslim interests in the BTAD. See Kaustubh Deka, ‘Assam Violence: Neither about Hindu–Muslim Rift nor Bangla
Migrants’, Caravan Daily (6 May 2014)
[http://caravandaily.com/portal/the-violence-in-assam-is-about-neither-hindu-muslim-nor-illegal-bangladeshi-
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as an exception to this general trend. There was a consolidation of Muslim and non-Muslim voters
against the Bodo candidates. The prime issue was the historical politics of Bodo domination through
the construction of a territorial Council that largely embodies and imposes this discourse through
language policies, cultural symbolism, and unequal access to or exclusion from political influence
and development resources, leading to a feeling of shared marginalisation by the non-Bodos.
3.8 Aftermath: Observations and the Post-Election Scenario
The 2014 parliamentary elections in Kokrajhar were of immense political significance for ethnically-
divided societies in general and, given the ethno-electoral discussion of the political history of the
region, in particular; and the social consequences were also far-reaching. BTAD has become a society
where notions of ‘majority’, ‘minority’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘immigrant’ have become territorially
scaled.63
Interviews conducted with members of the Muslim community and civil society organisations
after the elections provided some interesting insights into the processes of the production of collective
identities. The process of mobilisation, at least from the perspective of Muslims living in two relief
camps and two villages,64 seemed to be an elite arrangement that had been largely initiated by
political entrepreneurs rather than a process having widespread popular support. The non-Bodo
vote did not necessarily endorse Sarania; rather, it was a vote against the Bodos, especially after
the violence that had been initiated against Muslims in 2012.65 Interestingly, when asked if they
had ever seen or met the candidate they voted for, or if he had organised campaigns to explain his
manifesto or agenda, the response was a negative. They chose Sarania because were told by the
local political entrepreneurs to do so.
Of significance too is the issue of Sarania’s own ethnic identity, namely his ST status, which
continues to be contested by various civil society groups, including ST (Bodo) leaders and the
immigrants/, accessed 11 Nov. 2015].
63 Nancy Peluso writes about the relationship between violence and territory in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. See
Peluso, ‘A Political Ecology of Violence and Territory in West Kalimantan’, pp. 48–67.
64 They lived in Nawarbhita village and in temporary shelters/camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) under
Dotoma division and in Duramari village. People have now mostly returned home from the camps.
65 Ethnic violence between Bodos and Bengali Muslims took place in July 2012, mainly affecting Kokrajhar, Chirang
and Dhubri districts. More than 100 people were killed and nearly five million were displaced from their homes.
Most did not return home until January 2013, but remained in relief camps too afraid to return. Even once the camps
were formally shut down and people had returned to their homes, normalcy was still a distant reality. Fear is still
rampant and the past continues to haunt the Muslim community. Informal discussions with villagers and IDPs who
were the victims of this conflict, and with local journalists, the villages of Duramari and Dotoma, and Joypur and
Maligaon
Relief Camps, 15 May to 5 June 2014.
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Janajati Suraksha Samiti. Naba Sarania belongs to the Sarania Kachari community, which is not
identified as ST under Article 342 (1) and (2) of the Indian Constitution, and is not included in the
ST list for Assam as per the constitutional (ST) order of 1950 or any of its subsequent amendments.
The ST certificate granted to him was under the Bodo Kachari community that is a notified ST
community. He is accused of presenting himself as a member of a sub-caste of the Bodo Kachari,
although there is no constitutional provision for a community to partly retain its name and partly
adopt the name of another community. The petition filed against Naba Sarania is still pending in the
Guwahati High Court, and he has been asked to furnish documents validating his ST status.66
Interestingly, right after casting their votes, the minority communities sensed the possibility of
violent Bodo retaliation which could well be rooted in their past experiences of being in situations
of ethnic conflict. The violence this time was orchestrated against the Muslim community because
it had not voted for a Bodo candidate; because the other minority ethnic groups had also voted for a
non-Bodo candidate they feared similar retaliation and fled their villages.67 They were put up in
makeshift camps in and around Kokrajhar.
However, the collective mobilisation remained strictly at a political level. The non-Bodo com-
munities continued to maintain the existing social and cultural boundaries. Although almost all
non-Bodo ethnic groups voted for Sarania, only Muslims faced the brunt of the post-poll violence.
This indicates the fluidity of the temporal production of collective identities; the mobilisation was
strong enough to win the elections, but it was not resilient enough to protect and safeguard the lives
of the vulnerable Muslim electors. The expectation that Sarania’s armed leadership background
would act as a deterrent to violence turned out to be unfulfilled. Not surprisingly, when interviewed
after the violence, the Muslim community did not exult in their candidate’s win but rather expressed
disappointment at such an incredible victory. ‘He won by too many votes’ expressed their view
that the large winning margin had ended up costing them their homes and lives. Their fears were
spelled out in one common theme: ‘outsiders’. There was and continues to be a constant need for
66 The issue was explained to me during an interview and discussion with Mr. Janaklal Basumatary, former IRS
officer and a civil society activist who has been responsible for filing the petition against Naba Sarania. Inter-
view and discussion, Kokrajhar town, April 2015. Also see The Telegraph (22 April 2014) [http://www.tele-
graphindia.com/1140422/jsp/northeast/story_18263392.jsp#.VTpRh2Sqqko , accessed 11 Nov. 2015]; ‘Objec-
tions against Sarania, Murmu’, Assam Times (4 April 2014) [http://www.assamtimes.org/node/10415, accessed
11Nov. 2015]; and The Sentinal (20 April 2014) [http://www.sentinelassam.com/state1/story.php?sec=2&sub-
sec=2&id=189288&dtP=2014-05-22&ppr=1,accessed 11 Nov. 2015].
67 Benedikt Korf writes of similar ethnic dynamics in the context of the civil war in Sri Lanka where inhabitants fled
from a particular place in anticipation of violence, based on some sort of information or rumour, even before such an
incident had taken place. See Benedikt Korf, ‘The Certainty of Uncertainty: Topographies of Risk and Landscapes
of Fear in Sri Lanka’s Civil War’, in D. Müller-Mahn (ed.), The Spatial Dimension of Risk: How Geography Shapes
the Emergence of Riskscapes (London: Earthscan, 2013), pp. 68–81.
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Muslims to reassert their political as well as legal identity and to establish claims to the land where
they live. It appears that a three-fold strategy consisting of the production of collective and shared
ethnicities, a history of subjugation and contentious politics was used for the political mobilisation
of the non-Bodos by the political entrepreneurs. The Muslim leadership, working through the SJA,
succeeded in harnessing ‘collective memories’ of carnage, which seemed to be the common thread
that ran through the Muslim community in BTAD.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper argues that the Bodo sense of exclusion in Assam led to the production of contentious
politics and collective action by the Bodos against their historical domination by the Assamese. Yet
the Bodos’ own politics in the BTC created similar resentment amongst the other ethnic groups
living there, and led to a new phase of collective action by the non-Bodo groups. This in turn
resulted in an electoral–political re-drawing of ethnic and religious boundaries (apparent in the
election of Sarania). However the Bodos’ retaliation against the Muslims means this political
realignment is most likely short-lived. This case illustrates the possibility of poorly-represented
groups in autonomous councils engaging in contentious politics, and holds wider relevance for
several other societies across Northeast India.
The production and politicisation of ethnic categories through the politics of contention can be
extended to most divided societies, as seen in the work of Benedikt Korf on Sri Lanka and Nancy
Lee Peluso on Indonesia. In the context of Dayak–Madurese violence in West Kalimantan, Peluso
has described how recurrent episodes of ethnic violence helped to naturalise and harden categories
of ethnic difference in new ways: ‘Ethnic difference was constructed and lived through government
policies, colonial and contemporary laws, through integration into a post-colonial national state, as
well as through explicit efforts to revitalise and reconfigure identity and culture’.68
In such situations there is a constant production and reproduction of ‘us and them’. Seemingly
everything contributes to this binary concept, hardening ethnic categories. This does not cause
violence per se, but it has the capacity to aggravate relations and has been used in both the justification
and analysis of violence. These ethnic categories work to shape the targeting of violence which in
turn helps to produce the contemporary ethnic identities of the opposing ‘groups’.69 Moreover, the
democratic space provided by elections can become an arena where contestations are manifested in
violent form, as has occurred in pre- and post-electoral communal violence in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar
and Maharashtra, among others.70
68 Peluso,‘A Political Ecology of Violence and Territory in West Kalimantan’, p. 56.
69 Ibid., pp. 48–67.
70 Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: Cambridge
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Both identity and ethnicity can be instrumentalised in ways that are often intricate and intertwined:
ethnic polarisation and mobilisation can be used for collective action in the name of democracy
and can cause repercussions for the groups whose ethnicities have been subjugated. Identity-based
grievances may be historically related to inequality, fear and mistrust of each other in particular and
of the state in general, and can play out in ‘episodes’. A process- and episode-oriented understanding
of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ usually explains ethnicity-based violent conflict in unstable societies
and creates spaces for collective action by subjugated groups. This paper has explained the fluid
and negotiable nature of the production and processes of the construction of ethnic identities, and
that asymmetrical inter-ethnic relationships can form the basis for contention and lead to conflict in
fragile societies.
University Press, 2004), pp. 11-22.
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4 Constellations of Power and Authority in the Political
Economy of Illegal Timber Extraction in BTAD, Assam
Dutta, A. & Suykens, B. (2017). Constellations of Power and Authority in
the Political Economy of Illegal Timber Extraction in BTAD, Assam. Alterna-
tives, 42(3), 146-165.
This article was conceptualized by Anwesha Dutta inspired by an earlier paper by Bert Suykens
on the Beedi commodity chain in South India (tribal Telengana). Dr. Suykens helped with the
organization and structuring of the various sections while also contributing the two schematics in
the article (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The ethnographic data was collected by Anwesha Dutta and
analyzed by both the authors. Both authors worked on the revisions from the external reviewers.
Abstract
This article seeks to comprehend the way the illegal timber economy in the Bodoland
Territorial Autonomous Council (BTAD) in Assam is integrated within a constellation of power
and authority. Based on over ten months of ethnographic field research, our analysis shows
that the timber trade is indeed characterized by what can be conceptualized as an excess
of sovereignty. However, a burdened agency is still exercised by those in the timber trade.
Moreover, the authority structure consisting of state, rebel and non-armed actors do not directly
engage violently in the trade, but are more interested in taxation, governance, or indeed wildlife
protection, showing the other side of this multiple authority structure. As the article shows,
different ethnic groups, which are often thought to be diametrically opposed to each other,
collaborate in the local timber commodity chain. However, highly unequal relations of exchange
characterize these collaborations. Aswe argue, those that have preferential access to the authority
structure can use this to dictate the terms of interaction. Finally, while the timber economy is
usually characterized by the operation of the constellation of power and authority, there are
interstitial moments where the (violent) interactions among the actors embedded in the structure
weaken the direct territorial control by them. As a result, times of violence are often also those
in which the trade can flourish.
Keywords: Illegal logging, authority structure, commodity chain, ethnic conflict, burdened
agency, political economy.
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The Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Council (BTAD), located at the borders of Assam with
both Bhutan andWest Bengal, has long been a sensitive space1 in which rebel movements have been
fighting for (Bodo) autonomy. Even after a peace deal with one of the major Bodo rebel groups, the
region granted autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitutions and placed most (if
not all) political power in the hands of a Bodo elite, the area has been marred by repeated rounds of
ethnic violence, with Bengali Muslim and Adivasi groups mostly bearing the brunt of this violence.
Within this context, an illegal timber economy has been thriving. While this is not remarkable
given the proliferation of literature on the linkages between resource extraction and conflict, this
has been often linked to conflict financing by armed groups. What this article first highlights is
the way in which state, rebel, and non-armed actors integrate in this extraction network. As such,
this article wants to unravel the authority structure—akin to what Richard Snyder has called the
“institutions of extraction”2—making illegal timber extraction possible. However, as the article
will argue, the multiple authority structures are not integrating on a level-playing field and there
are important limits to the negotiated character of their interactions. Their individual capacity for
violence—what some might consider their de facto sovereign qualities3—and connection to a greatly
disaggregated state, as well as the spatial logic of the timber extraction chain itself allows different
forms of authority to claim differentiated access to rents.
Secondly, the article wants to underline the way an ethnically differentiated labor force has been
integrated into the illegal timber economy. As such, we illustrate the manner in which multiple ethnic
groups (Bodo, Adivasi, Bengali Muslim), who are in the larger narrative of the conflict considered
at odds with each other, are deployed in the illegal timber economy. While this points toward
interethnic collaboration across conflict lines in order to make trees into marketable hard- wood
product, our case does not corroborate liberal peace assumptions about potential transformations of
economic collaboration into political appeasement. Not only is the deployment of labor spatially
divided, the relations of exchange in the labor chain are highly unequal, mediated as they are by
violence and political and social exclusion.
While thus focusing on an illegal timber economy, the article also wants to emphasize on the
functioning of the authority structure or “constellation of power”4 in BTAD and the way populations
relate to it in a combination of coercion (power) and consent (authority). In the rest of the article,
we will use constellation of power and authority and authority structure interchangeably. This
constellation of power and authority at the time of our research was the outcome of a particular
(colonial) history of forestry and (forced) migration, the postcolonial engagement with bothmigration
and (plains) tribal populations, a long-lasting armed struggle and repeated violence on ethnic lines,
81
which among other things led to the large-scale presence of security personnel and a relative absence
of state forestry personnel. Figure 4.1 tries to provide a schematic overview of authorities and
powers present, distinguishing between those with important violent capabilities from those without,
and between those that constitute the state in Bodoland, and those that do not.
The conditions of possibility for the specific shape that the illegal timber economy in BTAD
takes is the outcome of a long-drawn and sometimes violent negotiation process between different
sources of power and authority. As such, our argument is indebted both to recent discussions on the
functioning of (public) authority in postcolonial contexts and those engaged with related questions
of state and sovereignty (for a full discussion on how these literatures can be combined in South
Asian contexts, see Hansen and Stepputat; Klem and Suykens). 5
The work of Christian Lund6 has been crucial in repositioning public authority as a trope to
understand the multiplicity of actors, organizations, and groups engaged in claiming the capacity
to rule. These both invoke state authority and resist it and sometimes combine both tendencies.
Claims are often overlapping and the particular authority structure is thus a dynamic product of an
intense process of negotiation. At the time of this study, the central locus of authority was vested
in the leadership of the BTAD, which had emerged after the tripartite peace treaty, signed in 2003,
between the government of Assam, central Government of India, and the Bodo Liberation Tigers
(BLT). Its personification and the main center of gravity was Mr. Hagrama Mohilary, chief of the
Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) and former head of the BLT. At the same time, not only elected
politicians, state bureaucrats, and (former) rebels (of different rebel movements) but also student
groups were a part of the constellation of power and authority.
While Lund7 makes a distinction between (legitimate) authority and the more naked display of
power, such distinctions become empirically ineffective, as power and/or authority in Bodoland
are both spatially and temporally contingent. At the same time, and crucial for the argument made
here, the process of negotiation mentioned is far from a level-playing field and, as pointed out by
Pauline Peters8 in Lund’s special issue, there are serious limits to negotiation. Power imbalances
and, crucially in our case, the capacity to deploy violence are vital factors that constitute these limits.
The question of violence of course links directly with the concerns of this special issue and with
discussions of state and de facto sovereignty. While we do not take questions of sovereignty as a
starting point in this article, it is clear that the capacity to deploy lethal violence with impunity is
not so easily divided between state and non-state actors. Moreover, and in line with Veena Das and
Deborah Poole’s9 work on the margins of the state, and, in particular, Deborah Poole’s10 contribution
to the same volume, it is clear that even for those actors associated with the state in BTAD, the
distinction between legal punishment and “personalized or extrajudicial violence”11 is far from clear.
It is exactly the blurring lines between authority derived from being the state and the capacity to
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Figure 4.1: The authority structure of Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Council.
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continue to engage in violence beyond the state, which is central in the BTAD leadership’s practices
of rule. Not surprisingly, the state in the timber economy is far from a unitary actor, with elected
authorities, bureaucracies like the forest department and state security forces, including police,
paramilitary, and military all being differently engaged in governing the illegal timber economy. At
the same time, rebel groups continue to be able to craft (unstable) territories of de facto sovereignty,
allowing them to use this power to extract rents from the said economy. Drawing from and expanding
on Snyder’s12 political economy of institutions of extraction framework, we situate the institution of
illegal timber economy in the BTAD within a joint mode of extraction. However, and expanding on
Snyder’s framework, while the various actors engage in a relationship of collaboration, it remains
crucial to highlight the impact of coercive relations on the institutions of extraction, emerging out
of hierarchical positionalities within the institutional structure.
Finally, this article wants to move beyond the institutional structure and understand how different
types of labor, in this case ethnically differentiated, are part of illegal timber’s political economy. As
mentioned, these different ethnic groups, which are normally thought of as in conflict, are integrated
in the working of at least some aspects of the timber trade. Yet, participation in the different sections
of the trade and the capacity to profit from it are largely dependent on relations of individuals
and groups with the authority structure mentioned above. It must be clear that Bodo, aligned both
with the BTAD leadership, with former rebel commanders, with still active rebel movements, with
sections of the bureaucracy, and with powerful student groups are able to benefit most, for instance,
as timber contractors. Still, this group is far from homogenous, and poorer sections of the Bodo
population can be seen to be engaged in collecting firewood or cutting timber, an activity mostly
associated with the most disadvantaged group: the Adivasi. Muslims, while forming the main
opposition group to the Bodo, are able to bank on individual relations with Bodo contractors and,
importantly, a specific skill set to overcome their lack of integration in the main structures of power
and authority. As hinted at above and as we will argue in detail below, the integration of the different
ethnic groups in different timber commodity chains within the larger institution of timber extraction
structure is strongly mediated by violence and exclusion, which is an integral part of the negotiation
of power and authority in BTAD.
This article will closely analyze the ways in which the political economy of the institution of illegal
timber extraction functions in BTAD, with specific attention to the functioning of its constellation
of power and authority. In doing so, we will highlight the manner in which interethnic cooperation
seems to overcome narratives of interethnic strife; yet simultaneously is highly dependent on the
violence which supports the authority structure. Before turning to the institution of illegal timber
economy itself, we will first explicate the gestation of this contemporary authority structure. We
will then in detail analyze multiple commodity chains of illegal timber extraction and trade— from
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firewood and small timber for local markets, to more valuable hardwood logging for house building
(according to the Assam Development Report, 13 about 180,000 cubic meters of timber are used
annually for the construction of houses in the state of Assam) and even domestic export—in relation
to this constellation. We will show that while different authority structures impact on the operation of
these commodity chains, the centrality of the Bodo authority makes Bodo contractors and traders the
central nodes in all chains. Thus while agency is shown by non-Bodo groups, this agency is greatly
burdened14 by the operation of the constellation. First, however, we will sketch the debate around
institutions of extraction and illegal timber logging (in violent contexts) to embed our analysis in
this larger academic field.
The data on the illegal institution of timber extraction were collected in three phases, first from
February to May 2015, then from February to May 2016, and finally in August and September
2017. Informal semi-structured interviews were conducted with forest officials, villagers who
were involved in the timber extraction trade, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working on
environment, officers of the Eco-Task Force, local politicians including the deputy chief of BTAD
and the minister for forest and tourism, owners of sawmills, officials of the Assam police force,
and local contractors. This was substantiated with participatory observations, visits to homes of
local timber smugglers or traders, sawmills, and villages near forests from where timber was usually
extracted. Most of the informal interviews were focused on understanding the modus operandi of
the timber. Extraction chain and with the idea to delve beneath the facade of formalized institutions,
groups, and networks down to the “relational substrata of the people.”15
4.1 Illegal Timber Economies in Violent Contexts
Illegal logging in Assam or elsewhere is not a recent phenomenon and has been dealt with in several
strands of literature spanning from Asia to Africa and Europe to South America. A review of
literature on the problem of illegal logging worldwide by Wynet Smith16 found that “most nations
with significant proportion of forest coverage—tropical or non-tropical experience at least some
level of illegal logging. Estimates range from 80 percent for the BrazilianAmazon, to over 90 percent
for Cambodia and over 70 percent for Indonesia.” Compared to countries like China, Myanmar,
Vietnam, and others that are highly integrated in the global trade in timber, Smith17 found that while
India has the third largest amount of forest cover, it is only ninth in terms of industrial round wood
production. Much of the wood is used for domestic consumption, and India also features as a major
tropical timber importer (ITTO18 in Smith19). Much of the available data on illegal logging in India
underline the level to which illegal logging in India is more of a village- level problem, rather than
an issue of industrial level activity, unlike in other countries. Therefore, it becomes important to
understand the local processes of illegal logging in India, where the everyday political economy of
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the timber trade not only includes complex sociocultural, political, and economic organizations, but
also is embedded within networks of exchange. Localized rules, established codes of conduct, and
multiple hierarchies of deference and power.20
The term illegal logging itself has been differently conceptualized by scholars and can be under-
stood differently within specific social, political, and cultural contexts. Casson and Obidzinski, 21
working on Kalimantan (Indonesia), define illegal logging as the harvesting of logs in a way that is
in infringement of national laws and regulations. These laws and regulations were essentially put in
place to check exploitation of mainly forest resources and also promote sustainable management
of forest.22 Going by this, “illegal” may therefore comprise logging activities in “protected” areas,
the logging of certain protected species of hardwood (in the case of BTAD, it refers to species that
includes sal or Shorea robusta, gamari or Gmelina arborea, teak/segun or Tectona grandis, among
others), logging outside concession boundaries (usually set according to forest regulations by the
state), extraction of more than allocated harvest or firewood, removal of oversized or undersized
trees as well as harvesting in areas where extraction is prohibited such as catchment areas, steep
slopes, riverbanks, and national parks and reserves.23 Conversely, Thomas Sikor and Phuc Xuan
To24 find the very terminology of “illegal logging” problematic since this only stresses its criminal
nature, but not the way it is operated through complex political–economic networks involving
multiple actors at different levels. Sikor and To25 seek to transcend this statist definition of illegal
and use illegal logging to “refer to a particular discourse about unwanted logging and associated
social dynamics. We speak of illegal operations when we consider actual practices deemed illegal
by statutory legislation.”
In our case, we use the term illegal to imply logging activities that are carried out in violation of
existing forest laws. Importantly, most, if not all of our respondents involved in the timber trade,
were very aware of what these violations consisted of. We also make a conscious effort to work
with emic categories of what constitutes illegal logging. Many of our respondents used terms like
dui nombori (number two) business, referring to the fraudulent or, indeed, illegal nature of the
timber trade. So, it appeared that those who were embedded in the timber economy and those who
observed it essentially considered it as illegal. This illegality was used in relation to violation of
laws, which entailed risk of arrest, seizure of timber and vehicle, prison term, and hefty fines.
Global Commodity Chains (GCC) have also featured prominently in the discussion around the
political economy of illegal timber.26 Authors like Jesse Ribot, 27 Kevin Woods, 28 and Sikor and
To29 have traced timber from the source of extraction till the node of consumption, usually the
(international) market. While we use a commodity chain framework, the chains presented focus on
the local extraction to consumption chains, which sometimes are neglected in other literature.30 still;
the GCC literature shares many of our key concerns. Woods, 31 for instance, use a GCC framework to
86
explain how timber travels fromBurma and crosses the border to reach Chinesemarkets. Woods notes
that valuable global resources like timber often originate in sites of conflict, in this case, Burma, since
these regions are not well integrated into global natural resource extraction/conservation networks.
In most cases, this violence is completely erased in the journey of the timber from extraction sites
to consumption nodes. This provides insight into the lax relationships “between national versus
insurgent economies, legal versus illegal resource extraction, (trans) national versus local resource
control, and trade versus trafficking. Zones of conflict experiencing the ‘natural resource curse’
help unbundle some of these binaries,” because insurgency aids in political instability and erosion
of national government authority and legitimacy. At the same time, our research shows that dividing
lines cannot so easily be drawn between state and insurgents when it comes to timber logging in
conflict zones. Moreover, Woods32 elucidates in much detail the various elements that sustain this
transnational logging trade, from trans border patron–client relationships, transnational alliance
capital, and international consumer desires, all pervading the border.
While not using a GCC framework, Phillippe Le Billon’s33 work corroborates many of these
insights. Based on long-term fieldwork on illegal logging in Cambodia, he finds that the case
of state ban on logging is a classic example of a “conflict between a central authority trying to
project its control and power over peripheral regions by addressing issues of national security,
political dissidence, and illegal trading, and a border population that is better off with close political,
social, economic, and cultural interaction across borders.” The wider political economy of conflict
scholarship has accentuated that war is less about the breakdown of political and economic relations;
rather, it is about their reordering and transformation.34 this transformative quality of war is often
manifested through opportunities in the illegal economy. Although somewhat over- stated in the
debate around greed as the primary driver of conflict, 35 conflict and war economies, in particular,
can provide opportunities for the emergence of alternative systems of profit and clientelism.36
Warfare functions as an “instrument of enterprise” and “violence as a mode of accumulation.”37 Still,
as Jonathan Goodhand has shown, these “war economies” often should be better conceptualized as
local “coping economies.” What our case shows is that a simple equation between war and illegal
timber extraction is far too simplistic, as illegal logging has continued after a peace agreement with
some sort of democratic transition. Moreover, as Snyder’s institutions of extraction framework
highlights simple dichotomies between state and rebel might not be tenable.
Before we turn to the case of BTAD, the environmental cost of resource extraction in these conflict
settings has to be mentioned. We do not discount the importance and existence of discourses around
conservation and forest management practices and concerns, especially seen in the works of Robbins
et al.38 on the illicit use of resources within wildlife conservation sites or Sivaramakrishnan’s
work39 on colonial forestry and forestland grabs, specifically in West Bengal. However, within the
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scope of this article, we want to present a grounded understanding of an illegal timber economy to
comprehend how the proliferation of multiple yet hierarchically structured sovereign actors have
harnessed the economic opportunities that emerged within this institution as part of recurrent ethnic
conflicts. We seek to understand how these various sovereigns are embedded within the commodity
chain (we use a very local commodity chain framework) and interact with each other as well as
local villagers and consumers.
4.2 The Constellation of Authority and Power in BTAD: (ex-)Rebels, the
Indian State, and the (ex-)Rebel-State
The constellation of power and authority of BTAD is quite complex (see Figure 4.1). This, of course,
is a reflection of the complex, but also violent history of the gestation toward the current BTAD
and to the resistance accompanying its formation. As Figure 4.1 also shows, different authorities
and power holders have a different weight, partly the result of their (territorial) scope to engage
in violence, and thus a different ability to impact on the whole of the constellation. Populations
living in BTAD are impacted upon differently by different sources of power and authority, often
depending on their degrees of affinity to them. Again, this closeness is often territorial (see also
below), but can also be due to the ethnic background of a specific population. Before turning toward
its operation in the illegal timber economy, let us now shortly introduce the historical gestation of
the contemporary constellation.
4.3 Historical Background
Although Bodo mobilization for a greater autonomy had already emerged in the 1960s with the
organization of the Plain Tribals Council of Assam, the struggle for a separate state of Bodoland
gained momentum after the participation in the anti-foreigner Assam Movement left activists
disappointed with the benefits accruing to the Bodo Community. Through the 1980s, and under the
leadership of the All Bodo Student’s Union (ABSU), a crucial authority to date, the struggle for the
creation of Bodoland took shape. Dominance at this stage was still clearly located in the Indian state,
including the State of Assam. However, from the end of the 1980s, violent opposition emerged, and
certainly after the organization of the Bodo Security Force (BSF) the authority structure started to
shift. Still, it would only be after a first memorandum of understanding for the creation of a Bodo
Administrative Council (BAC) between the Government of India, the Government of Assam, and
leading Bodo organizations, including ABSU in 1993, failed to assuage grievances within particular
sections that the current constellation of power and authority started to take shape.
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Most crucial for the formation of this was the organization of the BLT in 1996, together with their
rival National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) that was formed by the members of BSF
rejecting the BAC. Both these organizations deployed violence not only against Bengali Muslims
but also against most other non-Bodo communities including Adivasi (mainly Santhal) as well as
Koch-Rajbongshi and Nepali. This led to a further deployment of both military and paramilitary
forces in the region, but also to the massive displacement of the population, a scenario, which
would continue in the region. Still, and certainly in the massive forest areas near the border with
Bhutan, the rebel movements were able to carve out a (often overlapping) de facto sovereign space,
in which they to a large degree were able to monopolize means of violence. Moreover, the attacks
against Adivasi led to the formation of theAdivasi Cobra Force (ACF or COBRA) in 1996 to protect
Adivasi against Bodo attacks. While much less powerful, they still hold some measure of (violent)
territorial control, particularly in Adivasi-dominated areas. The All Adivasi National Liberation
Army (AANLA) also founded in 1996 has some presence in Adivasi-dominated areas of BTAD,
although they are a less organized group, with its main operational zone in eastern Assam. Finally,
another, smaller outfit operates under the name of Birsa, referring to Birsa Munda, the leader of the
nineteenth-century Munda resistance (and millenarian) movement against British domination in
current-day Bihar and Jharkhand.
The final and crucial shift in the authority structure took place in 2003, which led to the creation
of BTC. As such, the emergent political order clearly has its roots in violence. The council operates
largely independent from the state government and comprises four districts (Kokrajhar, Baksa,
Chirang, and Udalguri), known together as BTAD. Hagrama Mohilary, leader of the BLT, has since
Headed the council and has become the head of the political party incarnation of the BLT: The Bodo
People’s Front (BPF). Mohilary, along with the ruling Bodo elites leading the BPF, has overtime
emerged as the main centrifugal power in BTAD (leading us to position BPF, and not the council
as such, within the constellation). The power that Mohilary exerts over the council and within the
larger political coalition in Assam clearly has granted him the status of a sovereign personified.
Not having turned in their weapons, cadres of the BPF and what is known as ex-BLT still wield
considerable armed powers.
This is important, as the Bodo Accord did not end the clashes on ethnic lines. Major rounds of
attacks on Muslims in 1993 were repeated in 2008, 2012, and 2014. Similarly, major attacks on
Adivasis occurred not only in pre-Accord 1996 and 1998 but also in 2014. All these attacks led
to hundreds of deaths. While the brunt of these attacks has been on the non-Bodo population—
important sections of which have been relocated to IDP camps—limited retaliation against Bodos
have also led to a continued sense of insecurity within the Bodo populations, looking for armed
protection. The ongoing violence has also led to a continued presence of (para) military forces, of
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which the most important are the Border Security Forces (BSF), Sashastra Seema Bal, the Indian
Army, the Assam Rifles, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. They lead anti-insurgency operations
against different groups of armed militants. Both the counterinsurgency operations and the formation
of BTC also led to the emergence of different factions within NDFB, one of which has surrendered,
one, which is under a ceasefire, and finally one that is still fully active. Maybe surprisingly in the
context of Northeast India, the paramilitary forces continue to operate with a degree of legitimacy,
while most communities also look at one of the (ex-) rebel movements for protection, although
often unsuccessful.
To summarize, while in earlier phases the Indian state has tried to violently suppress movement
for Bodo autonomy, consequently, through the Bodo Accord, it has delegated (sovereign) power
to the party-political incarnation of the BLT. This placed a constitutionalized and democratically
legitimized powers within the hands of a particular Bodo elite (and Hagrama Mohilary) but also has
fostered the dominance of Bodos in general.
This is further supported by the ongoing presence of the various factions of the NDFB and ex-BLT
who have not surrendered their weapons. The gravitational center in the constellation is thus clearly
controlled by Bodo groups. The counterweight presented through the paramilitary and to a lesser
extent Assam police is often limited in time and place. Similarly, COBRA and AANLA rebel
groups are territorially bounded. The resulting constellation of power and authority and the way that
different groups are able to deploy violence is crucial to understand the functioning of the illegal
timber economy. Moreover, while many groups are involved in some section of the timber industry,
the enmity between different sources of power and authority—and particularly, paramilitary and
armed militants—can also open up interstices that are exploited by those in the timber economy.
4.4 The Travels of the Illegal Timber Economy: From Firewood to High
Value Logging
We distinguish three different types of illegal timber trade, each scaling up, both with regard to the
value of timber involved and the power and authority of the actors engaged in it. The three types are
firewood, contracted timber for popular building and furniture making purposes, and mafia-style or
syndicate-run timber trade for local elites, including Member of the Council Legislative Assembly,
MLAs, and others that further transport toward Dhubri, Barpeta, Bongaigaon up to West Bengal.
Our focus lies predominantly on the second layer, with the two others playing particular roles within
the illegal timber economy. We will first provide the basic setup of each commodity chain, after
which we will analyze in more detail the role of power and authority structures helping to shape the
chain(s) (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Timber commodity chains in Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Council.
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As stated above, we use a more localized version of commodity chain analysis as opposed to a
GCC to show how timber travels from the site of extraction to the nodes of consumption but in a
limited domestic and even regional geographical area. To be precise, from the forests in Kokrajhar
district, especially within the Haltugaon division up to the towns of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, and
neighboring districts of Dhubri and Barpeta. This type of a micro approach becomes important since
we seek to show how the commodity, that is, timber, locally referred to as “golai” links the different
sites of extraction, actors, authorities, and sovereigns through often-organized sets of networks.
Moreover, in the case we discuss, extraction and consumption often take place in a local arena,
with social relations often directly connecting those organizing extraction and those consuming
the finished timber. This actor-centric focus at each commodity chain node not only reveals the
political relations tied to the resource but also sheds a lot of light on existing interactions and power
relations among the actors themselves. We thereby transcend the politics of resource extraction to
have a more nuanced understanding of interethnic, unequal relationships of exchange characterizing
the local commodity chain.
The first type is fairly straightforward (Figure 4.2: commodity chain 1 [CC1]). In this, woodcutters
would enter the forest and cut a cart or bicycle load of timber. Woodcutters would mostly be
Adivasi, although Bodo also engage in this practice. The woodcutters mostly transport the firewood
themselves to the local markets where they sell directly to the consumers at about 150–300 rupees
(all amounts in 2015 (INR prices) per cycle load (depending on the size, quantity, and quality
of timber), which mostly consist of either local villagers and sometimes also middle-class and
lower-middle class consumers from Kokrajhar town. According to 2001 Census data, around 75.9
percent of the households in Assam use firewood for cooking. Sometimes, the firewood is also used
for the woodcutter’s household consumption. According to Assam Forest Policy, 40 villagers living
around the fringes of the forest are allowed to collect dried up tree branches, twigs, or cut wood
from trees that have naturally fallen, all for self-consumption. Compliance with these rules is at the
discretion of the forest department. However, they are not legally allowed to make profits by selling
this wood and neither are they allowed to cut trees in order to get firewood. In interviews, we were
told, “since these are poor people, we cut them some slack. Even they have to live. We are okay as
long as they do not destroy the forest or engage with and aid timber smugglers” (conversation with
a high- level forest official).
The second type involves the most complex set of relations (Figure 4.2: CC2) and engages the full
array of the ethnic communities involved, as well as the full constellation of power and authority in
the area. Whoever needs timber (mostly sal but also lali, segun, teetachapa, shirish, and gamari) to
construct a house in or around the main towns of Kokrajhar, Chirang, or Bongaigoan, first contacts
a timber smuggler or contractor. These timber contractors are in most cases Bodo and often have
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a history in a rebel movement, as former BLT or former NDFB cadres or enjoy the patronage of
a more powerful authority within the extraction economy. In this case, the timber is delivered to
the house of the consumer where it is processed, or, in other cases, the Bodo contractors delivers
the logs to Muslim traders for sawing and processing purposes. These Muslim traders are also
directly contacted for golai, and they order it through their Bodo networks. After processing, they
are also responsible for delivering it to the consumers. Therefore, Muslim traders emerge as a
vital link in the commodity chain. Respondents stated that it was important to know the contractor
or trader personally to not risk getting inferior quality timber. Usually, Bodo contractors were in
charge of procuring logs. Logs were sourced from the forest and the trees were felled usually by
Adivasi laborers, but sometimes also by Bodo youth from nearby villages. Some of the timber
would be roughly cut up in makeshift sawmills inside the forest, with the bulk being directly loaded
on thelas (wooden carts) usually fitted with large truck tires for transport. These carts have to be
pulled and pushed by six to seven persons, usually also Adivasi, who received around INR 700 each.
Carts are mostly organized in processions with an SUV (the Mahindra Scorpio being particularly
popular) going ahead to check whether the road is free. Still, a number of checkpoints, both of forest
departments and police, are to be negotiated. Important in this regard is whether the timber has to
be delivered “highway ke iss par aur us par,” to the north or the south of the highway, as crossing
the highway entails more risks and possibly more payments on the way. This first part of the trade
takes place at night (from around 1 a.m. till 5 a.m., before the sun rises). In almost all cases, the
logs are transported to Muslim villages, since they are considered to have the necessary skills to saw
the logs into usable timber. Some consumers, almost all Bodo, and especially those with some form
of economic and political leverage (NGO personal, youth leaders, and local businessmen) would
get the timber delivered directly to their houses. AMuslim artisan would then be called to saw and
process the timber on site.
However, the norm seemed to be that the wood is delivered to a Muslim timber trader who
organizes (Muslim) labor to cut the logs. After the logs are cut and sawed according to the demands
of the customers, risks generally decrease as a legal grey zone is exploited. While possession of
timber in the form of rough planks is a crime, finished timber produce is not considered illegal, with
the processed logs taking up an intermediate position. The finished timber is sometimes directly
delivered to clients and households, but also to markets or furniture shops that further process the
timber. It should be mentioned that the demand for wooden furniture is very high, as it is not only
durable but also a status symbol. Most respondents who bought timber illegally did so because it
is easier and cheaper to procure timber in the “black” market. The size of one piece of golai can
easily measure up to 50–60 cft or cubic feet. On an average, it is INR 1,000 cheaper per golai when
bought illegally, and a timber smuggler can profit up to 2,000 INR per golai.
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The third type (Figure 4.2: CC3) is quite similar to the second type. Yet the value of the
timber and the power of the people involved (most importantly as clients) distinguish it from the
relative petty timber trade discussed above (and makes it also more difficult to research in detail).
Respondents, including forest rangers, local journalists, NGO workers, research assistants from
the Bodo community, Bodo, Adivasi and Muslim student union leaders/members, and even some
villagers who often see truckloads of timber leaving the forest describe it as involving a timber mafia
or syndicate. Clients in this trade are the power holders in BTAD, including ministers, who source
it for the construction of their houses. This trade involved higher members of the bureaucracy and
the forest department. Often, this timber would pass through official sawmills, also operated by
friends and aides of the BTAD leadership where it could be mixed in with timber that was seized
and auctioned by the forest department (see below), or that was illegally sold to contractors by forest
department officials directly. While part of this timber is for local consumption, it is also smuggled
using the river. There are two main river routes both originating in Bhutan. The first one uses timber
sourced in the Chirang reserved forest on the Indo-Bhutan border. It is then tied to inner tire tubes
and floated on the Sarphang (name in Bhutan), known as Saralbhanga in India. This takes the name
of Sankosh in Jharbari, flows into Dhubri and subsequently to West Bengal and Bangladesh. The
second route comprises of the part of the Aai River originating in Bhutan and flowing to Chirang
district. It then flows via Goalpara into the Brahmaputra and is then floated upriver to Guwahati. At
several points, the floated timber can hit the shore to be collected by timber traders, after which
they follow the same trajectory as of those transported through trucks and carts.
When asked about this third layer, an ex-timber dealer (Muslim) who now works as a political
entrepreneur for Muslims but also maintains a good relationship with the ruling BPF said, “I went
to the house of a high level politician and happened to have a look at his godown [warehouse] where
I saw huge stacks of Sal. I asked his party men what this was for and they said, the leader was
planning to construct a new house.” To this, my respondent added, “we do not supply timber to
these guys, they have enough power and channels to source it themselves.”
Finally, it should be mentioned that the district of Kokrajhar has only one legal sawmill in the town
of Kokrajhar itself. The legal way to obtain timber is through the Forest Department. Contractors,
who are in need of timber for public works, for example, construction or renovation works for various
government departments of the BTAD, can get the timber through a permit system. According to
the permit system, these contractors have to apply to the Council Head of Forests. The Council
Head then forwards this request to the concerned Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) and the DFO
issues the permit to the contractor. Any timber that is left is then auctioned to legal sawmills or
timber dealers after which the forest department marks the timber and issues a permit. All timber
sold in official sawmills must be licensed timber obtained through this permit system. Once the
94
trader obtains the permit, he or she can get the timber.41 A forest department officer said that the
BTAD forest department annually generates about 50–60 million INR from the sale of seized timber.
However, another senior forest official stated, “Since 2009 there has been no auction of timber in
BTAD.” Other sources revealed that the loophole provided by the permit system is mostly used,
also for nonpublic purposes.
4.5 (Unequal) Relations of Exchange: Power, Authority, and Control over
the Timber Trade
As the text above already mentions and Figure 4.2 shows, many authorities and power holders engage
in the timber economy. As such, the timber economy is not characterized by a lack of regulation,
but rather by an excess of it. While a number of authorities try to curtail the trade in timber, most
are engaged in regulating (part of) the trade, and most importantly in taxing the timber economy
(or extracting rents if one would prefer that terminology, although tax or fees emerged as the emic
category during interviews). As will be shown below, while the threat of violence is omnipresent and
backs the capacity for taxation, lethal violence is not often used directly in connection to the trade.
Moreover, the connections of some actors, and, in particular, the contractors, to the dominant power
holders in the area, result in highly unequal relations of exchange. Finally, while the regulatory
excess does clearly not incapacitate the timber trade, the real booms are associated with periods with
particular types of violent conflict, drawing a number of actors away from regulating or curtailing
the trade.
4.6 Regulatory Excess: Taxation, Protection, and Seizure
Given the high number of authority and power structures within the timber economy, we argue that
the timber commodity chain is rather characterized by regularity excess42 who argues for African
sovereign excess rather than the absence of power, connection, and capital), than by an absence of
regulation. The full gambit of the constellation of power and authority in BTAD engages in some
stage of the commodity chain. Of course, given the difference of value between the different chains,
involvement varied quite substantially. Moreover, and this will be treated in a later section, the
specific rationalities of engagement would also differentially affect different groups in the timber
economy.
The firewood collectors, given the limited value they represent, were relatively less affected.
Still, at the time of collecting or harvesting firewood, they would have to pay local forest guards.
This allowed them some leeway in the exact application of the forest law. Our respondents put that
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they only collect firewood and do not fell trees. “We sometimes cut branches of trees but not big
logs. For one bicycle load of firewood, we usually pay INR 20–50 to the forest guard otherwise
he confiscates our cycles.” Forest rangers and guards use the bribe mechanism to exert authority.
Given the limited value, we found no evidence of rebel movements taxing this part of the economy.
However, the presence of rebel movements would sometimes restrict who would be able to collect
firewood. Certainly, at times of tension, the returns for collecting firewood were sometimes not
worth the risk of running into a rebel group associated with a rival ethnic group. A visit to anAdivasi
relief camp in the aftermath of the 2014 violence between Bodo and Adivasi revealed that after the
episode of violence, the Adivasis had lost access to the forest since they were too scared to go inside
for the fear of encountering Bodo. A similar, but reverse situation was observed in a Bodo village,
where the Bodo had temporarily stopped going into the forest for fear of Adivasi.43
When transporting the firewood to the market, firewood collectors would again have to pay
informal taxes or contributions to a number of authorities and power holders. The common practice
was to throw a log of wood when passing the offices of the forest department, the police, and
student groups, includingABSU, BSU [Bodoland Students Union], andAKRASU [All Assam Koch
Rajbongshi Students Unioin]. This would happen against the threat of (nonlethal) violence.
Unlike this more limited form of taxation, in which the seizure of firewood was not common, the
timber trade proper (CC2) would entail more risks. Given that the returns were also much larger,
many more authority structures were firmly integrated in operation of the trade, while some were
active in trying to curtail it. A formidable part of the necessary capital was spent on “taxes” or
“bribes”—often referred to as “line tax” or “line fees,” paid by timber traders and this was said to
have multiplied in recent times, indeed, due to an over proliferation of authorities, as a result of
regulatory excess. To and Sikor44 also found, in their work on timber logging in Cambodia, that
those directly engaged in the timber trade are likely to be embedded in wider networks involving
a further variety of actors beyond the point of extraction. The wider these networks, so is the
regulatory excess and resulting nodes of taxation. One former timber dealer named Raheem45
explained this situation: “I was in this timber business for seven years but over the years more and
more authorities have come up who want a cut and my profits have continued to diminish. So I
have decided to exit.” Raheem’s statement resonated with that of a Muslim timber dealer who said
that on an average he paid INR 5,000 on taxes each month.
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the authorities to whom these taxes commonly accrued to be the
Assam Police, the forest department, the Border Roads Task Force, ABSU, AAKRASU, NDFB,
and ex-BLT. Since part of the fieldwork was conducted right after the ethnic violence of 2014,
the COBRA and AANLA forces had temporarily retreated and their place had been taken over by
the AAKRASU. We also found evidence that these authorities also negotiated among themselves
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regarding the amount of taxes to be levied on their respective ethnic communities. This was observed
in a tea stall inside a forest when an NDFB militant said to a COBRAmilitant, “we charge INR 150
from the Adivasi so you should not be imposing more tax on the Bodo.” These different authorities
and power holders used their territorialized power to extract these taxes and bribes at particular
nodes in the chain. Some of the militants were more powerful in and near the forest areas, while
police operated around the highway. (Lethal) violence while not common was always a possibility
and was certainly used to back territorial claims. According to a senior police officer, which of
course had his reasons to stress, “The militants and timber smugglers are hand in gloves,” “the
militants do not hesitate to kill the timber smuggler if their transaction conditions are not satisfied.”
A blame game appeared apparent between the Police Department and the Department of Forest.
Most senior police officials accused the lackadaisical attitude of the forest department, which
according to this one official was actually perpetuating the timber trade. On the other hand, forest
officials accused the police of taking bribes from timber smugglers and were disappointed that most
of the forest guest houses had been allocated to the army and now acted as army bases to maintain
patrol over conflict affected villages.
While police and forest department were commonly said to be part of the timber economy
(although at some points also operating against it), the paramilitary forces mostly made up of
nonlocal personal were active in curtailing the trade. Given that they, like the militants, often
operated inside the forest allowed them to monitor the trade. While they would normally not operate
against the timber trade directly, they would tip off the forest department, which would then (be
forced to) conduct a raid. There, the forest department, but also the Eco-Task Force, could conduct
raids. The latter actor is particularly interesting as it consists of former army personnel (with some
regulars as a core), and is raised for the “ecological restoration of terrains, rendered difficult due to
either severe degradation or remote location or difficult law and order situation.”46 Given that they
also worked in the forest areas, they would also tip the forest department about timber activity. The
Forest Department, however, argued that they only had limited means to curtail the timber trade. A
high-level forest official explained:
We seize timber inside the forest, and conduct forest raids but it is an expensive
operation, which requires a lot of resources and also the help of army and state police.
Once the trucks leave the forest it is impossible for us to seize, since we get calls from
ex-BLTs, politicians, etc. who put pressure on us to release the trucks [...] as soon as
the truck leaves the forest, the stake holders increase and it becomes difficult to seize.
Another forest official further highlighted that it is not only the over ground actors that would
interfere in the seizing activities: “we do not usually seize timber inside the forest since we have
been threatened by the NDFB. As you can see several forest check booths inside are empty because
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it is dangerous especially with counterinsurgency operations going on. There have been cases in the
past where forest guards have been attacked by militants in the forest.”
The latter part of his statement becomes all the more relevant when we look at the third commodity
chain. As said, it was difficult to get clear-cut information on this part of the timber economy. While
it partly operates like the second chain, the scale and value of the timber sources and the consumers it
is targeting would lead to lesser involvement of the lower rungs of the different relevant departments.
Pressure would be put directly on the higher branches of the forest and police departments to limit the
involvement of these actors. It remains unclear to what extent both rebel movement and paramilitary
are involved in the trade. While we have indications that NDFB and ex-BLT are facilitating the
trade and extract taxes, the role of the paramilitary is even more difficult to ascertain. It remains
unclear whether the BTAD-specific power networks are strong enough to penetrate the paramilitary.
4.7 Violence and the Timber Economy
While the previous section clearly shows the way that regulatory excess saturates the timber economy,
to the point where some of the timber contractors move out of the trade, the over- lapping presence of
many claimants of power and authority also provides opportunities in the timber economy. While this
sometimes worked in favor of those trying to curtail the economy—as when the NDFB informed the
DFO that members of their rival ex-BLT were extracting timber—these overlaps and confrontations
between authorities often allow for a flourishing of the timber economy.
Given the close cooperation between the different ethnic groups in the trade, one would expect
that moments of violence would disrupt the trade. However, and depending on the way that different
authorities align and confront each other during these violent episodes, violence can provide an
interstitial space where the regulatory excess becomes reduced. While we have already mentioned
that during periods of conflict Adivasi or Bodo villagers are not too keen on entering the forest
depending on which rebel movement might be present, in discussions with forest officials, NGO
personal, and officials of the Assam Police, it became clear that during times of conflict the timber
trade was usually at its peak due to the withdrawal of certain armed actors. During counterinsurgency
operations, the militants usually left the forests and fled across the borders into Bhutan. The forest
guards and rangers also mostly left their posts, with paramilitary often engaged in combating
militants rather than catching timber smugglers. This usually lifted existing patterns of territorial
control. The timber “syndicate” exploited this.
Also, and this seems to go directly against the dominant narratives of never-ending ethnic conflict,
it was not only paramilitary operations which facilitated the trade. Likewise, when ethnic violence
occurred in a different part of BTAD, this could benefit the timber economy. Ethnic clashes would
draw away the paramilitary and police, making the puzzle slightly less complicated. In some cases,
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rebel movements would also be drawn away to participate in the violence (either actively or as a
protection force). This would again lift the normal patterns of territorial control and allow the trade
to exploit this. While this would, of course, depend on the fear of a spillover of the violence to the
timber extracting communities, it remains hard to ascertain how such calculations are made.
In contrast, during elections, the timber economy faced a draught due to the presence of additional
security forces and checkpoints, which heightened risks. Since data for this article were collected
during the BTAD council and AssamAssembly elections, interviews with both Bodo and Muslim
traders revealed, “business is down now because of elections. There is too much security and we
cannot extract as much timber as during times of conflict or otherwise.” Elections are also the
times when usually authorities like the army, paramilitary, and police took control of the forest and
heightened counterinsurgency operations so as to avoid any form of electoral violence.
4.8 Coping Economies and Unequal Relations of Exchange
From the previous sections, it becomes possible to outline three types of relationships of exchange
in the commodity chains: one between the different groups of laborers involved in the commodity
chain; one between these groups and the power and authority structures; and finally between the
various power and authority holders themselves. When we delve deeper into these three relationships
of exchange, the inequalities between the different actors and groups become apparent. Moreover, it
highlights a particular group that up to now has remained in the background: the BTAD leadership,
including most centrally the BPF and its leader Hagrama Mohilary (which we indicated to be the
central sovereign body in Figure 4.1). The absence of the latter in Figure 4.2 can be attributed
to two seemingly contradictory elements. First, the BPF leadership is omnipresent in all stages
of the trade, and secondly, this omnipresence is hard to locate as they are not engaged directly
in, (the taxation of) the trade. As such, the trade is dependent on their approval, while they are
directly engaged in its operation (except as consumers). It is not surprising, therefore, that most
big constructions in Kokrajhar town like hotels, guesthouses, hospitals, showrooms, and petrol
pumps are owned by Mohilary himself, his relatives, or one of his close aides. Until about 2016, a
good friend of Mohilary was running the only licensed sawmill in Kokrajhar. Moreover, a number
of other authorities and power holders are partly dependent on BPF patronage. This includes ex-
BLT, BSU, forest department, and district administration, among others. This is reflective of the all-
pervasive nature of control (not only physical but also psychological) exercised by Mohilary and
his BPF aides.
Analyzing the role of the ethnic background of the different actors in the chain, the benefits
are usually tilted in the favor of (elite and influential) Bodo. This ethnic community holds most
positions within different crucial authority structures, including the BPF and active/ex militants, but
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also in central authority structures, including the forest department and different student groups.
While Adivasi labor is crucial in the first stages of the chain, and Muslim knowhow is crucial for the
cutting of the raw timber, it is the Bodo contractors, often with a background in a rebel movement or
a close relation to the chief, which control all the interactions between the different groups. They are
able to use their (Bodo) social networks, both in the administration and in the executive leadership
to smoothen and make possible the timber trade and allow them to gather the necessary capital to
engage in the trade. Importantly, while Adivasi rebel movements like COBRA, AANLA, or Birsa
were present and were able to extract taxes from the timber economy, Bodo militant, including
NDFB and (ex-)BLT controlled larger swaths of forest land. Therefore, although it may appear
that the different ethnic groups share a relationship of collaboration against the backdrop of bitter
ethnic violence, this relationship is not equal socially, economically, or politically. As such, the
integration of different ethnic communities in the illegal timber economy should not be thought of
as having potential to integrate across ethnic groups and overcome the clear-cut ethnic divisions in
the area. We observed that in most cases the relationship was contained to the economic sphere
without having a spillover effect on everyday social or even political interactions. The second phase
of data for this article was, for instance, gathered during the time of Assam State Assembly elections.
In this context, it was found, during an interview with a local Muslim timber dealer, that while in
front of his Bodo suppliers he “pretended” that he and his co-villagers would vote for the ruling
BPF party, as soon as the Bodo men had left, the trader told us that they would definitely vote for a
Muslim party.47
When compared to Adivasi laborers, the Muslim timber traders were clearly better off. Because
of their distance from the nodes of extraction itself, they usually enjoyed a fairly lax regime in terms
of risks and also possessed access to capital to procure and process timber. Still, a visit to the home
of a Muslim timber trader revealed that he had to fully depend on Bodo suppliers to deliver the big
logs to his home for further sawing and supply, as well as for the costumers who mostly engaged
a Bodo contractor for their supply. On the day of visit, we also met the Bodo suppliers and when
asked about them, the Muslim trader whispered, “these boys are ex-NDFB, look at him without a
hand and an eye. He lost it in a blast.” Although it is hard to ascertain the truth of this information,
the fear in the eyes of this Muslim trader was apparent. The village itself had also been completely
gutted by Bodo, most likely from neighboring villages during an earlier episode of ethnic violence
in 2012. Given that Muslim and Adivasi were mostly at the receiving end of the violence, one could
think that amicable relations might develop between these groups as part of their engagement in
the timber trade. However, given their relatively different class background and the fact that their
relation was fully mediated by Bodo contractors, we found no traces of such emergent relationship.
TheAdivasis, despite having the closest physical proximity to the forest, could be said to have the
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least control over the trade. They were either engaged in firewood collection or worked as laborers
to fell the trees and to transport the timber. Due to a lack of capital, but also the necessary networks,
they were mostly not part of procurement or processing. As some of the Adivasi firewood collectors
stated: “We do see syndicates operating inside the forest and militants, but we do not meddle with
them since what they are doing requires capital and is all part of the black market.” Except for
some forest areas that are claimed to be a hotbed of Adivasi militants like the COBRA, AANLA, or
Birsa, the Adivasi did have limited control over forest areas. Moreover, in recent times, most of
these militant groups have surrendered their weapons, which further weakened the Adivasi access
to powerful patrons.48 Still, a Forest Ranger argued: “Santhals [one of the main Adivasi groups] are
the main destroyer of forest since they aid timber smugglers.”
This indicates that access to forest profits itself is dependent on one’s embeddedness within
social and political networks. The unequal power relations within the commodity chains were also
reflected in terms of economic returns. Let us give some indication based on the petty timber trade.
We already mentioned that an Adivasi gets about INR 500–700 for pulling a cartload of timber. It
has to be kept in mind that for most of these Adivasis, this was an irregular source of employment.
When it comes to the costs associated with the commodity itself, the Muslim trader paid about INR
400–450 per cft to the Bodo contractor. The timber that lay in front of me in one of my visits to a
Muslim trader’s house was worth about INR 54,000 and measured around 75 cft. The timber was
clearly marked with “do not take,” which indicated that it was sourced from timber seized by the
forest department. The Muslim trader would have to pay an additional cost to cover taxes or bribes
that were paid on the way. Besides, he would also pay labor costs for sawing at about INR 100 per
cft. He could then sell the sawed timber to a customer for about INR 1,000–1,500 per cft, depending
on the social and economic status of the client. According to the son of this particular timber dealer,
“in a good month, we can make up to INR 25,000.” It has to be kept in mind that Bodo contractors
could make over INR 50,000 for those involved in the petty timber trade, whereas those involved
in a more syndicate or mafia-type trade could earn “lakhs” (meaning anything over INR 100,000;
interview with an experienced local journalist).
While the above indicates that good profits continue to be made within the timber economy, it
is necessary to state that for many actors, if not for most, it continues to be not much more than a
coping economy. According to a high-level police official, “more than sixty per cent of the rural
population engages in one or the other form of timber trade.” This is most apparent for the Adivasis.
They engage in firewood collection and can be found at the lower rungs of the timber trade, where
they work as laborers inside the forest and for transport. Moreover, while the Muslim trader is able
to work for profit, his aides, while skilled, do not benefit similarly. Finally, while Bodo contractors
operate the chain, and Bodo elites benefit, in the form of bribes, taxes, or as consumers. A majority
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of Bodos remains excluded from these benefits. As such, while this article might have given the
impression of a full-fledged Bodo dominance, for many, Bodo firewood collection remains a part of
their everyday coping strategies. And some Bodo youth take up a similar position as the Adivasi,
also being engaged in the felling of trees. As such, while ethnic boundaries and the ways these are
maintained are crucial in understanding the political economy of BTAD, we should not turn a blind
eye to class based lines of distinctions which run through the different ethnic communities.
4.9 Conclusion: Everyday Timber Extraction Consumption
In 2012, on World environment day, the forest department conducted a drawing com-
petition in a forest village, that is, a hot spot for timber extraction. The theme of the
competition was “bon” [forest]. Almost all the children drew trees being cut, and
timber/logs being carried out in carts. (Interview with a high-level forest official)
This example shows how deeply the economy of timber extraction is embedded in the “everyday”
of the community who are an essential part of our timber constellation. For them, extraction of
forest resources like timber was almost a natural source of livelihood. Although they knew it was
illegal and, in recent times, were also aware of the fast depletion of forest cover, they observed
on a daily basis “truck and cart loads of timber being taken out of the forest” (interview with an
Adivasi village headmen living in proximity to a fringe forest village). As stated above, in our
commodity chain, the extractor and the consumer often know each other and, unlike in GCC, the
consumer in our case exactly knows where the timber is being sourced. This led us to interview
several consumers (who are often absent in GCC framework analysis). Most of these consumers
were student leaders, local politicians, and NGO personal who, for instance (slightly ironically),
organized the annual World Environment Day events by planting saplings and spreading awareness,
but at the same time used illegal timber to build their homes. It appeared as a situation of moral
duality where cutting trees was unacceptable but using timber cut from this very tree was acceptable.
As long as one was not directly involved in extraction processes, it was easy to blame the syndicate,
“the Muslim traders,” and the “woodcutters” for the loss of forest.
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5 Rural Informalities and Forest Squatters in the Reserved
Forests of Assam, India
Dutta, A. (2018). Rural informalities and forest squatters in the reserved forests
of Assam, India. Critical Asian Studies, 1-22.
Me: “Will you sell me some of your land, since you say you have over fifteen bighas1
of land?”
Jogeswar Lakra2: “Why do you have to buy land from me? Look around (pointing to
vast stretches of forestland) there is mela maati (abundance of land). Go and dokhol
some!”
Abstract
It has now been well established that forests in South Asia are postcolonial political zones.
In Assam, in northeast India this was accomplished through the colonial project of converting
jungles into Reserved Forests. Using the politics of dokhol, which translates to grab or occupy
by force, as an entry point, I interrogate the comparative epistemologies of forms and trajectories
of squatting and informality in urban and rural contexts. This inquiry becomes particularly
important since the focus on relational ties between squatting and informality has been predom-
inantly urban centric. Neither has there been any systematic attempt at understanding everyday
forms of life and informality in these rural settlements. My intent is to systematically unpack the
everyday practice, maintenance and sustenance of dokhol within the reserved forests of Bodo
Territorial Autonomous District. This entails an extension and confrontation of the existing
scholarship on formal-informal dichotomies in relation to rural squatters, in particular those
on forestland. I do so by using a methodology, combining an ethnographic study of dokhol by
rural squatters with three influential strands of critical scholarship on urban squatting, namely
Partha Chatterjee’s political society, Asaf Bayat’s quiet encroachment, and Ananya Roy’s take
on planning and deregulation. My agenda is to push the case of rural informalities further and
open a dialogue between the two forms of informalities – rural and urban, especially in the
context of South Asia. Keywords: Reserved Forests, rural Informality, encroachment, gray
legality, ethnic conflict
1 In Assam, 1 bigha= 1/3 acres (approximately).
2 Personal interview with Jogeswar Lakra, Lung Sung Forest Division, Kokrajhar District, March 28, 2016. I have
changed all names to maintain confidentiality.
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5.1 Introduction —Why Rural Informality?
At the time of my fieldwork, Jogeswar had been residing in the Lung Sung block under the Haltugaon
forest division within the Bodo Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) of Assam for over three
decades. Being a proud encroacher of over fifteen bighas of reserved forestland.3 His response to
my question, asked in jest, unlocked a Pandora’s box regarding everyday forms and practices of
informality in rural squatter settlements inside the reserved forests of Assam.
Using the politics of dokhol, as an entry point, in this article I interrogate the comparative
epistemologies of forms and trajectories of squatting and informality in urban and rural contexts.
Dokhol is a local Bengali/Assamese word that translates as “to grab or occupy,” usually illegally. In
this context Joeswar used it in relation to land. The most common response among my interviewees
as to how they came to possess land was through dokhol.
This inquiry is salient because the main focus on relational ties between squatting and informality
has been predominantly urban. On the one hand, encroaching on public space and public order has
been more pronounced within urban settings. Due in part to the prevalence of police surveillance,
urban conflicts over encroachment are more visible and audible, and hence attract more media and
scholarly attention.4
Conversely, rural forms of squatting and informality have received scarce attention. Tania Li has
examined rural squatting in the Dongi-Dongi valley inside Lore Lindu National Park in Sulawesi,
Indonesia.5 In that case, access to land and natural resources were guided by customary rights that
are locally acknowledged and respected, but not formally registered, and therefore “not recognized
by the various official agencies responsible for allocating state” land.6 Similarly, Ann Stoler has
written about squatter settlements and subsequent resistance movements around northern Sumatra’s
plantation peripheries during the 1960s and 1970s.7 More recently Carl Griffin has provided a
systematic historical account of squatting practices in rural Britain within the post-Restoration New
Forest characterizing squatting as an abuse to forest resources.8 This existing body of work on
rural squatting in the milieu of plantations or on the fringes of national parks has been framed in
a context of resistance rather than everyday forms of mediations and negotiations.9 Neither has
there been any systematic attempt at understanding everyday forms of life and informality in these
3 All forestland in Assam is officially state owned.
4 Personal communication, with Asef Bayat, March 10, 2018
5 Li 2007,167.
6 Li 2007, 98.
7 Stoler 1986.
8 Griffin 2018.
9 For an overview of work related to rural squatting in the context of resistance see Li 2007, Griffin 2018, Hilson
2013, Cattaneo 2013.
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rural settlements. My intent is to systematically unpack the everyday practice, maintenance, and
sustenance of dokhol within the reserved forests of BTAD, where dokhol operates as a form of gray
legality. This entails an extension and confrontation of the existing scholarship on formal-informal
dichotomies in relation to rural squatters, in particular those on forestland, mostly referred to as
encroachers rather than squatters. 10
In South Asia the debate around informality has been framed through theorizations of the urban
poor who live in slums and wage their claims to space and resources from a disadvantaged position
as “citizens without a city.”11 The literature on state engagement practiced by the urban poor
across several cities in South Asia has revealed a multitude of methods, exploiting the pluralistic,
multifaceted and fissured state apparatus.12 Partha Chatterjee (2004) illustrated these everyday
forms of engagement by squatters with the state through his concept of political society. Other
scholars emphasize forms of negotiation, claims to urban citizenship by the urban poor, and more
recently and the concept of insurgent citizenship.13 Roy (2004) has argued for the concept of a
subaltern urbanism that not only explores the slum or squatter settlement as a “terrain of habitation,
livelihood, and politics,” but as well as a key theoretical frame for rethinking the “epistemologies and
methodologies of urban studies.”14 Bert Suykens has engaged with everyday forms of negotiations
through the dakhal regime in the context of a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh, arguing “the notion of
dakhal firmly positions the use of informality by the (relatively) wealthy (jomidar) in the seemingly
quintessential place of the poor, thus showing their interconnectedness.” 15 To sum up, scholars of
urban informality in South Asia have consistently examined the various forms of popular agency
developed by the urban poor and their forms of resistance to state authorities.
In this article, I shift away from this urban-centrism to illustrate how squatting plays out in
a remote rural context characterized by conflict along ethno-religious lines, violence-induced
displacement, and natural disasters like floods. A better understanding of rural forms of squatting
not only contributes to the general body of work on squatting and informality in South Asia and
beyond but also shows how squatting and informality play out in precarious rural environments. I
combine an ethnographic study of the dokhol regime of rural squatters inAssamwith three influential
10 For a comprehensive discussion around issues of the urban poor living in slums, jhuggis and squatter settlements
and discourses on urban rehabilitation, re-settlement and poverty alleviation specifically in the global south see
Ramanathan 2006; Suykens 2015; Benjamin 2008; Isabaeva 2013; Björkman 2014; Hatcher 2015; Rao 2013
11 Appadurai 2001, 27.
12 See Ranganathan 2014; Rao 2013 (who uses the concept of “tolerated encroachment,” and Das 2011. Jha et al. 2007
discuss how local politicians serve as alternative democratic conduits for the urban poor to derive concessions from
the state. Appadurai 2001 and Kumar 2016 demonstrate how the urban poor challenge governmentality from below.
13 For a detailed overview on urban citizenship claims see Zerah et al. 2011. For ”post-media” urbanism in postcolonial
India see Sundaram 2010.
14 Roy 2011, 224.
15 See Suykens 2015.
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strands of critical scholarship on urban squatting: namely Partha Chatterjee’s political society,16
Asaf Bayat’s quiet encroachment,17 and Ananya Roy’s planning and deregulation.18
The abovementioned scholarship denotes how urban ontologies on informality tend to span
collective and individual demands for socio-economic recognition, representation, and access
to state welfare services and resources. Although similar categories exist when it comes to rural
informalities, an intimate relationship withmaati (land) is a centrifugal point of ontological departure.
This relationship can be traced back to the colonial history of forest making in the state.19
Urban squatter settlements are usually home to rural migrants, essentially poor people with limited
resources.20 As Janice Perlman (2004) writes in the context of favelas in Brazil, they are perceived as
“cancerous sores on the beautiful body of the city” and dens of “anti-social activities, filth and various
pathologies.” 21 Such claims do not always hold true for rural squatters, because while the slum
appears as the “other” in the eyes of city dwellers or civil society,22 rural squatters remain “others”
mostly in the eyes of state forest authorities. This form of alienation from aspects of urban living
has led to the emergence of “right to the city,” a concept coined by Henri Lefebvrein the context
of university students protesting in the streets of Paris in May 1968. 23 David Harvey (2003) later
linked this to Marxist theory and argued that excluded protestors should go beyond their individual
status and strive for collective rights to shape every aspect of the city. In recent times, urban groups
have seized upon the term as a slogan to protest against political oppression, disenfranchisement,
and unequal distribution of urban services.24 More recently, there has been renewed attention within
the urban squatting literature on poor people’s movements, while ethnographers have focused on
“cramped spaces,”25 spaces within which subaltern classes resist and rebel against government
programs.26
However, the concept of rights to the city and everyday resistance might be too extreme in the
context to this study. This is encroachment for survival- one day at a time. Rather than a potential
site of resistance against exclusion, it is a site of domination and unequal relations of power. To me,
the squatters I have engaged with are subjected to even harsher forms of isolation–social, economic
16 Chatterjee 2004.
17 Bayat 2000, 2013. Although Bayat used the concept of quiet encroachment in the context of Middle East and
authoritarian regimes, authors like Hackenbroch 2013 and Subadevan and Naqvi 2017, among others have used it in
the context of urban slums in Dhaka in Bangladesh and Chennai in India.
18 Roy 2004.
19 Saikia 2008
20 Roy and Alsayyad 2004.
21 Perlman 2004, 120.
22 Chatterjee 2004, 38.
23 Lefebvre 1996 [1967].
24 LeGates and Stout 2015.
25 Li 2007.
26 Roy 2013.
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and political–than their urban counterparts.
Some have argued that urban squatters can derive inspiration by observing the life of the city,
while it continues to be hard for them to embrace that dream.27 As such, while urban squatter
settlements have often been considered to be at the margins of the state,28 forest squatters’ lives
are far more marginal. They barely have social or economic networks outside of the forest, and in
almost all cases they lack the capital–both social and economic–required to migrate to cities and
become urban squatters. In such a context, talking about a “right to the forest” would be spurious.
5.2 Jungle Becomes Forest — The Colonial Project
The colonial project of transforming jungle into forest changed the face of Assam, especially the
northwest of the state, Bodoland. The drawing of new borders around an unrestricted jungle to
which everybody had access was part of a British policy to make its colonies profitable. In order
to do this, natural capital – sal wood, rubber, and silk worms – had to be clearly inventoried. This
mapping of the jungle became a political project from 1826 onwards. 29 The British Imperial Forest
Department, created in 1868, finished the mapping after fifty years. By 1874, much of the jungle
in this region had been transformed and divided into a reserved forest, into which only the Forest
Department could enter.. Political competitors – zamindars (big landowners) and local chiefs – were
granted access to some forest resources. This policy aided keeping these local elites in check and
created a dependency relationship. The main goal of the project was to keep the local population out
of the forest.Violence and political repression against encroaching foresters and shifting cultivators
(jhummers) was thus inherent to border-making.30 The state agency given jurisdiction over this
territory, the Forest Department, claimed exclusive rights to allocate and enforce use rights (for
example, logging, grazing, or mining) while setting conditions and refraining from allocating the
right to lease, transfer, or sell the land.
Although the British presence in Assam dates back to the Treaty of Yandaboo in 1826, it was only
in the 1870s that the British sought to expand their grip on the Assamese economy and regulate the
mobility of its tribal population. Competing ownership claims to resources and land in the present
can be traced back to the East India Company, which had asserted property rights over the vast
forest territories of Assam. This colonial appropriation was sanctified by legislation in the years of
27 Perlman 2004.
28 Das and Poole 2004.
29 The treaty of Yandaboo was signed in 1826 between the kingdom of Ava and Britain and led to the withdrawal of the
Burmese fromAssam and by 1842 the whole of Assam came under the British rule.
30 Saikia 2008; Van Schendel, Mey and Dewan 2000 write about the marginalization of indegenous jhummers in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts after it came under the colonial rule in the 1860s.
110
British imperialism.31 Various legal enactments led to a situation in which most forest areas were
leased out to British tea planters.32
These tea plantations required enhanced labor support and this was supplied by immigrant workers
from across British India.33 Thousands of Adivasi peasants and Bengalis were resettled in Assam
as tea and jute plantation workers. Interestingly, in local popular imagination the forest remained
part of the agrarian frontier, notwithstanding the changed landscape. This land grabbing by British
tea planters led to eventual upheaval and disturbances in the area, leading the British colonial
government to introduce an inner line permit system in 1873.34 According to Guha (1977), “Under
this system, an imaginary line was drawn in the districts under pressure in order to settle immigrants
in segregated areas.”35 The net result of land settlement in Assam shifted large expanses of land and
forest resources from the control of the peasantry to the colonial state. In recent years, this historic
land issue has reemerged at the heart of recurring ethno-political conflict in the region, demonstrated
by the practice of dokhol.36
5.3 ATheatre of Violent Conflict on Ethno-Religious Lines: Forest becomes
Frontline
The continuation of the colonial process of forest making in the post-colonial period is particularly
significant in the case of Adivasis37 and their settlements inside the forestlands of western Assam.
These populations are erstwhile tea laborers whose forefathers have migrated to Assam from central
and eastern India at different periods since the middle of the nineteenth century in search of work.
Being non-Scheduled Tribes in Assam, their descendants have no forest use rights. Over time, these
Adivasis (along with Bengali migrants) became part of a rural mobility and began to seek land in
distant forests. Agitated and threatened by their continued efforts at grabbing forestland, Bodos
clamored for state protection of tribal land, which led in 1947 to the amendment of the Land and
Revenue Regulation Act of 1886. The newly independent government of India created tribal belt
and block areas.38 This restricted the transfer of land to non-indigenous people in such protected
31 Saikia 2008.
32 Guha 1993.
33 Bhowmick 1981; Siddique 1990.
34 Vandekerckhove 2009.
35 Guha 1977.
36 See Mishra1999, 2012, 2013; Barbora 2008; Baruah 1999, 2001; Vandekerckhove 2009.
37 Adivasis here mostly refer to groups who were brought from Bengal, undivided Bihar, and the Chotanagpur plateau
to work on tea plantations. They consist mainly of Oraon, Munda, and Santhals. In recent times there are claims of
Santhals immigrating to these areas from Jharkhand. While these groups have specific rights over forestland under
the Forest Rights Act, this does not extend to BTAD where they do not have scheduled caste (ST) status.
38 The tribal belts and blocks were established with the objective of protecting land from occupation by
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Figure 5.1: Squatter settlement burnt during Bodo-Adivasi conflict in December 2014, Ultapaani
Reserved Forest, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
areas. However, land in tribal reserves continued to be sold to outsiders well into the 1980s. Not
surprisingly the issue of protection of tribal land and forests was a prominent demand of the All
Bodo Student Union’s (ABSU) agitation for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland, which
turned violent in the later part of 1980s after the formation of insurgent groups. This illustrates how
the Bodo–Adivasi-Muslim conflict that followed “was about land and its delineation, as the Bodo
militants saw their natural, exclusive ethno-botanical link with their Bodo homeland threatened by
the non-autochthones”.39
It is therefore important to situate the emergence of dokhol within the turbulent movement for a
separate state of Bodoland, which in turn is intertwined in a history of forest making and insurgency.
The Bodoland Movement culminated in 2003 with a tripartite Memorandum of Agreement known
groups other than the protected class of people such as plains and hills tribes, STs, and Nepali grazers. Later on,
indigenous Koch-Rajbongshis of Goalpara, Dhubri, Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts were also added to this
category.
39 Vandekerckhove 2009.
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as the second Bodo Accord. The Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) was then established and four
Bodoland Autonomous Territorial Districts delineated. Although this accord ended the insurgency
the process has been commonly referred to as a manufactured peace since it continues to be temporal.
Incidents of violence erupted again between Bodos and Muslims and Bodos and Adivais in 2008,
2012, and 2014. A key feature of the conflict is that it took place in the forests bordering Bhutan
and Arunachal Pradesh.40 The area was once known as Kachari (an older terminology for the Bodo)
Dooar and acknowledged as the traditional territory of the Bodo people. As already mentioned,
large parts of the area, mostly forest lands, bordering Bhutan andArunachal Pradesh was turned into
reserved forests during British colonization, subsequently making it off-limits for the indigenous
people of the region. Initially it was mostly due to the scarcity of cultivable land that led both
Bodos andAdivasis to encroach on the forest areas. However, interviews with local non government
organization’s (NGO) staff, forest officers and members of theABSU indicate that a sizeable number
of Bodos settled in these reserved forests during the Bodoland movement in the early 1990s in
order to match the already settled Adivasi population. This was possible because the forest areas
during the conflict were mostly controlled by insurgent groups like the Bodo Liberation Tigers and
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. Only after 2000 were stringent counter-insurgency
measures resumed. Moreover, in recent times, the reserved forests have also served as a place for
temporary rehabilitation of victims of ethnic violence.
The reserved forests in the Bodo region thus have emerged as a gray zone of informal economies
and practices. This is because the continued state attempt to control forests has not eliminated
illegality or informality, rather as I shall empirically show, at many levels it has stimulated it.
5.4 Comparative Epistemologies: Urban-Rural
Delving into urban informalities, Partha Chatterjee has emphasized the notion of “para-legality” in
the context of a Railway colony in the city of Kolkata.41 Lacking full citizenship, the vast majority
of India’s urban population is left to make claims on the state from the murky field of political
brokerage, which he calls the “political society,” where the needs of this excluded populace are
voiced and occasionally met, but always as conditional claims rather than formal rights.42 The
political society makes claims to state services by forming associations and by “making a large
array of connections outside the group—with other groups in similar situations, more privileged and
40 The data for this paper was collected primarily in reserved forests bordering Bhutan and therefore the focus will be
on that specific borderland.
41 Chatterjee 2004.
42 Chatterjee 2004.
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influential groups, government functionaries, political parties and leaders.”43 This political society
is not segregated along caste, religious, or ethnic lines, especially when it comes to lobbying for
rights and services. As one of his interviewees explained, “We are all a single family. We don’t
distinguish between refugees from East Bengal and those from villages in West Bengal.”44
My observations on rural forms of squatting and informalities digress from this form of political
society on several points. The political society approach over-emphases collective action through
associations, especially in the case of communities that do not live in urban cityscapes with direct
access to politicians and state officers. Moreover, BTADs is a militarized society unlike urban
centers like Delhi, Kolkata, or Mumbai. Additionally, the squatter settlements in these districts are
ethnically segregated, since the very nature of conflict in the region has been on ethnic lines. Also,
urban slums are made up of rural migrants who relocated to the semi- urban periphery of cities. In
some cases cities grow around them. This story does not take into account the tales of those who
have neither the resources nor the networks to migrate from rural areas and thus are relegated to the
peripheries of rural areas, such as forests. When asked about the trajectory of mobility, more recent
settlers in these districts responded, “Our houses have been burned during the conflict and we are
too scared to go back. We do not have the means to migrate to Guwahati like some of our neighbors
back in the village.” They always added, “We wish for our own iece of land” (amak nizor maati
laage).
Ananya Roy in her work on urban informality asserts that emerging patterns of informal urban
development in many regions of the world occur on private rather than public plots of land, involving
new and shifting configuration of actors like real-estate developers, liberalizing government officers
and bourgeois urbanities. 45 She describes informality as a mode of metropolitan urbanization
and argues that South Asian research on this topic can make a significant contribution to the
understanding of such processes. 46 With its strident focus on the agrarian question, the spatiality of
rural urban nexuses, and the implications of neo liberal reforms for stage power, this research can
address questions about how the rural-urban interface is determined by urban and agrarian laws
and regulations, and how these are restructured in the context of liberalization. Along with the
political society literature, this assumes that SouthAsian and particularly Indian t urban informalities
operate within not only a vibrant democracy but also one free from violence along ethnic and
religious lines. However, rural informality within the BTAD is more akin to that of Lebanon
during its civil war, with ethnic politics playing a crucial role, or the case of Israel/Palestine, where
informal land rights of settlers have been intensely ethicized. Moreover Roy’s focus has mostly
43 Chatterjee 2004, 40-41.
44 Chatterjee 2004, 56.
45 Roy 2004
46 Roy 2009
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been on semi-urban peripheries, while my focus is on the peripheries of the rural. The increasing
(dis)associations between the state and encroachers unpack the spatial and legal categorization of
the forest settlements as informal, given that the ontological division between the formal and the
informal and the hegemonic connection of the state to legality appear to be increasingly devious.47
In regard to resistance, empirical evidence suggests that instead of resisting the state, forest
squatters make deliberate attempts to remain invisible from the gaze of the state, baring certain
events like evictions or elections, when the state comes to them. Typically, they make do with
whatever limited resources and services they have access to.
Forms of rural informality in BTAD are similar mirror the squatting, street trading, and the illegal
tapping of utilities in urban Iran observed by Bayat: “… quiet encroachment - silent, protracted but
pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public in order to
survive and improve their lives”.48 These processes of appropriation have been enacted “quietly,
individually, and gradually” rather than through organized social movements or associations, and
are justified as acts of necessity in a context where the state has failed to provide employment or
housing.
In the case of rural informalities, there is no supply of electricity, water pipelines, gas, or services
such as health-care or education to illegally tap inside the reserved forests. Forest squatters silently
squat on their most valued possession, land, in the context of violent conflict and forms of insecure
land tenure.
5.5 Ethnographic Inquiry into the Site and the Notion of Dokhol
I conducted over ten months of ethnographic fieldwork in three phases. The first phase was carried
out from April to June 2014, after an episode of ethnic violence between Bodos and Muslims in
April 2014, followed by the national elections in May 2014. The second phase was from February to
May 2015, and preceded ethnic clashes between Bodos and Adivasis in December 2014 and BTAD
council elections in April 2015. The final phase was from February to May 2016, during which
time the AssamAssembly elections were held. During my fieldwork I focused on five factors that
not only reinforce the dokhol regime but also add to our knowledge of gray legalities. These factors
include recurring violence along ethnic lines, periodic elections, episodic evictions, construction of
semi-permanent structures, and counter-insurgency operations. Although similar processes can be
found at work in urban settlements, the geographical, socio-political, and economical context of
these rural settlements distinguish them from urban peripheries.
47 C.f. Rajagopal 2008.
48 Bayat 2000.
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Figure 5.2: A girl poses inside her home (interiors of a forest squatter’s home), Lungsung, Kokrajhar
District. Credit: Author.
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I situate these factors within the system of institutional decentralization, where the forest depart-
ment falls under the local BTAD administration. The counter-insurgency operations within the
forest is led by the state of Assam through Assam Police and Indian central government through the
Indian Army. However, resettlement policies post conflict is the responsibility of the Assam state,
the central government of India as well as the BTAD. These factors shed light on how the space of
gray legality in a rural and forest space is comprised of a complex web of relations, recognitions,
and concessions that transcends formal (legal) property rights within a system of unauthorized
tenure leading to insecure and uncertain tenure and access to forest resources. It is thus similar to
Chatterjee’s railway colony and Roy’s processes of deregulation. Before detailing each of these
factors, I sketch the context in a more empirical fashion through one of my visits to Sorolpara, a
remote village located within the Haltugaon forest division in Kokrajhar district on the indo-Bhutan
borderlands. I was accompanied by a forest ranger and his team of forest guards, which enabled me
to observe interactions between authorities and encroachers. A walk through the destroyed vestige
of the forest49 presented a gradual appropriation of space, with tiny make-shift bamboo hovels
scattered across the landscape with plots of land in front used for cultivating chilies and mustard.
We ventured deep and came across what according to the forest ranger was a green patch with
several tall trees the last time he was there, some three months before this. It had been cleared
and converted into a cowshed. The ranger was apparently informed of this by the para-military
patrolling the area. This infuriated the ranger:
We already give them so much leeway, the last time I visited I asked them to stay on already
deforested areas of land and not cut more trees by sticking to marshy land on the river bank. The
District Forest Officer (DFO) had drawn an imaginary boundary six months back and had requested
them to not cross that, but these greedy people have crossed this line as well. I will not do anything
but report to the police and let the police deal with it.
He added, “Most of these encroachers are new settlers and have come from nearby villages or
even Jharkhand.50”
The practice of claiming, clearing and eventually allocating pieces of land was usually executed
through brokers or diwanis51 who were in most cases headmen of an existing village within the
49 There has been a rapid erosion of what actually constitutes forestland in the region. In post- colonial times, this
was through rampant felling of trees during the Bodoland movement, when timber sales were used to fund the
rebel movement, state administrators cleared the forest for counter-insurgency operations, and Bodo and adivasi
communities cut the forest for construction of houses and farming. In recent times, rampant timber smuggling has
also been a cause of deforestation. Therefore, in reality the landscape is one of vast stretches of cleared land with
mostly non-precious trees strewn around and bamboo huts.
50 Jharkhand is a state in Eastern India. The Santhals are an adivasi ethnic group native to this state.
51 This describes a person who yields power especially through close relationships with local politicians and adminis-
trators.
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Figure 5.3: A squatter settlement deep inside the forest in Sorolpara, Kokrajhar district. Credit:
Author.
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reserved forests. The diwani (in most cases belonging to adivasi or Bodo ethnic groups) first claims
and clears a big patch of land, builds a thatch and bamboo house, and proclaims himself the headman.
He then invites people in his social network (but within his own ethnic group) that live in nearby
villages or those that have been displaced due to conflict or natural disasters to come and settle on a
piece of land usually measuring about twelve bighas52 in return for a small fee. Over time families
settle and the cleared land is transformed into a small hamlet with as many as fifteen households. In
interviews with settlers, residents were unanimously aware of encroaching on state property, since
each time I asked how they came in possession of land, the answer was “ami dokhol korisu or etu
dokhol maati” (we have encroached or this is occupied land). They said they had purchased the land
from a certain forest official and in consultation with the dewai they had the right to rent, sell, or
transfer their landholdings within their ethnic group with the approval of the rajya53. When I asked
if they had directly paid the forest official, the usual response was, “No … we paid to the diwani
and he assured us that he would pay to the official on our behalf.” This indicates the reluctance of
the squatters to engage directly with the forest authorities.
When I posed this question to the forest ranger, hewas completely unaware of any such transactions
and said that land clearing was an illegal racket run by the diwanis in connivance with and backing of
local politicians. It was evident that the fuzzy boundaries drawn by the forest officer were frequently
transgressed, often with the knowledge of these officers. In an interview the District Forest Officer
(DFO) explained how evictions were mostly symbolic:
GIS imagery from 1976 reveals no trace of settlements in Lungsung and Sorolpara, indicating
this as a recent phenomenon. When it comes to eviction, we carry it out peacefully and give the
encroachers prior notice so that they have time to gather their belongings. Given the limited financial
budget of the forest department, eviction drives have become a rarity and mostly symbolic. After
all, these are poor people and they also need a place to live. We usually encourage them to erect
temporary bamboo structures so that the damage during evictions is minimal and they can move
back to their homes within a day. Evictions are mostly a way to contain the expansion of settlements
rather than permanent displacement or ousting of the population.
There are no resettlement or rehabilitation policies for forest squatters, who forest officers refer to
as jongli or wild. Moreover, given the remoteness of these settlements, lack of resources, and risks of
insurgency, it is extremely difficult even for the forest department to have adequate data on the actual
number of households illegally occupying state forestland. Secondly, the production of informality
in this context challenges the notion that state institutions enact laws in an unambiguous manner.
52 In Assam, 1 bigha= 1/3 acres (approximately).
53 A rajya is something like a panchayat but in this case informally selected by the villagers comprising of old and
wise men with economic resources and political connections. Matters of land allocation, allocation of votes, settling
of disputes are generally managed and decided on by them.
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Figure 5.4: Home of a forest squatter from outside, in Lungsung, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
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Rather, in this ambiguous space of gray legality and insecure tenure, a symbiotic and symbolic
relationship prevails between (formal) state and informal practices.54 The encroachers comply
with periodic evictions as long as they are given prior notification and have time to gather their
valuables, if any, since their most valued possession is the land. Recent squatters have transgressed
boundaries in two ways- by being invisible, usually venturing deep inside the reserved forest to areas
not frequented by forest officers, and by expanding existing settlements rather than establishing
new villages, making it difficult for the forest officers to identify new settlements.55
Similar to their counterparts who spend years squatting in urban areas, transgression and improvi-
sation become the condition of living for forest encroachers, without necessarily resulting in forms
of collective action. The collective life of those living on the fringes is one of jugaad, the creative
and opportunistic piecing together of arrangements, exemplified by the practice of squatting or
encroaching.56 This symbiotic relationship between law as manifested through the state apparatus
and legal acts and forest as a political space of everyday contestation and negotiations have been
continuing since colonial times.57
Additional issues concerning security and counter-insurgency operations seep into the everyday
practices of encroachment, which makes the geography of rural squatting unique as compared to
an urban city. This comes with constant vigilance and patrolling by the armed forces as well as
their impunity to kill under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The consistent lack of
clarity in respect to state laws related to informality and the drawing of fuzzy boundaries within
the reserved forests enables flexible accommodation, but also gives unchecked eviction rights to
state officers.58 Boundaries within forests are ambiguously assigned and in a constant state of
flux depending on relationships between encroachers and officers. Therefore, the dokhol regime
comprises “fuzzy zones of compromise, hide and seek, accumulation and accommodation” that
“become the rule rather than exception.”59
Next, I turn to the five factors that aid in the practice of dokhol over time. These are not to
be viewed in isolation but overlap and flow from and into the other. These factors help unpack
comparative epistemologies of mutually exclusive contexts of informality and marginalization that
have great potential in interrogating meanings of gray zones by incorporating accounts of rural
informality.
54 See Cooper 1998
55 Interview with forest ranger on September 15, 2016.
56 cf. Gotz and Simone 2003; Simone 2001.
57 Sivaramakrishnan 1995.
58 Hall, Hirsh and Li 2011,12
59 Ibid, 16
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5.5.1 Recurring Violence on Ethnic Lines
BTAD has been the site of recurrent violent contestations along ethno-religious lines. This frequently
results in large-scale displacement. Initial rehabilitation efforts by the state consist in setting up
makeshift relief camps within the reserved forest. Once temporarily settled, displaced people usually
refuse to return to their original homes, either out of personal fear, worries that their homes have
been destroyed, or concerns that they will not receive a resettlement grant to construct a new house.
There are also cases where the displaced do not have title to land and temporary resettlement serves
as a cue to work towards the establishment of a dokhol regime. As one of the DFOs explained:
The administration (referring to the district and state governments) always sets up relief camps
inside the forests since it is considered a safer haven in times of turmoil and the population can
be segregated on ethnic lines and placed in different camps under the protection of the para-
military forces. Since the army and para-military outposts are already set up inside the forest for
counter-insurgency purposes, it makes sense to place the displaced population close to these already
established units. However, once a relief camp is set up for 100 people, more than 200 arrive, even
those not affected by conflict but looking to grab land. I would blame this entire business of illegal
encroachment to administrative failure.
According to DFOs, rangers, and NGO workers I interviewed, on average about twenty to thirty
percent of people displaced after each incident of violence refuse to move back to their homes. This
is illustrated by one of my interlocutors, whose in-laws have been living in Lung Sung since the
conflict began in 1998:
My in-laws first lived around char60 land and were displaced due to soil erosion. After living in a
relief camp for a couple of months they returned to their old home and were displaced for a second
time due to the building of a dam. They were rehabilitated in a nearby village but were displaced
for a third time in 1998 due to ethnic violence. Then they contacted relatives in Lung Sung and
moved there. Now they have over fifteen bighas of dokhol land and they refuse to move anywhere
else. They will not leave their land.
This account brings to fore aspiration, a key factor in rural—urban migration. Appadurai (2004,31)
characterizes aspiration as a specifically cultural capacity, thus moving culture away from an
association with “pastness”.61 However, this does not exclude the fact that a majority of rural-urban
migration happens in search of better economic prospects. As Annapurna Shaw (2008,21) points
out in a review of Ananya Roy’s book on Calcutta Requiem: Gender and the Politics of Poverty
“With our cities growing larger, their fringes or where the urban and rural meet, have become sites
of conflict over land and other resources, and are experiencing considerable demographic and social
60 A track of land surrounded by river or sea.
61 Appadurai 2007, 31
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Figure 5.5: A post-conflict relief camp inside the reserved forest in Haltugaon Forest Division,
Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
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change.”62 She further adds that the growth in such squatter settlements since the 1980s is an
indicator of increasing landlessness in rural areas. Forest squatters illustrate the vulnerabilities of
landless, displaced populations who have no means of commuting to a city and hence find themselves
on the peripheries of remote villages. As some of my interlocutors recounted, “We will never get so
much land anywhere. We shall give our blood but not part with our land” (Ami aru kot u imaan
maati napau. Aami tez dim kintu maati nidieu). Once settled in the forest, the encroachers make
sure to not construct any permanent or solid structures and seek to remain invisible. Maneuvering
between having legal land rights (patta) and squatting emerges as a process of ambiguity subject to
resourceful manipulation.
5.5.2 Periodic Elections
Along with elections to the national parliament and the state assembly, residents of the BTAD
also elect a territorial council. The elections are an important democratic event where the jungle
emerges as a centrifugal space for political campaigns that in turn permit encroachers to leverage
the advantages of scale to address the state administration and advance their claims to the land they
occupy. Interestingly, political parties come to the forest instead of squatters going into towns to
attend political rallies. As a political imaginary, periodic elections and election campaign attempts
to build a political space in which each of its constituents can live under the safety of a state, which
I define as a temporary absence of state-led evictions. Like their urban counterparts, the diwanis
are conscious of being valued as votes and use this position to negotiate with the political parties
and the local administration for wells, roads, and even land rights. These practices are particularly
important for encroachers’ ability to engage with the state. By articulating these efforts the state is in
many ways compelled to expand the circuit of knowledge accessible to these communities. But the
engagement happens at an individual level and has not resulted in collective forms of resistance.63
Therefore voting becomes a necessity rather than an exercise of choice. As Malati who had been
dwelling on forestland in Lungsung since two decades with her family said in an interview 64,
“Elections will come and go. We vote because they ask us to vote and say if we don’t vote we will
be evicted. We just want to live peacefully inside the forest.”
This gradual involvement of the state and with the state over time in turn unpacks and shifts the
meaning of informality and reaffirms the point that these are not reified end products. To illustrate
the above, in one of my visits to Lungsung just before the 2016 AssamAssembly elections, a forest
ranger said:
62 Shaw 2008, 21
63 This resonates with squatters in Tehran who steal urban services not to express their defiance vis-a-vis the authorities,
but to necessity..See Bayat 1997.
64 Interview with Malati, Lungsung , April 19, 2016
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We [the forest department] repeatedly warn the encroachers to not cross the boundaries and clear
more trees to construct houses, but what can we do when the politicians assure them of granting
land patta. Only last week a senior Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), who has been in
power for over a decade, distributed cartons consisting of an assortment of tarpaulin sheets, utensils
like pans and pots, a bucket, mug, mosquito net and some firewood. These are gears necessary to
sustain in these forests. I have even heard that they have granted permission to an NGO for the
construction of a school on forestland. So, how are we supposed to do anything when the politicians
are encouraging them to nest illegally; because of them (politicians) we become the bad guys.
The relationships that emerge between vote seekers and the electorate is not limited to the event
of elections but often lead to formation of larger patronage networks which are of course unequal
in nature, where some encroachers manage to stay and some are forced to exit the reserved forest.
According to Chatterjee (2004,40), in case of urban slum dwellers, “They profess a readiness to
move out if they are given suitable alternative sites for resettlement, for instance.”65 But this does
not hold true for these forest squatters. Eviction usually results in them going deeper into the forest.
The process of political accommodation was explained to me by an officer of the Indian Police
Services who, being concerned with the continuing encroachment, had approached the Minister of
Forest for the BTAD. He related to me the conversation that transpired between them:
I told the Minister about a recent trip to Sorolpara where I noticed new encroachers in a particular
area. The minister said to me, if you would like to evict them, you have to do it now when they are
less in number. Once the number of households goes over forty, we will not be in a position to issue
political clearance, as it will affect our chances in the next election.
This reflects the close relationship that exists between legality and political practice on the ground,
where those in positions of power maneuver through constitutional definitions of illegality to further
their political interests and promote illegal accommodation based on insecure tenure. This fragility
and partiality of the state and its involvement with law making is “… an aspect of more complex
power relations.”66 The lives and homes of the squatters continue to hang by the thread of electoral
politics, and they remain subject to be evicted anytime according to the whims of either the ruling
party (once they have won the elections) or the forest department on grounds of afforestation and
conservation.
5.5.3 Episodic Evictions
Interviews with forest officers, senior officers of the state police, and local politicians always
pointed towards one solution to the problem of encroachment - eviction. When asked where these
65 Chatterjee 2004,40
66 Mitchell 1991, 77.
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marginalized people would go after eviction, there were no clear answers. A DFO said, “We could
get a few bighas and settle them on grazing lands by the highway,” while another forest officer said,
“They have come from Jharkhand and they should be sent back.” Evictions (not always staged) are
a constant in the lives of the encroachers. Satya Murmu67, who had been encroaching over thirteen
bighas of land in Lungsung recounted,
We have almost gotten used to eviction since the forest ranger usually informs us in advance
and ask us to temporarily vacate our shacks. They also advise us to not build solid structures to
minimize the damage of eviction. There have been incidents where we have clashed with the forest
department by pelting stones and standing guard in front of our homes when they came to evict us
without prior notice, but eventually we returned. Almost all of us have over ten bighas of land and
no matter where they resettle us, if at all; we will never have so much land. The forest department
does not really trouble us much.
The above assertion has to be situated in context of forest officers, especially the guards who
live in close proximity to communities and often are of the same ethnicity. Over time the forest
department has reverted to a politics of negotiation and only selective contestation towards the
dokhol regime. Protecting the forest while trying to uphold the welfare of the encroachers within
highly rigid and outdated forest laws and regulations brings to the fore the contradictions associated
with laws and strategies that are inconsistent. The encroachers as well as the forest department
engage in a policy of mediation wherein they navigate between rebel disturbances, rigid forest laws,
and an influx of encroachers seeking a means of livelihood.
I would like to explain this phenomenon through an event of eviction that happened in 1998
and assumed monumental importance due to its magnanimity and over all implication. I have
collected two versions of this particular incident, one from the DFO in change and the other from
the encroachers who were directly affected by it. According to the encroacher:
The forest department did not give us any prior notice, there were some rumors that an eviction
drive would be carried out, but we were not specifically informed and hence were not prepared.
The forest department along with the army68 not only demolished our houses but also set it on fire.
When we tried to resist, some of us were brutally beaten up. In fact, an infant who was inside one
of the houses lost his life to the fire.
The DFO’s rejoinder was the following:
It was a peaceful drive in which we demolished over fifty houses and requested the encroachers
to either go back to their native villages, in case they did not have access to any land patta, we
promised to resettle them on grazing land across the highway from Karigaon. We carried out this
67 Interview with Satya Murmu , Lungsung, March 15, 2016
68 The locals usually did not distinguish between the army and the para-military and usually used the term army to
refer to both.
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Figure 5.6: Possessions of a squatter family in Saralpara, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
operation with the help of para-military forces. As far as we are concerned, no lives were lost in
the process but the cunning encroachers burned a cat and used the corpse of the cat to accuse us of
murdering an infant in the process. These are just blatant lies and I can assure you that it was the
corpse of a cat.
Eventually this case was taken to the High Court of the state of Assam. The court acquitted the
DFO and dismissed allegations against the forest department but ruled that henceforth every eviction
drive had to be accompanied by planned processes of resettlement and rehabilitation. Since then
there have been fewer evictions.
5.5.4 Construction of (Semi-)Permanent Structures
According to Indian law it is illegal to erect any structure inside a reserved forest. Although
encroachers are aware that they are encroaching on land claimed by the government, they did not
believe their illegal village settlement was different from legal villages where people had land titles
and access to state services such as health clinics, schools, and well water. This arose from the
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belief that the state had a responsibility to protect its citizens, something repeatedly promised by
candidates during elections. Forms of mediation and negotiations over time can lead, in rare cases,
to the erection of permanent structures. I witnessed one such case within a reserved forest space that
housed a concrete building, mainly used as a school. A local adivasi leader who was also a senior
teacher at this school explained:
We have been residing here post the conflict of 1998 and have not yet received com-
pensation from the government. Our houses were burned down during the conflict and
we are still scared to go back since our village is very close to Bodo villages. So, we
decided to construct make shift houses in the same space which once used to be the
relief camp but still have no running water or electricity. For this school, we had to
pressurize the education department. The Don Bosco foundation first built this school
with bamboo and thatch, as an educational project to instruct children of the relief camp
up to primary level and gradually the groundwork for a concrete structure was put in
place. It finally took over eight years for this school to come up and now we teach up
to tenth grade here.
When I asked the DFO about this, he gave me a sly look and almost whispered:
Did you have a careful look at the foundation stone just outside the school building? It was laid
and inaugurated by the BTAD’s minister for forest and tourism. I should also mention that during
elections, this school is turned into a polling booth for all the squatters residing even in nearby areas.
Erection of permanent structures like school buildings by political parties serve a two-fold
purpose. On the one hand it increases the bargaining capacity of the encroachers by rendering some
permanence to the system of dokhol and on the other it helps politicians gain electoral support.
Therefore state law appears to be increasingly fragmented and internally pluralized69. Often, parties
in power tend to support the construction of semi-permanent structures, that are easy to demolish
since changes in ruling government along with local leaders and ministers usually affect these
decisions.
5.6 Counter-Insurgency Operations
The reserved forest is at the core of the state’s counter-insurgency operations. In the last two decades,
the armed movement for the creation of Bodoland has forced the forest department out of the interior
parts of the reserved forests after several incidents in which rebels burnt down forest check-posts.
In one incident in December 2014, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit faction
69 Santos 2002.
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launched an attack on a squatter settlement, establishing their presence in the inner parts of the
forest. The military has responded by felling tall trees so as to seek out rebel hideouts. Eventually
encroachers have occupied these cleared plots of land. In one of the encroached villages I visited,
the headman said:
Look at the clear patches of land around, it used be forest; it is the work of the Indian Army. We
heard that rebels were hiding in these forests and one day the army came and cut down all the trees.
Now people have built houses there.
Moreover, the limited control over forest by the forest department due to fear of insurgents has
also opened up space for encroachers. Most of the forest offices have been relocated in army and
para-military camps, further distancing the forest department from everyday forest life.70 The forests
have emerged both as the center of conflict and counter-insurgency operations and conservation.
The squatters find themselves stuck in between these processes, where they fear further attacks from
the insurgents and eviction threats by the state.
5.7 Conclusion
In this article I have compared and contrasted how informality plays out in a rural context by
identifying five ethnographic factors which demonstrate squatter’s unconditional attachment to land
and the practices which allow them to hold this land. This intersection between formal governance
and informal encroachment in a forest setting illustrates dokhol as a tactic. This also reflects the
vulnerabilities and power relations that come with living on the fringes of the state. The rural
squatters in this study are not only extremely poor and vulnerable; they have also been kept out of
academic discourses and policy domains.
These rural squatters prefer to remain invisible from the gaze of the state and practice dokhol,
but not as a form of collective action. A key reason attributed to dokhol by a forest ranger was,
“These are all new people who have taken xujuk or opportunity during the conflict and settled here.”
Conflict opened up junctures to retain this attachment to land. I have also highlighted how, unlike
their urban counterparts who negotiate and resist in order to gain access to housing, water, education
and health, these forest encroachers usually use less than one bigha of their total land to build a
make shift house, often trampled upon by wild elephants. What motivates them to live deep in the
forest is the idea of possession of fifteen bighas of land. Land is scare in quantity; what is scare is
legal land. It is this legal scarcity that entrenches the squatters in unequal power relations with state
authorities. Factors like counter-insurgency operations and the presence of insurgents allow them to
hold onto their small pieces of land, while remaining invisible.
70 This relates to Peluso and Vandergeest’s work on violence as an opportunity to find more entry as a state in affected
areas. See Peluso and Vandergeest 2011.
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6 Forest becomes Frontline — the Ecological Task Force,
Conservation and Counter-Insurgency in a Space of Violent
Ethno-Religious Conflict in Assam, India
Under Review: Special Issue – Conservation and Violent Environments in  Po-
litical Geography.
Abstract
Using the case of the Ecological Task Force (ETF) of the Indian Army as an entry point,
I expand on existing conceptual and theoretical views on green militarization and violent
environments in the context of poaching and national parks. I situate this within the broader
literature on critical conservation and militarized conservation practices and applying it to the
reserved forests (RFs) in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) in Assam,
northeast India. Here, politics that surround conservation is immersed within a context of
violent ethno-religious conflict. The BTAD has been a theatre of recurrent insurgencies between
the autochthonous Bodo tribe and the Adivasi, Muslim groups over land and territory. A
key characteristic of the conflict is its occurrence in the RFs on Assam-Bhutan borderlands,
which can be traced back to the colonial process of forest making that brought immigrants into
Assam, threatening cultural and territorial loss for Bodos. During the Bodo movement for a
separate state, starting in 1980s and continuing, the militants operated from within the forest,
leading to the departure of the forest department. As a result, rebels and locals appropriated
the forest through rampant resource extraction. In response, the ETF was constituted in 2007.
Fieldwork suggests that ETF is not engaged in counter-insurgency, and rely on the regular
Army for protection during conservation operations. Drawing on regional environmental
history, I analyze how ethno-religious conflict influences modes of conservation exemplified
by continuing inter-institutional competition between the forest department and the ETF. I
further argue that at the end it is counter-insurgency that prevails over conservation in the RFs.
Moreover, despite ETF’s efforts to buffer from local politics, incidents of a political nature seep
into its operations, e.g. ambushed by militants during conservation activities.
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6.1 Introduction
Traditionally, the role of the military, across the globe has been to defend the integrity of the country’s
international borders from external aggression, to ensure internal peace, counter-insurgency or
anti-terrorism operations. After the Second World War, two additional dimensions were added:
international peacekeeping and disaster relief. However, it is an established fact that the greatest
threat to the planet is colossal environmental degradation resulting, inter alia, from the greenhouse
effect, the piercing of the ozone layer, deforestation, pollution of water and land resources, acid rain
and rampant consumerism. Conversely, well before the discourse of environmental degradation,
security and climate change entered public consciousness in the Indian sub-continent, the Indian
Army engaged in environmental restoration in the form of afforestation and sand dune stabilization.
An abundance of empirical cases illustrates that the military has diverged from its traditionally
assumed responsibility of defending the state from external enemies to nontraditional missions
inside the state. For example, in light of increased participation of the European Union’s (EU)
armed forces in diverse operations, including peacekeeping, Timothy Edmunds (2006) asks the
following question: what are the armed forces for? According to him, since the end of the Cold
War in 1991, a profound shift occurred in states’ perception of military roles. This was because
after the collapse of the bipolar system and the US–Soviet rivalry, internal conflicts and civil wars
came to the fore. Further reassessment of contemporary military roles was caused by the September
11 terrorist attacks, and the consequent “War on Terror,” followed by the invasion of Iraq. New
security challenges compelled the EU governments to use their armed forces for diverse internal
security purposes, including assisting local law enforcement during national disasters.
In India although, the process of involving the armed forced in conservation commenced in
the 1980s and since then a number of Ecological Task Force or ETF units have been raised in
the Territorial Army of the Indian Armed Forces and currently there are six battalions across five
states, namely Rajasthan, Assam, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttarakhand. There is a lack of
visibility of the role of the ETF, which could be attributed to certain factors, including civil-military
relations (despite the absence of any discernible attempts of the armed forces to stage a coup unlike
neighboring countries in South Asia like Pakistan and Bangladesh) and organizational inertia within
the military, among others. However, with increasing signs of the impact of climate change coupled
with growing clout of India in global climate governance, D’Souza (1994) also projected that the
Indian military could be an instrumental player and leading force in India’s climate change policy
and strategy on domestic and international fronts. In keeping with this, Michael Harbottle (1992),
recommended the raising of and training by the ETF in Mongolia, Nepal and Vietnam as part of
India’s military diplomacy through a ecological theme.
Conceptually, the idea of using military in conservation efforts was suggested by Dr. Ernest
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Borlaug, the father of the green revolution in the early 1980s when he proposed the need for
a disciplined force to undertake such tasks as it was beyond repair by civilian agencies. He
recommended that the Indian Army on ‘war footing’ should take up the task of environmental
protection and restoration. The then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on observing the ecological
degradation in the Himalayas, operationalized the idea by issuing an executive order to form an
ETF out of the Territorial Army. The most recent 135 Infantry Battalion was set up in 2007 in
the Haltugaon forest division within the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) of
Assam in Northeast India. Unlike the other battalions of the ETF (J&K being an exception), this is
situated within the conflict context of BTAD, where the primary task of the ETF is afforestation
and soil conservation of the RFs destroyed over the years by rebel violence and COIN operations
through massive illegal logging. One of the major reasons for establishing this unit was the fast
depleting forest cover in the region coupled with political instability which led to the sxpulsion of
the forest department from the RF, resulting in further (il)legal extraction of resources like timber.
For example, the forest cover in Kokrajhar district alone, declined from 51.44 (as percentage of
total geographical area) in 1999 to 36.10 in 2009 (Nath and Mwchahary 2012). Till 2013, the ETF
had plated over three hundred thousand saplings in an area of over nine thousand 3700 hectares.1
The notified forest area of Kokrajhar district includes six RFs, namely Guma, Ripu, Kachugaon,
Chirang, Bengtal and Manas. The ETF has been carrying out its plantation activities along with the
forest department across these RFs.
However, the raising of the ETF has to be situated in the context of the larger environmental
and ecological history of India beginning with World War II. During World War II the Indian sub
continent became a base for allied operations in West Asia and the Burmese front, leading to a large
number of Indian troops being stationed in the country. Shikar or hunting surfaced as the most
popular form of recreation and due to the continuity of a war, game laws were lax if not non-existent
(D’Souza 1994). In an effort to build roads and railways in support of the war, massive forests
were cleared in the eastern parts of India. Enviroenmental degradation continued unabated until
stringent restraints were applied when Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India in 1966
and environmental protection became de rigour with strict implementation guidelines. Shooting
was banned and orders often tricked down from the three chiefs of staff to the smallest units and
defaulters were punished. Subsequently the Wildlife Protection Act was passed in 1972, the Forest
Conservation Act in 1980, the Air (Prevention and control of Pollution) Act was passed in 1981, and
as Jayram Ramesh (2017) notes, these acts were almost single handedly pushed through by Mrs.
Gandhi at a time when discourses around environmental protection and security were far from being
imbibed into both national and international psyche. This was also the period when the military
1 Interview with a senior officer of the ETF in Kokrajhar
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became increasingly conscious of their role in wildlife protection. General P.P. Kumaramangalam,
on retirement as army chief, was elected President of the World Wildlife Fund-India (WWF-India)
during its formative stages, and numerous other officers, both while in service and after retirement,
took leading roles in wildlife and environmental protection (Ramesh 2017). This was the phase in
India’s ecological history where environmental policies were created and implemented through a
central fiat from the top. It is within this historical phase of ecological transition that the creation of
the ETF has to be situated.
Using the case of the ETF or the Green Army, this article shall expand on the existing conceptual
and theoretical views within the critical conservation literature, by applying it to violent forest space
like the BTAD, which has surfaced simultaneously as a site of conservation and counter-insurgency
(henceforth COIN) operations as well as inter-institutional competition between the ETF (set up
through the mandate of the central government) and the state forest department. Based on empirical
evidence gathered through over five months of fieldwork comprising of interviews with officers
and workforces of the ETF and the forest department as well as local villagers, from February to
May 2016 and subsequently fromAugust to September 2017, I shall further show how the situation
in these RFs is a digression from the more general literature on green militarization that expresses
conservation as a means to produce violence or how nature conservation regimes produce green war.
Instead, my focus shall be on a micro level understanding of how state (ETF, the forest department
and the armed forces) and non state actors (local populations and rebel/insurgent groups) operate
and interact within each other within a conflict setting especially the ones directly embedded in
the conflict process. Although existing literature suggests a merging of counter-insurgency and
conservation practices (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018), using an inter-institutional and multilayered
approach to conservation, my case demonstrates that counter-insurgency prevails over conservation
within the RFs.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I examine the political ecology scholarship on green
militarization and the work on environmental security and khaki or militarized conservation in
order to extend the literature on military activity, conservation and COIN and the critical geography
literature on militarization The larger literature that deals with other cases of the role of military
forces in conservation is reminiscent of some evident patterns which I flag in course of the discussion.
The first relates to cases where state managed conservation efforts are militarized in fragile contexts
through deployment of armed forces. The later case pertains to the creation of a terrain of warfare
against insurgencies and armed criminals (poachers, illegal miners, and timber thieves) by using the
legally mandated exclusion of civilians enabled by protected areas to insert armed forces into these
areas for combat operations.
Second, I outline the formation of the ETF and situate it within the environmental and forest policy
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of India and trace the processes of colonial and post-colonial forest making in India and Assam. I
also highlight how the protected areas of BTAD have been a site of conflict and counter-insurgency
and how across time-frames the control over the forest and its resources have changed hands, from
being fully under militia control to being only partially controlled by the forest department. Within
this I draw on the above two instances instances as presented in the literature and highlight a third
instance using the case of the ETF where military habits become a valued skill in carrying out
arduous and at times risky conservation work.
Third, I narrow down to the everyday working of the ETF within the RFs in BTAD and it’s
relationship with the forest department. I also highlight that the ETF does not engage in COIN
operations and neither does it seek to foster civil-military relations. I conclude by emphasizing on
place and site-specific studies of militarization (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009) and argue by empirically
situating the working of the ETF within the larger micro political context of the region that despite
its best efforts to buffer itself from local violent politics, events and incidents of a political nature
seeps into its operations. An additional finding arising out of the state’s COIN policy in the context
of Assam, as well as other historical and empirical factors indicate the prevalence of COIN over
conservation efforts of the ETF as well as the forest department in these protected areas.
6.2 Khaki Conservation or Green Militarization — Conservation, COIN
and Conflict
Although, the literature on the engagement of the military in environmental protection or ecological
missions or Khaki conservation is still scarce, the role of armed forces in environmental security
activities particularly in developing countries is not as well documented as is quite common in the
Western democracies these days with dedicated websites and doctrinal references. Yet, militarized
forms of conservation especially in developing countries has received harsh criticism within the
emerging literature in political ecology focusing on forms of green militarization, work on ‘violent
environments’ (Peluso andWatts 2001) and green violence (Büscher and Ramutsindela 2016), among
others. These scholars have argued that conservation by military personnel or representatives of
nation-state regimes, often result in the use of excess violence — physical, emotional and structural.
Political ecologists and geographers have further acknowledged the use of military tactics, weaponry
and even personnel to patrol protected areas (PAs) such as national parks and reserved forests against
incursion by those wishing to extract wildlife and other resources (Fletcher 2018), which has been
termed as ‘green militarisation’ (see esp. Duffy 2014; Lunstrum 2014; Duffy et al. 2015; Büscher
and Ramutsindela 2016; Kelly and Ybarra 2016). This exercise of physical violence has been
accompanied by violent rhetoric advocating often-extreme forms of punishment for the perpetrators
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of such incursions (Büscher 2016; Lunstrum 2017). On a similar vein, Joni Seager (1993) asserts
that “whether at peace or at war, militaries are the biggest threat to the environmental welfare of
our planet” (see also Ehrlich & Birks 1990). Therefore, military environmental discourses seem
to justify military control over vast swathes of land and obscure the destructive nature of modern
warfare (Pearson 2012).
Drawing from the above discussion, it emerges that military’s role in conservation especially
in developing and post-colonial countries goes beyond peaceful means and encompasses within it
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations which aid in shaping human-nature relationships, processes
of territorialization and resource access and control in relation to protected areas, or reserved forests
(RF) in the context of this article (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). This assumes further significance,
when conservation has to be carried out in landscapes scathed in violent conflict, thereby developing
a linkages between violence, environment and conflict which has been a forte of Political Geography
researchers (Raleigh and Linke 2018; Springer and Le Billon 2016, Benjaminsen et. al. 2017).
6.3 Conservation with Might
Contemporary forms of conservation, as the need to protect endangered species often comes into
contact with the lives and rights of people who live in and around the increasingly threatened
national parks. A mounting interest in political ecology sutures linkages between conservation,
violence and conflict over contested resources in protected areas (PAs) that include wildlife parks
and sanctuaries, especially where local, state-led conservation efforts rely on eviction of marginal-
ized peasant communities while promoting tourism and wildlife preservation as a form of capital
accumulation (Brockington and Wilkie 2015; Craven 2016; Duffy 2016; Lunstrum 2014; Massé and
Lunstrum 2016; Peluso and Watts 2001). Elizabeth Lunstrum (2014) draws a connection between
the extensive use of paramilitary forces, technology, military hardware and killings of poachers who
challenge the sovereignty of the State, in conservation efforts. Adding to this is a growing body
of research addressing what Büscher and Ramutsindela have termed ‘green violence,’ outlined as
‘the deployment of violent instruments and tactics towards the protection of nature’ (2016, 2). The
predominant focus of this discussion has been the application of such violence by representatives of
nation-state regimes that frequently include forest guards, para-military forces and national armed
forces. Using the case of increasing militarization of the Kruger National Park in South Africa,
Lunstrum (2014) argues that this is not an isolated instance of such violent form of conservation by
the military; rather it reflects a wider and deepening pattern of militarization altering conservation
practice around the world. National armed forces, for instance, have performed important roles in
establishing conservation measures, often forcibly across South America, Asia and countries across
Africa. This has been seen in Guatemala, Colombia, Nepal, Indonesia, Congo, Cameroon, South
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Africa, among many others and in case of Botswana, the protection of it’s national parks is one of
its Defense Force’s primary responsibilities (Peluso 1993; Henk 2006; Ojeda 2012; Ybarra 2012;
Ethirajan 2013; Piombo 2013). In the case of India, drones have recently been introduced in the
Kaziranga National Park (KNP) in Assam where around twenty-four persons (allegedly poachers)
were killed in and around the core area of KNP in the year 2014 (Barbora 2017). The death toll
has risen since then with the arming of forest guards with sophisticated arms and ammunitions and
shoot at sight operations.
Some of the earliest and ongoing studies of military activity and the environment have investigated
the deep-seated ecological destruction brought about by military activity, especially militarized
forms of conflict (Lunstrum 2014). Fashioning on this, Seager has contended that military activities
have left a ‘chain of militarized environmental destruction that stretches around the world’ (1993,14).
According to Lunstrum (2014), the crux of these studies espouses the notion that militarized activities,
during and post periods of conflict, cause overwhelming harm to the environment, and that the two
are indeed antithetical. On a similar vein, Ybarra (2012) has shown in the case of Guatemala how
the forest as a site of guerrilla refuge heightened the military’s perceived need for army control of the
jungle and a territorial strategy to separate nature from civilization and/or agriculture. Duffy (2014)
carries this discussion forward by re-emphasizing that this whole notion of “Militarized forms of
anti-poaching are not new: for example, early game wardens in British colonial administrations were
often ex-military personnel” (2014, 821). In fact the newwar for conservation of biodiversity mirrors
the language of interventionism and that the onus of wildlife preservation, especially endangered
species lies with the international community and that military forms of intervention may be brought
into effect to save them (Duffy 2014).
More and more advanced states in the Global North along with NGOs and para-state organizations
increasingly connote rural protected areas in economically poorer countries as sites of (in)security
which provide opportunities and threats in order to counter deforestation, mitigate loss of biodiversity,
postulate ecosystem services and restrict terrorist access to valuable natural resources and nation-state
borders (Kelly and Ybarra 2016). This is how conservation paves the way towards securitization,
the process by which spaces and subjectivities become targets of regulation and surveillance in
the name of security. Kelly and Ybarra term this process as ‘green security’, “which refers to the
overt use of policing and militarization of protected areas vast territories (land or maritime) in
the name of security” (2016, 172). The increasing securitization of conservation sites generates,
in multiple ways novel raisons d’etre for state militaries in times of post civil war and/or, as it is
usually the policing and military agencies that are incorporated into protected area surveillance and
enforcement strategies (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011; Ybarra, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014; Dwyer et
al., 2016). Moreover, this links to the larger discourse relating to the moral force of conservation,
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with the heightened awareness of ecological crisis. Moreover, as has also been highlighted in
the literature on political economy of lootable resources and crisis conservation (Le Billon 2004;
Duffy 2014;Lunstrum 2012), conservation hotspots and politically fraught areas are often spatially
overlapped. The rainforests of the Indian northeast as well as the biodiversity regions of the Indian
Himalaya are good illustrations of this. In fact this is where national heritage and security also
tend to converge as was seen in the Indian case in the 1960s and has been succinctly described
by Mahesh Ranjarajan in his volume on Nature and Nation: Essays on Environmental History.
Rangarajan explained how the protection of nature was equated with protection of heritage. On
lines of political economy theses, this resonates with variable incorporation of positions into nature
as elements of identity and the strategic use of such identities to wage political struggles. These
were the ways in which varieties of nationalism are mediated and constructed through reference
to the natural (Rangarajan 2015). Examples of these include and are not restricted to indigenous
claims over forestland, protests against dams and developmental projects including SEZs. On the
other hand, however, echoing the sentiments of national heritage while nature got nationalized as
localized carnivores got renamed as the Indian tiger and the Indian lion, historically forest-dwelling
tribal groups suffered and were forced to make nature free of humans.
Dovetailing the increased use of military and/or military strategies often in violent ways in
conservation practices, the political ecology of conservation literature argues that one of the primary
justifications of the current wave of green militarization is that wildlife crimes including trading
in animal parts and/or organs, poaching and hunting, especially in the global south is recurrently
driven by insurgent or terrorist groups (Duffy 2016; White 2014). Consequently, combatting such
crime through militarized means is presented as an effective way to subdue insurgencies with
the two-fold persuasion of conservation and stabilization (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018). The
literature discussed above pertains to instances in developing countries or sensitive spaces where
state driven or managed conservation enterprise is militarized in politically unstable or trouble
regions by deploying armed services personnel to support the work of conservation bureaucracies,
or to provide them security while discharging their duties. This often results in forms of violence on
local populations as has been discussed in the work on militarized conservation, discussed below.
6.4 Military and not Militarized Conservation
Building from insights in the literature focusing on militarized forms of conservation, Lunstrum
(2014) states that those engaged in conservation efforts on the ground have long come with military
backgrounds, and even in present times the nationalArmy and police are vital vocations for recruiting
forest rangers since military-style discipline and skills are exactly those deemed necessary for
effective wildlife policing (Ellis 1994; Neumann 2004; Carruthers 1995; Warchol and Kapla 2012).
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Militaries themselves have also been deployed for forcible eviction of populations in order to create,
maintain or expand PAs, thereby reflecting one of the core ways in which conservation rests on the
use of violence (Peluso 1993; Gibson 1999; Spence 1999; Neumann 2001; Ojeda 2012; Ybarra
2012). Yet, another strand of scholarship within the domain of military diplomacy, security and
International Relations, that engage directly with issues of environment and the military tend to either
argue against the use of the military in environmental protection or highlight the positive aspects
of military’s involvement in conservation practices which is supported by improved civil-military
relationships, disciplined management of PAs and so on. Geoffrey Dabelko and P. J. Simmons
(1997), for instance, assert that engaging the military in nontraditional roles would decrease its
operational readiness. Matthias Finger (1991), on the other hand, views the military as a possible
solution to the problem of environmental pollution, not a cause. Global militarization, he argues,
would lead to the conditions in which environmental crises could only be addressed through crisis
management, with the military as a useful tool. However, this would lead to increased pollution
from military activities, creating a vicious circle. Another example of the current trend to rethink
the connection between environmental pollution and the military is revealed by the case of Latvia.
A recent report compiled by the Latvian Ministry of Defense illustrates the preoccupation with
environmental pollution of the soil on many military bases formerly used by the Soviet troops
stationed there prior to Latvian independence.
The report points to the absence of relevant legislation and management plans to cope with the
problem and puts forward the major objectives of the Latvian Government and National Armed
Forces in connection to solving this issue, including an increase in civil–military cooperation, such
as working with national environmental protection institutions and authorities, as well as ensuring
the provision of training through environment- educated managers at all command levels of the
Latvian Armed Forces.
This discussion reinforces the possible use of the military to secure environmental protection in
other states, beyond the global north. Robyn Eckersley (2012) argues that this is worth exploring
for at least two reasons. First, there are still imminent environmental threats, which national
governments are grappling with. Second, viewed from this perspective the concepts of sovereignty,
nonintervention, and environmental norms come once again under scrutiny. Eckersley (2012)
determines that despite the fact that ‘eco-humanitarian intervention,’ like humanitarian intervention
itself, is still ‘particularly shaky on the question of political legitimacy, especially from the point
of view of many developing countries,’ (2007,15), the moral nature of such interventions cannot
be completely rejected, especially since it is now reaching a point “where extending the idea
of ‘responsibility to protect’ to include biological diversity is no longer unthinkable” (2007,16).
In the case of India, retired major general of the Indian Army, Eustace D’Souza, discussed the
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potential use of the Indian army for environmental protection. He argued that although the military
establishment has been acknowledged as a powerful force in politics and economy, the positive role
that the military can play in “protecting and restoring our degraded environment” is not usually
acknowledged (D’Souza 1994, 208). As Duffy (2014) notes, in South Africa, former soldiers from
the apartheid-era South African Defense Force (SADF) carved out a new niche in conservation.
Military personnel usually possess similar skills akin to that of forest rangers, comprising of
knowledge of weaponry and the ability to plan and carry out operations in remote and tiring terrains
and skills necessary to survive in these areas. Therefore, from the mid-1990s the conservation sector
increasingly saw the use of private military companies for enforcement as was apparent in the case
of Kruger National Park, among others. Pearson (2012) feels that scholarly positions on khaki
conservation have become entrenched. Some researchers brand the military as the ‘new defenders
of wildlife’ (Cohn, 1996). Harvey Meyerson (2001) dwells on a pro-military historical angle and
argues that the US army was instrumental in the creation and survival of Yosemite national park.
On a similar note, others like Francois Reitel vies that the military-motivated forest conservation
in nineteenth-century France turned the army into proto-ecologists (Pearson 2011). Although
environmental security as a concept has found its place in the security discourse at both normative
and empirical levels, the role of the military in within this discussion has been largely relegated to
the domain of the environment-conflict thesis—that is, to the military’s duty of maintaining internal
peace in the event of violent conflict caused by environmental stress (Jayaram 2016).
However, the relationship between military and environment cannot be viewed in terms of binaries
and as Jeffrey Sasha Davis reasons, “the relationship between the military and the environment
is a much more complex story than merely one of destruction” (007, 131). This holds particular
significance in the context of protected areas (PA) in the global south where the creation and
maintenance of such zones is a colonial project enmeshed within unequal power relations. As the
discussion above reveals, although the military has the potential to engage in efficient and organized
management of biodiversity, the way this potential is operationalized on ground is however a
altogether different story. Military operations adopt further significance in contexts where COIN is
used in biodiversity conservation (Ybarra, 2012; Verweijen and Marijnen, 2016), as part of larger
practices of ‘green militarization’ (Lunstrum, 2014), as well as the securitization of conservation
(Neumann, 2004; Duffy, 2016) and the generation of ‘green violence’ (Büscher and Ramutsindela,
2016). Additionally, authors like Osborne (2013) and (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014) have shown how
subsequently COIN is also assimilated into forms of ‘green grabbing’ to ‘pacify’ and ‘neutralize’
resistance movements, thereby strengthening or producing new environmental commodity markets.
Not surprisingly, COIN appropriates and is being appropriated by an environmental ethic that
facilitates control of populations and territorial expansion. Using cases from Southeast Asia in
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the 1950s through the 1970s Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) demonstrate the ways in which both
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have enabled the establishment, extension, and normalization
of political forests, for “Insurgency and counterinsurgency brought new political forests into being
and vastly extended national forest territories. In due course, particular materialities of tropical
forests, including, “biological and ecological properties and spatialities as specific locations and
extents facilitated guerrilla warfare” (2011, 589). Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) further add that
the relationship between war and forests can be comprehended in relation to a historiography of
insurgency in which forests had been important principally as cover for insurgents along with being
coveted strategic territory. This in turn led to systematization of military counterinsurgency practices
targeted towards regulating forest territories, insurgents, and forest dwellers. In more recent settings,
researchers like Ybarra (2012) in the context of Guatamela and Verweijen and Marijnen (2016) in
their work on the Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have shown the
intimate relationship that exists between conservation and COIN.
The discussion above leads me to identify yet another pattern on military forms of conservation.
These occasions rest on the creation of a terrain of warfare against insurgencies and armed criminals
(poachers, illegal miners, and timber thieves) by using the legally mandated exclusion of civilians
enabled by protected areas to insert armed forces into these areas for combat operations. Conservation
areas are then both missions and theaters, respectively, for military personnel and special units.
Nonetheless, what the above literature has only focused on in passing is how conservation on war
footing by the state armed forces is carried out in contexts of violent conflict and COIN. Therefore,
my attempt here is to empirically demonstrate how wider geographies of prevailing violent conflict
feed into the conservation efforts of the ETF especially in the presence of a motley crew of actors
operating at different scales, and how they react to the specific challenges of conservation in ‘violent
environments’.
6.5 “Our mandate is not COIN” — the Military’s (ETF) Role in Risky
Conservation in Assam
Conceptually, the idea of using military in conservation efforts was suggested by Dr. Ernest Borlaug,
the father of the green revolution in the early 1980s when he proposed the need for a disciplined
force to undertake such tasks as it was beyond repair by civilian agencies. He recommended that the
Indian Army on ‘war footing’ should take up the task of environmental protection and restoration.
The then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on observing the ecological degradation in the Himalayas,
operationalized the idea by issuing an executive order to form an ETF out of the Territorial Army.
However, the raising of the ETF has to be situated in the context of the larger environmental
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and ecological history of India beginning with World War II. During World War II the Indian sub
continent became a base for allied operations in West Asia and the Burmese front, leading to a large
number of Indian troops being stationed in the country. Shikar or hunting surfaced as the most
popular form of recreation and due to the continuity of a war, game laws were lax if not non-existent
(D’Souza 1994). In an effort to build roads and railways in support of the war, massive forests
were cleared in the eastern parts of India. Enviroenmental degradation continued unabated until
stringent restraints were applied when Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India in 1966
and environmental protection became de rigour with strict implementation guidelines. Shooting
was banned and orders often tricked down from the three chiefs of staff to the smallest units and
defaulters were punished. Subsequently the Wildlife Protection Act was passed in 1972, the Forest
Conservation Act in 1980, the Air (Prevention and control of Pollution) Act was passed in 1981, and
as Jayram Ramesh (2017) notes, these acts were almost single handedly pushed through by Mrs.
Gandhi at a time when discourses around environmental protection and security were far from being
imbibed into both national and international psyche. This was also the period when the military
became increasingly conscious of their role in wildlife protection. General P.P. Kumaramangalam,
on retirement as army chief, was elected President of the World Wildlife Fund-India (WWF-India)
during its formative stages, and numerous other officers, both while in service and after retirement,
took leading roles in wildlife and environmental protection (Ramesh 2017). This was the phase in
India’s ecological history where environmental policies were created and implemented through a
central fiat from the top. It is within this historical phase of ecological transition that the creation of
the ETF has to be situated.
The primary objective of bringing in the armed forces was to instill discipline and dedication into
the whole exercise. Armed forces personnel shared this thought as well, according to whom they
could “execute specific ecology-related projects with a military-like work culture and commitment”
(Mohan 2005). Conservation, however, was not the sole aim for the creation of the ETF. It encom-
passes the dual role of conservation as well as rehabilitation of ex-service men of the Indian Army.
Since serving personnel could not be withdrawn from regular service, it was proposed that young
ex-servicemen from the same region where the environmental activities were to be carried out be
recruited for either five years or having an upper limit of forty years of age.
The first battalion of the ETF was commissioned in 1982 with the aim of saving nearly 2500
hectares of deforested mining area in the Shivalik hills (in Shahjahanpur block, near Mussoorie)
from turning into a rock-strewn desert. For the next few years, the 127th Infantry Battalion (Garhwal
Rifles) worked under the guidance of scientists from the Dehradun-based Central Soil and Water
Conservation Research Institute to create a robust watershed management system. By this time, the
128th Infantry Battalion (Rajputana Rifles) had already been deployed (in 1983) in Thar desert in
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the state of Rajasthan. The aim was the stabilization of sand dunes and the creation of a greenbelt,
covering about 35,000 hectares. The initial successes of the ETFs in the Shivalik hills and the
Thar desert inspired other state governments to partner with the central government and establish
similar battalions in other ecologically degraded parts of the country like Jammu and Kashmir,
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Assam. As mentioned, the 175th Battalion was raised
in BTAD due to fast depletion of forest cover in the region coupled with instances of recurring
political violence where the RF emerged as centrifugal hot spot. As, mentioned earlier these RFs
have been a site of conflict and contestation on ethno-religious lines since the early 1980s. The
1990s were a violent period when a serious of conflict occurred in 1993,1994,1996 and 1998.
At this juncture, I would like to revisit the literature above on militarized forms of conservation
to highlight how in the Indian context of raising the ETF battalions, military habits have in actuality
become a valued skill in carrying out arduous and at times risky conservation work in such sensitive
spaces. I would like to extend this discussion further to encompass the role of retired army personnel
who are the major recruits of the ETF, since the scheme encompasses the dual role of conservation
as well as rehabilitation of ex-service men of the Indian Army. This idea can be linked to post world
war II demobilization of soldiers where it was suggested that carrying out plantation activities in
England would not only be therapeutic for the ex-soldiers but also be a gesture in home coming.
The idea of protecting the earth with spades after having protected the nation with tanks and guns
seemed to be the motivating factor working behind the creation of the ETF. Besides, the aim of
rehabilitation, there definitely had to be something more to draw these soldiers into the less glorified
task of planting trees and the thought behind it seemed to be that since these ex-servicemen would
come back to work in their home states, they would also have a better knowhow about the local
flora and fauna. Moreover, tilling and protecting that part of the earth on which one has their ethnic
roots along with their fellow ex-servicemen from similar terrains would act as a motivating factor
for these jawans. This was also evident during the time I spent at the ETF camp and plantataion
sites, where the officer seemed quite clueless and it was the jawans who spoke in fluent Bodo and
Assamese and gave me a detailed taxonomy of the various species of saplings in the greenhouse,
their germination processes, plantation and after care. Thus, in this context it is these abilities and
traits of retired military personnel have come to be the desired attributes when they are redeployed
as peaceful conservation workers. This goes on to highlight the fact that the inherent violence of
conservation, that often begins with displacements and exclusions (of unwanted human settlements)
and confinements and surveillance of preserved non-human species and organisms, against the care
and restoration aspect of conservation work that seeks to engender protected lives and sustain valued
communities of plants and animals.
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6.6 Conflict and Conservation in the RFs
Assam’ s contemporary politics has been defined by political violence on ethno-linguistic and
religious lines since the 1980s. The conflicts nonetheless coincide with contemporary concerns for
conservation that had emerged following a period when insurgents took refuge in Manas National
Park, which I discuss below, even though conserving areas for wildlife go back to the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, when it was introduced (by the colonial administration) amid protests from
local peasants (Barbora 2017). The violence in BTAD also commenced during the 1980s. The
Bodoland Movement, being the Bodo movement for a separate state, came to an end in 2003. The
Bodoland Territorial Council was then established and BTAD was formed.
However, violence on ethno-religious lines erupted again in 2008, 2012 and twice in 2014
claiming over hundreds of lives and displacing over a hundred thousand people. Most of the violent
episodes took place inside the RFs. The first major attack hit the Manas RF and in 1996 and 1998
the violence stuck entire parts of northern Kokrajhar district and the worse casualties occurred in
the RFs bordering Bhutan (Kimura 2018). In the following decade the violence of 2008 and 2014
affected the Chirang, Riphu and Kachugaon RFs. Historically, the Bodos, who are also the largest
plain tribe of northeast India, consider themselves to be the autochthons of the region and claim
ownership over these forests. However, during the colonial times large-scale immigration took place
from Bengal and Bengali Muslim peasants were settled in western Assam. Adivasis comprising of
Santhal, Orao and Munda tribes were also brought in to work in the expanding tea plantations as
well as building of the railways. Some tribes were also recruited to work in definite forest zones in
timber plantations. Since the local populations were often hesitant to do this, the abovementioned
tribes were brought in from Bihar, Odhisa and central India. Soon enough cultivable land became
scarce which forced Bodo peasants to move into RFs and eventually being termed as ‘encroachers’,
despite this being the land of their ancestors who used it for cultivation and also as a trade route
with Bhutan. In the post-colonial period the adivasis also began to settle in the RFs, which posed
a direct threat to the Bodos. However, immigration and faulty land policies is not a sufficient
explanation for the raging and continuing violence in the region. According to Vandekerckhove and
Suykens (2010) it was the commoditization of forests and the implantation of tea estates that led to
the creation of restrictive boundaries furthering entrapment of the tribal communities living in the
area, especially the Bodo. Added to this, the insufficient responses of both the Indian and Assam
governments to this increasing entrapment have furnished the basis for the organization of violent
movements. The situation worsened when in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, new
restrictive forest rules and regulations were introduced under the banner of ‘protection’, since by
then over eighty percent2 of the forest had become inaccessible. Thereafter, in 1987 the movement
2 See BTC, Profile on Forest and Wildlife of Bodoland Territorial Council (Kokrajhar: Forest Department, n.d.), p.10.
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became violent with the launch of insurgent group called the Bodo Security Force (BSF). Overtime
BSF split into the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and a wing of NDFB led by
Songbijit or the NDFB(S) is active till date and were responsible behind the most latest episode
of violence against adivasis in the Chirang RF in December 2014. The Manas National Park on
the border of Bhutan was declared a wildlife sanctuary and a subsequent tiger reserve in 1973. In
fact, most of the plantation drive carried out by the ETF is on the fringes of Manas. Conversely, in
1992 Manas was declared a ‘World Heritage Site in danger’, a label attached to the reserve as a
result of the Bodo insurgency (Vandekerckhove and Suykens 2010). Conservation in Manas was
culminated into a face-off between the state and the insurgents, resulting in a shift in control over
the contested forest territories. The insurgents extracted timber and engaged in poaching to fund
militant activities while simultaneously using the forest as passage to their bases in Bhutan. The
park lost almost 90 per cent of its rhinos (close to 100) and a large number of swamp deer and wild
buffaloes as a result of the unrest3. Soon the forest guards became the main targets that eventually
led to the departure of the forest department and closure of the park from 1989 to 1995.
Although in 2007, four years after the creation of BTAD, the forest department had started re-
building forest offices in the Chirang, Riphu and Kachugaon RFs, forest rangers till date are scared
to reside in the interior forest. In 2010, the minister for Tourism and Forest in BTAD constituted the
Bodoland Forest Protection Volunteers (BFPV), a 100 man volunteer group comprising of members
who lived in and around the forest areas, along with the aid of some local environmental NGOs.
The BFPV was set up to assist the forest department in anti poaching and anti smuggling activities.
Initially the BTC provided the members with support for uniforms and set up camps inside forest
to exercise surveillance. Some funds were also allocated towards a lump sum salary for these
volunteers. This organization did work for a few years, but in 2015 when I interviewed one of the
founding members, I was told that the lack of bare minimum financial and bureaucratic support and
guidance on regular basis, the whole initiative had an adverse effect on the initial conservation zeal
of the community. The group now barely consists of twenty irregular volunteers and most of them
actively participated in and carried out political campaigns on behalf of the ruling political party
and the minister of forest during elections. As one of the volunteers recounted, “since we don’t get a
salary anymore this is the only way we can get access to some part-time contractual jobs. However,
we continue to support the forest department in whichever way we can”.
The recurring conflict over the years led to a steep rise in the number of army and para-military
forces who have now become a permanent part of the forest landscape. Given the sensitive location
of the RF with borders with Bhutan and the RF emerging as a centrifugal space of conflict, COIN
and rehabilitation of those displaced in violence, these armed forces have had to be stationed inside
3 See https://www.sahapedia.org/manas-national-park-those-living-the-fringe-areas
148
or in the vicinity of the RF. Due to paucity of infrastructure in these remote locations, with a directive
from the state home affairs and district administration most of the forest guesthouses have had
to be converted into camps for the army and para-military to facilitate COIN operations and also
protect the forest dwellers. Although Manas is now open to the general public, at least 100 people
were displaced and more than forty Bengali-speaking Muslims were killed on May 2, 2014, when
NDFB(S) militants opened fire in the villages near Manas National Park. Fieldwork with the forest
department in the RFs soon revealed that the NDFB(S) rebels are still pursuing to control the inner
parts of the forest, by launching attacks on forest guards and forest dwellers they are trying to define
who has access to resources and who does not.
I must also mention here that unlike the Kaziranga National Park (KNP) in Assam, which has
developed into a site of serious contestations about the idea of conserving nature in colonized spaces,
leading to the outright militarization of the park and celebration of the killings of alleged rhino
poachers (Barbora 2017), COIN still remains a prerogative even at the cost of conservation within
and around Manas. It has been widely acknowledged that Kaziranga’s success in protecting the
Indian one-horned rhino is majorly because of extreme often militarized methods like shoot at sight
used there (Balmford 2012; Saikia 2009). Although the partial departure of the forest department
and extensive deforestation led to the setting up of the 135 Battalion of the ETF, conservation by
the armed forces in Kokrajhar district is in no way comparable to processes of green militarization
as seen in KNP in India and elsewhere. In fact, I recently asked an ecologist who works with
an environmental NGO for conservation inside the Manas National Park about the conservation
situation in KNP vis-e-visManas and his response was clear, “we cannot compare Manas and KNP
either in terms of environmental protection protocols and/or poaching activities.” Given that as
recently as June 2017, about forty NDFB(S) rebels were found to be taking shelter in and around
Manas4, it becomes obvious that COIN operations take over conservation in such a context. This also
stands contrary to what authors like Barbora (2017) argue, that in the last decade, instances of armed
encounters between insurgents and security personnel had reduced considerably leading to expansion
of tourism, particularly around the main national parks in the state. While this holds true in the case
of the KNP but cannot necessarily be extended to capture the conservation COIN conundrum in
Manas and the RFs that surround it. This resonates with Verweijen and Marijnen (2018) notion that
the extent to and the mechanisms by which conservation and counterinsurgency converge are context
dependent. Although the literature reveals certain similarities in the practices that relating to both
militarized conservation and counterinsurgency including violent rationalities such as ‘shoot-on-
sight’ and ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies, property destruction, threats, evictions, displacements, patrolling,
surveillance and the construction of informant networks (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018), in the
4 See http://www.rediff.com/news/report/this-assam-national-park-now-a-sanctuary-for-bodo-militants/20150617.htm
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RFs in BTAD such practices are firstly, primarily aimed at COIN operations and carried out by the
Army and para-military forces. Secondly, exercises like eviction, displacement and threats are the
decree of the forest department aimed at those encroaching forestland, illegally. The motley crew of
actors operating within the RFs has their roles clearly defined and COIN and conservation does
not usually converge. As a senior officer of the ETF recounted, “we have a clear mandate. We do
not involve ourselves in COIN and neither are we here to foster civil-military relationship. It is
the forest department that is supposed to interact with the local populations. From time to time we
distribute saplings to villagers to create awareness about the environment and also employ them
under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) to assist in
our plantation activities, but that is where our interaction ends.” It is in this milieu that I would
like to highlight the ensuing relationship between the forest department and the ETF in regard to
conservation.
6.7 The Forest Department and the ETF— Community Engagement,
Inter-Institutional Competition and Local Politics
The more recent attack on the Adivasi population by the NDFB (S) in December 2014, led to the
setting up of relief camps for the quarter million people who fled their villages again, inside the
RFs. A visit to the RFs in January 2015 indicated the improvement in the security situation as
compared to the heydays of the Bodo insurgency in the mid 1990s; nevertheless political power was
far from being completely in the hands of the ruling government. The Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)
might have ended their fight more than a decade ago with the creation of BTAD, yet the militia of
the NDFB(S) do not seem to have any intention of putting down the arms for good. Eventually,
over the years, the forest department had devised a form of forest politics rested predominantly on
negotiation and only selective contestation towards forest crime fuelled by the discrepancy between
the rigid forest laws since the 1980s and the lack of financial means or local support to implement
these.
Although rebel groups continue to strive to define access to and use of natural resources like
timber and poaching, interviews with forest dwellers revealed that the forest department was still
regarded as a main protector of the forest responsible for eviction operations and penalizing forest
crime. The forest department’s physical presence in the interior parts of the forest is still remains
scarce, but this has not adversely affected the states recognition within the forest. It appears that in
the years of militia violence the desire for state presence in the forest villages had actually grown,
and this is discernible given the large presence of the armed forces inside the RFs. In 2007, the 135th
battalion of the ETF was created to restore extreme forest degradation in the RFs and specifically
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plant in the interior areas of the forest where the departure of the forest department had created a
void.
It ought to be mentioned that the forest is a transferred subject in the BTAD, meaning that when
the BTAD was constituted in 2003, the department of forest was transferred to the council from
the Assam state and now comes under the jurisdiction of the department for forest and tourism of
the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The ETF has a very clear mandate in BTAD, which is to
restore forest cover through plantation drives. The ETF does organize activities with villagers in
their plantation areas from time to time to create awareness about environmental protection, but it is
usually done with the support of the forest department and the instances of these are rare. Moreover,
exchanges with officers of the ETF indicated that although the ecological forces in other states are
more engaged and work closely with the local communities, especially in the states of Uttarakhand,
Rajasthan and Delhi, in a place like BTAD they have to be on alert and guarded given the fragile
political environment. Therefore, there has not been any transformation in civil-military relations
due to the coming of the ETF, who maintain their distance from the civilian population. However,
what has been an interesting development is the transformative while simultaneously derogative
relationship among the ETF, the forest department, the regular army and the local administration.
The Planning Commission (October 2011, 40) in a report mentions that: “the establishment and
operational expenditure on the ETF Battalions raised by Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reimbursed
by the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF)” while operational assistance like provision of
saplings, fencing, as well as overall professional and managerial guidance has to be provided by
the respective state forest departments. The ex-servicemen recruited are preferably from within the
region of operation, “where as the nuclear core of the force is constituted of regular servicemen”.
This entails that the ETF would have to both rely on and communicate with the forest department
and maintain a close working relationship especially in a hostile environment as that of BTAD. Yet
another major hurdle the ETF faces, as pointed out by the officers is encroachment of forestland.
Occasionally land allocated to the ETF is encroached by certain ethnic groups or the community let
loose their cattle which destroys saplings. As an officer noted,
Encroachment seems to be considered almost legal in these areas (sic). We have tried
bringing this up with the forest department as well as the local administration but to no
avail…. there is a lot of political pressure and at the moment it is just about maintaining
the status quo and not undertake any eviction operations. Who knows may be the state
itself settles these people on forestland?
The local social and political circumstances seep into the ETF’s conservation efforts, revealing the
different objectives of the forest department, army, local administration and the ETF that does not
ally. Besides, the officers of the ETF deem the forest department officials to be “lazy, corrupt and
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useless” and often have to “be pushed and given constant (personal) reminders”5 to attend events and
(awareness) meetings on conservation and planning organized by the ETF. Moreover, as mentioned
in the Planning Commission document, it is the responsibility of the forest department to supply the
ETF with saplings for plantation, but in BTAD the ETF has created and currently maintains several
nurseries and instead from time to time provides saplings to the forest department. They also do not
rely on the quality of saplings provided by the forest department and maintain their own nurseries
and vermin-composts to ensure quality saplings with better survival rates. Given the existence of
rampant illegal logging especially of high value woods like Sal, Gamari and teak, the ETF mostly
plant medicinal and fruit trees (like mangoes, gooseberry, guava, black berries, date palm etc.) in
their plantation drives, which in the long run is also beneficial for the local communities.
The officers of the ETF sense that they have been forced to take up some of the workload of the
Forest Department in terms of maintaining the nurseries, creating awareness programs and even
communicating with village headmen regarding plantation drives around the respective villages,
which should ideally be done by the forest department. In following with the protocol, 300 hectares
of land per year is handed over to the ETF by the forest department for plantation for a minimum
period of five years. In the first year, they prepare the ground and soil and plant the saplings. In
the second year, a tree count is carried out and dead saplings are replaced. The forest department
is required to monitor and take account the progress of the plantation site, annually. At the end of
five years of monitoring progresses, the area is handed over to the forest department. This is where
the discord arises, since to begin with the forest department do not carry out the annual monitoring
of the sites and additionally when the plantation site is handed over after five years, the forest
department habitually come up with excuses, besides finding flaws and eventually refuse and/or
delay taking over the site, thereby rendering additional burden on the ETF. Since forest comes
under the jurisdiction of the BTC and the ETF is under the MoD the whims of the forest department
prevails. This seems to be a case of conflicting jurisdiction within the federal structure, especially
in an area where the state is very much present and is neither fragile nor collapsed. The officers of
the forest department did not seem to consider the ETF important enough and instead felt like they
were treading on the department’s erstwhile territories. Although the ETF makes every attempt to
include the forest department in it’s activities the latter does not seem too keen to participate and
as a ranger said, “we are already overworked and do not have time to attend these functions and
train these people.” In recent times, senior officers have been sent to the Forest Research Institute
(FRI) in Dehradun for training in techniques of seed dormancy pre-treatments, seed storage, clonal
propagation of bamboo and nursery techniques of important tree species of Assam. Once back,
they disseminate the learning among others, usually sub-ordinates. Despite prevailing frictions,
5 Excerpt from an interview with field officers of the ETF.
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what emerged from the various interviews is that both parties have come to realize know that it
is a relationship of dependency and over time have established mutual tolerance and refrain from
stepping on the other’s toe. The ETF is aware of the corrupt practices of the forest department and
their alleged linkages with the timber mafia, but they have decided to stay quiet about this. If at all
they encounter logging or poaching activities during their plantation drives, they report it to the
forest department or the local administration. The forest department has the added advantage of
having historical dominance over the forests. For the villagers the ETF are outsiders that plant trees
and do not necessarily interact with them unlike the forest department. Moreover, the ETF has to
rely on the Army and the forest department, since the latter works in close conjecture with the local
communities residing in the RFs for safety information relating to insurgent and COIN operations, I
shall revisit this point in the next section. Over time however, the forest department has come to the
realization that it shall not be able to match the efficacy of the ETF and nor will it be able to venture
into areas deep inside the forests, till rebels continue to operate in the region.
Since, the ETF has to work with and under the supervision of the forest department, the scales tilt
in the latter’s favor. As the above shows, there are resource and authority issues between these two
institutional structures, but at the same time there also exists strained collaboration as expertise and
control become exchangeable.
6.8 The ETF and the Local Political Context
As it stands, conservation activities even in relatively peaceful settings can be daunting since it often
necessitates fencing off forestland which villagers use as grazing land, or clearing of encroached
land often leading to contestations with local populations. However, conservation in the BTAD,
which falls under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA),6 is particularly challenging for
the ETF, since the image of the army or the paramilitary is synonymous with rape, abduction, torture
and killings. Interestingly the ETF was not only brought into BTAD for its discipline but also
their uniform, which is the same as the regular Army. Furthermore, the forest department’s appeal
for advanced weapons or additional security inside interior forest was met with deaf ears. In an
interview, an officer of the ETF said to me “local population cannot distinguish between regular
Army and us and usually view us with similar awe and fear”. So, the ETF carries out their plantation
drives in interior forestlands where in principle their uniforms (are supposed to) act as deterrents for
6 AFSPA, 1958, gives armed forces special power to maintain public order in disturbed areas. They have the authority
to prohibit a gathering of five or more persons in an area, can use force or even open fire after giving due warning if
they feel a person is in contravention of the law. If reasonable suspicion exists, the army can also arrest a person
without a warrant and also shoot; enter or search a premises without a warrant; and ban the possession of firearms.
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villagers as well as insurgents who would otherwise engage in logging, hunting and encroachment
activities. As already mentioned the regular army is extremely unpopular among the local population
given the continuing COIN operations along with incidences of rape, torture and abduction. Since
the villagers cannot usually differentiate between the ETF and the regular army, it appears as though
a Janus faced Army is at play, which is on the one hand trying to protect the ecology and on the
other killing and torturing at random. The relationship between the forest communities and the
forest department was based predominantly on negotiation and the latter exercised only selective
contestation towards forest crime. Besides fear and uncertainty brought about by political conflicts,
this was also due to the unavailability of adequate human and financial resources at the disposal of
the forest department for such interventions Due to this mediated rule the state could survive the
hostile environment of rebel dominance over the years and even came out stronger as its legitimacy
rose with time.
A senior officer with the ETF also pointed out the drawback it creates for the ETF in terms of
additional threats and mistaken identity. As is frequently the case in such sensitive spaces of violent
rebel led conflict, the militant groups are regularly in contact with the local villagers and retain
informants in interior villages. As the officer related, their presence also leads to the villagers
reporting on them to the militants who then presume that the ETF is undertaking COIN operations.
Although the officer added “in case we stumble upon any solid intel, we pass it on to the regular
army. This though is extremely rare”7, given their mandate. When I spoke to the village headman
of one of the villages situated next to the plantation site, he did not seemed slightly baffled as to
why the ETF was so fearful of the local situation. He further recounted,
This is the last village beyond which we have the plantation site and then flows the
Saralbhanga river on the banks of which lies Bhutan. This has been a corridor for
illegal activities, smuggling of timber and also movement of insurgents. Of course
we had insurgents frequenting our village, but in recent times insurgency seems to
have declined. The ETF ask us things like if the insurgents extort money, if the area if
safe and look at us for reassurance it seems. We used to be scared of the ETF at the
beginning but not much anymore. Usually they call us once a month to check on the
insurgency situation.
This however, does not in way translate into the ETF or the forest department being engaged
in COIN. What emerges from the above discussion is that conservation on war footing within the
recurring conflict context of BTAD is characterized by non-aligned inter-institutional competition
among the motley crew of state and non-state actors, who usually have their individual directives
7 Excerpt from interview(s) with personnel of ETF.
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to fulfill and act upon. Although COIN over the years against militants and vengeful attacks has
played a role in shaping human-nature relationships (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011) within the RFs
especially in relation to determining access to and control over forest spaces and resources, but the
case of RFs does not essentially feed into the debate on the application of COIN in biodiversity
conservation (Ybarra, 2012; Verweijen and Marijnen, 2016), as part of wider processes of ‘green
militarization’ (Lunstrum, 2014). I would like to substantiate this claim with an incident that ensued
between the NDFB (S) militants and the ETF. On the morning of October 2014 a heavily armed
group of about seventy NDFB(S) cadre ambushed a team of the ETF while they were carrying out
plantation activities in the Khalasi area inside the Chirang-Riphu RF. The militants outnumbered
the green army and snatched seven INSAS rifles along with magazines. Although this is the official
version as reported in local newspapers, according to local villagers not only did the militants loot
the members of the ETF but also took a lift in the latter’s truck to a certain site. There have been
similar instances where personnel of paramilitary forces have been waylaid and executed by rebel
groups. Post this confrontation, the ETF abandoned this specific plantation site and also moved
their base camp and nursery from inside the RF to Bismuri, closer to Kokrajhar town. The entry to
the base camp is extremely restricted and interestingly the villagers who live around the camp view
the ETF as regular army and presume have been stationed for their protection.
This signifies that despite the numerous efforts the ETF makes to buffer itself from local politics,
incidents of a violent nature invariably affect conservation practices. This also leads to the ETF
relying even more on the regular Army and the forest department as well as local villagers. Since
this incident the ETF is often accompanied by a small group of army personnel when they go into
interior areas for plantation. Interviews conducted with villagers who live close to plantation sites
revealed that before starting plantation projects, the ETF personnel often have informal meetings with
members of the village council and request them to keep the ETF abreast of any recent happenings
pertaining to security in the area or if they happen to site insurgent activities. The fact that the ETF
finds itself in a vulnerable position both in terms of self protection and also everyday interaction
with the forest department, points to the deployment of a central body in a conflict zone, seeking
co-operation from the state government. Conservation by a unit of the Indian army along with the
forest department in a militarized zone where COIN and conservation do not necessarily align adds
to Lunstrum’s (2014) call for place-specific studies of militarization that are still sparse.
In the context of the RF in BTAD, the process of conservation is a combination of cooperation and
co-inhabitation in the forest areas. The hostility and resignation with which different agencies are
viewed by the local communities as well as the way they perceive and relate to each other becomes
important both to the relative effectiveness of conservation activity but also the extent to which
violence is actually bred or exacerbated by this activity.
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6.9 Concluding Remarks
Using the case of the ETF as an entry point, I have shown how in the context of the RFs in BTAD,
the joint roles of the ETF, the forest department and the active rebel groups in prevention of illegal
logging, access to control over resources and encroachment by local populations renders conservation
and environment only a second fiddle to issues around counter-insurgency and national security. As
the literature discussed shows, there tends to be three emerging narratives about the role of military
in society with respect to the environment. One is that the environment and national security stand
opposed to one another, the other lends to the notion that environment needs to bend if national
security is an issue and final conception brings together the military and paramilitary personnel,
training, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation efforts with a larger goal of
COIN and preservation of national security. In the case at hand, COIN and securitization remains the
forte of the regular army; eviction operations lie with the forest department and intense afforestation
and soil conservation is the domain of the ETF. The non-convergence of COIN and conservation here
is also explained by the coming together of regimented bureaucracies in environmental operations,
along with local and historical factors operating alongside conservation.
Additionally, conservation by the military does not in all occasion transform into militarization
of the environment, as this case has shown. There is always a risk of this happening as has been
seen closer home in KNP, that boasts of a remarkable conservation success, with considerable costs,
including human lives. In spaces where the nation-state is more vested with fighting insurgency
and separatist tendencies and the preservation of law and order is of paramount importance, COIN
shall invariably prevail over conservation and the coalition among the various state and non-state
actors will be steered towards this goal. Therefore, I expect my findings to have resonance beyond
Assam and India, as similar conservation and coalition approaches are likely to exist elsewhere. In
this article, I have drawn precise conceptual linkages between the political geography and political
ecology literature on ‘violent environments’, crisis conservation and green militarization and the
broader work on military security and violent conflict. I have expanded empirically on the concepts
of ‘violent environment’and greenmilitarization by applying it to spaces like the RFs in BTADwhere
the politics of conservation is embedded in a larger context of violent conflict and inter-institutional
competition. Using the case of ETF, I have also argued and demonstrated how conservation by a
wing of the Indian army in sensitive borderland spaces does not lead to the convergence of COIN
and conservation. I have further shown how localized conservation practices are intertwined with
micro conflict dynamics and inadvertently perturb both the ETF and the forest department. Finally,
I have also indicated how conservation on war footing in actual zones of conflict encompasses a
range of different state and non-state actors, operating at different scales and their reaction and
adaptation to the specific challenges of conservation in ‘violent environments’ and a non-alignment
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of their functional goals related to COIN and conservation.
A line of inquiry worth exploring would be to arrive at both analytically and conceptually middle
ground within the conservation-COIN nexus, especially when using national armed forces for
conservation operations. The goal is to find sustainable futures for both people and the ecology
which requires coalitions that work together.
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7 A Phenomenological Exploration of Lived Experiences of
Violence in Northeast India.
Under Review: South Asia – Journal of South Asian Studies.
Abstract
Using a framework of phenomenology of lived experiences to analyse conflict narratives
of interlocutors living in crisis contexts of an on-going ethnic violence since the 1970s in the
Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) in Assam, this paper seeks to explore how
exposure to repeated cycles of violence influences temporalities. Does a past experience of
violence make one more resilient to a similar suffering occurring in future, or when violence
strikes for the second time one is relegated right back to that past? How does one migrate both
psychologically and physiologically through this process of living through uncertainty in their
own homes to temporary relief camps? How do people memorize an episode of violence and
translate it in their everyday mediations, negotiations and socio-political relations?
7.1 Introduction
The Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) in the state of Assam in northeast India
can be described as a landscape of terror since it has been a stage for recurrent, mostly violent
contestations on ethno-religious lines since over four decades. Over the years, the violence has
claimed more than thousand lives and displaced millions. The first phase of violence was unleashed
through the Bodo struggle for a separate state within the territory of India, with two central rebel
groups- the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
leading the cause, in the early 1980s. The long drawn battle between the rebel groups and the Indian
Army as well as the Paramilitary, led to over a decade of curfews, shooting at sight, abductions,
bomb blasts and targeted killings. In 1993, the first BodoAccord was signed, however it’s provisions
failed to please many, and so the BLT emerged in 1996, unbridling a reign of terror. Finally in
2003, a tripartite agreement among the BLT, the government of Assam and the Indian state led to
the surrender of the BLT and the creation of the BTAD, comprising of the districts of Kokrajhar,
Udalguri, Chirang and Baksa. However, the NDFB refused to participate and one faction of the
movement NDFB(S or Songbijit) has remained active until today.
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The BLT (trans) formed into a political party called the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), which
has been in power ever since. Meanwhile, the NDFB went into ceasefire and there have been several
offshoots of the group over the years, which continue to engage in periodic episodes of violence for
a separate state of Bodoland. Since the inception of BTAD, there have been over twelve reported
episodes of violence1 between the Bodos and Adivasis as well as the Bodos and Bengali Muslims,
the most prominent ones being in 2007, 2008, 2012 and twice in 2014. Prior to 2003, ethnic violence
occurred in 1993, 1996, and 1998.
To give a brief overview into the context of this conflict, the Bodos who are the largest plain tribes
within the northeast India, at present constitute 29 per cent of the population in BTAD, followed by
the Rajbonshis (fifteen per cent), Bengali Muslims (about twelve to thirteen percent), and Santhals
who are an Adivasi group make up six percent. There is a perception of massive illegal migration
from Bangladesh, which has generated a fear psychosis among the Bodo community that their
ancestral lands will be illegally taken away by these migrant Muslims. The lack of any reliable data
on the number of people coming in from Bangladesh into Assam further aggravates this situation.
Moreover, the inclusion of the names of the so called illegal migrant in the voters list is seen as a
deliberate strategy by some outside force to empower an outside group against the Bodos, so that
the latter lose their sense of distinct indigenous identity. Moreover, the existence of armed groups
like the NDFB (the anti talks faction), the Birsa and the Cobra Commando Force representing the
Santhal Adivasis has further contributed to repeated cycles of violence (Goswami 2012). Hence,
this inter-generational experience of living through uncertainty and violence has and continues to
shape the social and economic structures and everyday transactions. That the Muslims and Adivasis
feel a constant sense of vulnerability has been wrought about due to repeated attacks against them.
Notwithstanding the fact that the dominant ethnic group, the Bodos also bear both cultural and
physical fate akin to the Muslims and Adivasis orchestrated through retaliatory forms of violence
against them.
With this backdrop, when I entered the region in 2009. What stared me in the face was a landscape
scattered with narratives of fear, terror, violence and uncertainty. Drawing from and expanding on
Henrik Vigh’s idea of crisis context, where he argues that instead of placing crisis in context, the
need is to view crisis itself as context – as a terrain of action and meaning, thereby opening this
up for ethnographic exploration (Vigh 2008), I propose a phenomenological inquiry into the lived
experiences of those living through these chronic crisis context in the BTAD. Such an exploration
feeds into the need for what I term an intimate ethnography of the region and those who have
suffered- my interlocutors, especially since the past decade forms of non-traditional and humanistic
1 See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/data_sheets/BTAD.htm
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ethnography with a goal of reaching out has been gaining momentum in anthropology, through
the works of Veena Das (2007), Henrik Vigh (2008), Sverker Finnstrom (2008) and more recently
Townsend Middleton (2015). These scholars have engaged in peeling political and social violence
layer by layer and interrogated the production and maintenance of agency in contexts of extreme
suffering and uncertainty.
Moreover, phenomenological approaches have continued to gain significance in anthropology
throughout the past twenty-five years. These approaches have helped anthropologists “to reconfigure
what it means to be human, to have a body, to suffer and to heal, and to live among others” (Desjarlais
and Thoorp 2011). Therefore, as Desjarlais and Thoorp (2011) further state, “to study experience
from a phenomenological perspective is to recognize the necessary emplacement of modalities
of human existence within ever-shifting horizons of temporality”. For, the human existence is
temporally structured in ways that the past experience is always retained in a present moment that is
feeding forward to anticipate future horizons of experience. Duranti (2010) points out that Husserl’s
rendering of the natural attitude “closely resonates with what anthropologists understand to be the
cultural configuration of reality”. To this extent, as Duranti (2010:18) suggests, the “natural attitude”
might just as well be termed the “cultural attitude”. By developing on Husserl’s phenomenology,
Merleau-Ponty views the individual as the body itself, within a time and place, performing in the
world in which it lives. For Merleau-Ponty the body is ‘our anchor in the world’, or ‘our general
means of holding on to a world’ (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 239). Such an approach focuses on the
reading of social behavior as ‘the study of human lived experience and that human experience is
rooted in people’s meanings, interpretations, activities and interactions’ (Prus 1996: 9). Therefore,
one of the more instrumental influences of phenomenology to contemporary phenomenological
anthropology becomes apparent in the tradition’s focus on embodiment, where the body is not
only an object that is available for scrutiny. It is also a locus from which our experience of the
world is arrayed. The objective of a phenomenological method is, therefore, to describe the full
structure of an experience lived, or what that experience meant to those who lived it. Every armed
conflict therefore, consists of an accumulated mass of small details, which linger as facts, figures
and memories in people’s attempt to make social life and a living beyond the conflict and especially
when it comes to war and peace, every case needs its own context (Richards 2005: 14).
Drawing from over fifteen months of ethnographic research spanning over four years from 2014 to
2017 consisting of participant observation, in depth interviews, life histories, informal conversations
across multiple villages and relief camps set up at the immediate aftermath of conflict, my focus has
been on the minute rather than spectacular manifestations of agency in the everyday. In this article,
I shall focus on the everyday narratives across two cases- the first is a village that was torched
during an episode of violence in 2012 and fieldwork was conducted in 2014 and subsequently in
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2015 and 2016. The second site is a temporary relief camp set up after the conflict in December
2014, where fieldwork was carried out from January to May 2015. The narratives reveal how within
the immediate context of a temporary relief camp, the abject loss and magnitude of suffering is
visible through imageries of physical destruction of property, bullet injuries on bodies and extreme
emotions either through hysterical outburst or haunting silences. Whereas within the gradual context
of a village, two years after the episode of conflict it is the memories that begin to take shape
and everyday chores are exercised with caution and imposition of restricted mobility in social
interactions. Although the material culture of violence lingers, physical violence ceases to be the
centrifugal part of life, at least temporarily.
Using a cross case comparison, I show how the body understands, feels and interacts with textures
and objects of everyday life. Since this notion of lived experience relates to how members of
subjugated groups find themselves in the world, make sense of the external world, and through their
actions actively (re) shape their world, my proposition in this article is to interrogate, compare and
capture the temporalities of lived experience across the two cases. This I believe, aids in an intimate
understanding of how temporality or time alters people’s experiences in terms of the affect conflict
has on people’s bodies and senses.
In the following sections, I shall first provide a brief description about the two cases, and how I
draw from existing theoretical insights within the broader debate on anthropology of conflict and
apply it to these cases by focusing on lived experiences. By weaving the various narratives and
observations gathered through ethnographic fieldwork, I compare the temporalities of the ordinary
and the everyday to highlight the fluidity of these categories, which become pronounced at the wake
of certain events. Using temporality as a central trope, the analysis of the cases reveal how people
transcend from the lifeworld of the camp to that of the village.
7.2 The Two Cases — Sites of Violence and Methodology
My first case is the village of Misalmari2, inhabited solely by Bengali speaking Muslims. This
village was attacked by the Bodos in July 2012 and was completely charred and gutted. In the words
of one of my interlocutors, “it was the 19th of July, 2012 when uncontrolled violence commenced
and spread like a virus”3. The population lived in make shift relief camps for over ten months and
some up to a year before rebuilding and returning to their village in 2013. I conducted fieldwork in
Misalmari, first in 2014 and subsequently in 2015 and 2016. The second case is a makeshift relief
camp comprising of Santhal Adivasis from seven villages, located within the Ultapaani reserved
forests. The villages were attacked by militants belonging to the National Democratic Front of
2 Names of persons and villages have been changed for reasons of confidentiality.
3 All interviews were conducted in the local languages, Bengali and Assamese and the excerpts are my translation.
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Bodoland’ anti-talk Songbijit faction in December 2014. Later the NDFB(S) claimed responsibility
of the attacks and also stated that this was done to make their present felt and continue the movement
for a separate state of Bodoland. This relief camp was set up deep inside the reserved forest on the
Indo-Bhutan border where I conducted fieldwork at the immediate aftermath, from January to April
2015. Since, it was difficult to follow all the families that lived in this camp, I was able to follow
families from at least two villages and conduct fieldwork with them subsequently in 2016.
I visited Misalmari, first in April 2014 when the residents were beginning to return and rebuild
their homes and lives after having spent over ten months in makeshift relief camps. Misalmari had
also been the site of violence in 1996. The calcined remains of the sole primary school around
which the village was built, was still visible from the main mud road that led into the village and was
the site of the local market which consisted of a homeopathic pharmacy, a cassette store, a butcher
shop and a tea-stall where every evening the villagers gathered to discuss their lives, local politics
and business, among other things. It is here that I often sat and engaged in detailed conversations
and discussions for hours. Invariably, their thoughts gyrated towards that sultry summer evening
in July 2012, when their village was set on fire, ten people were shot dead, over ten went missing
and several injured while they ran for cover. At first they took shelter inside the primary school, to
escape from the bullets that were being fired by the attackers. The Indian para-military forces came
in the meantime and started shooting the perpetrators from the other side. After being cramped up
inside the school for several hours, the villagers were escorted by the military to a nearby relief
camp. Two days later, when a few men returned to the village, all that remained were ashes. As I
started visiting the households, each time I was told, “my entire house was burnt down, I lost all my
cows and crops. I still have not fixed my tin roof since I am scared they might come and burn it all
down”.
As already mentioned, the second case is a temporary relief camp, comprising of residents
primarily from seven Adivasi villages, located deep inside the reserved forest where in December
2014, attacks were carried out by the NDFB(S) faction. The relief campwas amakeshift arrangement,
with tarpaulin tents in blue donated by an NGO and one tube-well as the only source of drinking
water, serving about three hundred people. This camp was strategically set up in a field opposite to
the walled compound of the Border Security Forces (BSF). The people of this camp had also faced
another episode of violence in 1998, and had moved into their houses inside the reserved forest,
barely a few years ago, after having received compensation from the government for their losses
in 1998. They acknowledged that their proximity to the forest meant that they would often have
to feed and shelter NDFB(S) militants and they tried to maintain a cordial relationship with them
out of fear for life. On that evening, three days before Christmas the women had returned home
after a day’s work in the fields and were sitting by the hearths cooking their evening meal. Malati, a
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twenty-five old woman whose husband was shot at by the militants, summed up the incident for me,
We were very familiar with the presence of the NDFB (S). That evening they entered
our huts and asked baido aji ki bonai ase? (Sister, what is for dinner tonight?). Just as
I started responding to them, I heard gunshots outside and the militants inside my hut
also ran out and started firing indiscriminately. We ran into the forest for safety, but
almost twelve people, including women and children were killed from my village.
Standing close to Malati was Babulal, a forty years old man who worked as a daily wage labourer
in a neighboring Bodo village. He was home early on that evening to prepare for the Christmas
celebrations. He lifted his shirt and exposed his abdomen to show me the bullet marks and stitches
which were still healing. He had sutures along the thumb on his right hand. He recounted, “baido
ami jongol, dhaan kheter maaje di polai golu, ekdum andher aaru gute gaat jok dhorise” (sister we
ran through forests and paddy fields for hours in the dark with leeches sticking to our bodies).
As already stated, I used an ethnographic method comprising of mostly narratives of lived
experiences and participant observation. Narrative methods have a long tradition within a range
of scholarly fields; including anthropology reflecting varied theoretical paradigms and research
interests over the years (Eastmond 2007). Narratives are attractive for what they can reveal about how
people themselves, as experiencing subjects make sense of violence and turbulent transformations.
More specifically, these relate to understanding of other people’s experiences and how best they
and their experiences can be represented to do them justice. Analytically, there emerges the need to
differentiate between life as lived, life as experienced and life as told. Lived experiences demand to
be understood based on how the person perceives and prescribes meanings drawing on previous
experience and cultural repertoires; the aspect of told has to be looked at with how experience is
framed and articulated in a particular context (Eastmond 2007, Bruner 1986).
I must mention that my intention here is not to give violence a prurient form. The nature of
the setting of the two sites and the narratives that emerged through repeated interactions with my
interlocutors were of a shocking nature, nonetheless pertinence of analysis, especially in terms of
their everyday lived experiences.
A comparison of the cases highlights how bodies open up to the world and those around them.
In case of displaced people in the wake of immediate violence in camps the everyday is more
extraordinary due to the immediate uprooting. Whereas those that have returned to their village and
recount narratives two years after the last episode of violence, continue to struggle to come to grip
with the past. By understanding the lived experiences of those directly affected by violence in two
different temporal sites which are just sixty miles apart, I strive to unpack how exposure to repeated
cycles of violence influences temporalities i.e. experiences of past versus the present, the cycle of
temporal regularities and irregularities as well as the ordinary and the extraordinary. Given that the
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residents of Misalmari were also affected by violence in 1996 and the internally displaced persons
at the relief camp were affected in 1998, proves that they have been engulfed in cyclic episodes of
violence and often while recounting their experiences, as I shall show below, they amalgam one
episode with the other.
7.3 Situating the Study Within the Existing Discourse around Anthropology
of Conflict
Before, moving on to the more empirical section, I would like to locate this article within the
larger discourse of anthropological phenomenology and conflict by also focusing on the work on
embodiment. The anthropology of conflict and violence is a fast-growing field of study, where
critical ethnographers like Sverker Finnstrom have used phenomenological and reflexive approaches
to minutely detail the everyday lived realities and experiences of those living amidst violence in
Northern Uganda, and has reflected on how people engage with their local surroundings in search
of balance, control and meaning, (Finnstrom 2008). This resonates with Michael Jackson’s idea of
balance, control as well as lack of control that should be woven into analysis of suffering, loss and
vulnerability (Jackson 1998). Valentine Daniel’s anthropography of violence in the context of civil
war in Sri Lanka revolves around an extended peripatetic inquiry into the effects of violence on
victims both in the short term which he describes as ”the experience of the passion and the pain of
violence in its brutal immediacy” and in the longer run outlined as ”complex agendas and already
begun mediations such as demands for justice, revenge, forgiveness, freedom, and relief”(Daniel
1996:4-6). Therefore, it becomes apparent that at the core of phenomenology, “the intent is to
understand the phenomena in their own terms — to provide a description of human experience as
it is experienced by the person herself” (Bentz and Shapiro 1998: 96), thereby also allowing for
the essence to surface (Cameron, Schaffer and Hyeon-Ae 2001). According to Wolputte (2004), in
social and cultural anthropology, “the body was never completely absent, even if only for the fact
that, implicitly, the bodiliness of the Other served as a principal marker of his or her Otherness”.
The body can be further distinguished at an individual and a social level. The individual body as
already mentioned, emerges as the domain of phenomenological analysis through its focus on the
lived or embodied experiences people have of their bodies. The social body, in contrast, refers to
the ways the body (including its products like blood, milk, sperm etc.) functions as a natural symbol
and a tool to think and represent social relationships like kinship, gender and mode of production
(Featherstone et al. 1991).
Therefore, the anthropology of the body has transcended from its focus on the “abstract or
ideal(ised) body”, and instead shifted to those moments during which the body and bodiliness are
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questioned and lose their self-evidence based on the experience or “threat of finiteness, limitation,
transience, and vulnerability”. These embodied ambiguities confront the autonomy of the individual
in a sense that they no longer appear “as a lack or deficiency, but instead as an existential characteristic
of the human condition and as an ethical challenge” (Wolputte 2004). Moreover, while responding
to William James’s (1996) call for a “radical empiricism,” anthropologists have worked to introduce
more fully the historical, the cultural, the variable, and the relative into phenomenology, using
methods of radical ethnography with a focus on experiences. Phenomenologists argue that at the
root, even one’s very basic experiences of physical objects both envisage and entails a foundational
intersubjectivity. Indeed, phenomenological anthropologists have frequently relied on the concept
of experience as a way to orient their research generatively to the “complexly temporal, at times
ambiguous, and deeply ambivalent realities of human existence” (Desjarlais and Throop 2011). It
is in keeping in line with the existing approaches within anthropological phenomenology, that I
use this approach in a situation of intense conflict and suffering and reflect on how the focus on
the immediate is usually guided by the past and in anticipation of the future. As Vigh further notes
that the focus should be geared towards the way people cope, not through crisis but in crisis, and
in so doing provide valuable insight into an important but, as yet, largely implicit anthropological
enquiry (Vigh 2008). Moreover, my attempt at reconstituting the normal or the ordinary does not
mean that life in the relief camp or in the village is somehow what it was before the conflict (cf
Greenberg 2011:89). As I shall go on to show that however compromised, makeshift and uncertain,
everyday life continues to have some form of stability and predictability and over time the things
people encounter during the day are familiar and make sense (transition from camp to village) and
they are almost forced to chalk out ways in which to organise their present lives and attempt at
planning for the future.
7.4 Analysing Comparative Lived Experiences of Conflict across Two Sites
of Narratives
7.4.1 The Case of the Relief Camp
It deserves mention that my analyses contains not only dramatic but also repulsive ethnographic
field material, including images and narratives of deeply dehumanizing violence. I shall now make
an attempt to analyze the narratives that shift and altercate within the realms of past, present and
future of my interlocutors within these two cases. These narratives provide a window into the
impact of this conflict on the daily lives of individuals, families and communities, the reflective
ways in which they make meaning of these experiences, and the activities they occupy themselves
with to maintain a sense of agency. A comparison of these narratives across the two cases, as was
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also unearthed by Finnstrom (2008) in his work on northern Uganda, shows that social memories
created by these reflexive accounts are flux. They morph and alter along with lived realities and
temporalities as a mechanism of adaptation, comprehension, and balance.
I believe that the two cases I present adds an additional layer to this by providing comparisons of
how within a span of two years people’s bodies transcend from finding themselves ruined, mutilated
and uprooted to rebuilding and healing, notwithstanding in relation to time, space and everyday
sites, albeit the fact that human beings ubiquitously actively participate, though not always equally,
in the making of a future whether that future appears to repeat the past or not (Jackson 2005). The
past remains more pronounced in the relief camp, while the present is still sinking in and the future
doesn’t hold much significance. In the village the immediate past often is mixed up with the more
distant past and the future appears to be more prominent then the present. As I shall show, the
violence is a break in their life worlds, but the external world continues.
The residents of the relief camp also lost their young children to the conflict. Bimala narrated,
“as I was running into the forest I saw my neighbor also run with her three month old child, till a
bullet pierced through her breast, she collapsed, as she held the baby close to her heart”. I was later
told that that the child was saved by another neighbor and is now being raised by his father. Among
those who lost their young children was Jagori. When I first met Jagori, she was dressed in a long
loose gown, locally known as a nightie and her two year old toddler trailed behind. She slowly
began to recount the events of that evening,
I had gone to fetch water from the village well to cook the evening meal. A few NDFB
militants had come to my house with a chicken and wanted me to cook it for them. My
husband and two sons, aged two and four were at home chatting with the NDFB. As I
was getting water and chatting about the day with the other women, we heard gunshots
and it grew louder. I ran towards my hut and found that both my sons had sustained
bullet injuries. My husband and I picked them up and ran to take shelter deep inside
the forest, on the heels of other neighbors. My elder son bled profusely throughout the
night. We tore up the clothes we were wearing to cover his wounds along with wild
medicinal leaves. We all crouched together, shivering in fear. The army finally came in
after what seemed like several hours and we took our son to the hospital, but he could
not be saved.
She narrated all of this without shedding a tear and with a straight face. She then lifted the
toddler’s shirt and showed me the multiple bullet injuries he had sustained, while constantly tugging
at the suture that gouged into the bullet wound on his arms. Satya, a forty-year-old man also related
his story of narrow escape on that evening.
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I was returning home after working in the field with two of my friends, on our bi-cycles.
We did not hear about the attack that was taking place in the village. Suddenly we
heard gunshots and a few men with locally made guns came chasing. We left our cycles
and fled for our lives. I hid on the side of a stream and heard a loud scream. One of
my friends had been shot. I ran like a mad man and thought this was the end for me. I
ran for a while and thought that my other friend was behind me, but after running for
a while I hid behind a tree and saw that my friend was being hacked with a sickle. I
started running again, and finally came across a side road through which I escaped.
Both Jagori and Malati’s narratives point to the fact that the coming of the NDFB(S) men to their
villages, cooking meals for them and perhaps even sharing a meal was nothing out of the ordinary.
Their bodies had oriented to this activity and therefore even on that uneventful evening, they could
not foresee the attack coming. This notion of how bodies relate to familiar events leads me to Amit
Baisya’s expansion of Jean Amery’s notion of codified abstraction. Baisya states that everyday
reality is a dense network of “codified abstraction that orients my body towards objects in a certain
way.” He explains this as “the image of me buying a newspaper orients my daily action of going to
buy a newspaper. This act seems habitual and familiar because this orientation towards the object
closes the gap between the imagination and the event. A familiar world comes into being through a
repetition of this act” (Baisya 2018:29). This connects with what Sarah Ahmed writes, “Familiarity
is what is, as it were given, and which in being given gives the body the capacity to be oriented in
this way or that. The question of orientation becomes, then, a question not only about how we find
our way but how we come to feel at home (Ahmed 2006:7).
The encounter with a world-shattering event, like the sudden attack by those familiar acquaintances
strips away the protective casing that comes with our body being at ease with the familiar world
around. The body then begins to relate to everyday objects through the tragic incident. To illustrate
this, paddy fields and leeches remain etched onto Babulal’s body as objects intrinsically connected to
the violence, since Babulal and his friends ran for hours though the paddy fields. In my subsequent
visits, Babulal would often speak about that night and how he had developed both an aversion
and fear towards leeches, which otherwise are an everyday object in the reserved forests. Sleep
had evaded him and others in the camp and they claimed to be in a constant state of alertness.
Conversations always spiraled into that evening and their present state of helplessness. On one of
my visits to the camp, I went for a walk with Bimala to her village, which had been torched in the
conflict. She took me to show the remains of her house where she lived with her mother, father
and two brothers. On the way to her house, she gestured towards a well and said, “look there...this
is where they dumped the dead bodies of two elderly people in the village. They first shot them,
then tied them with ropes and threw them into the well. The police found their bodies three days
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later.” She then pointed at a few cows and goats that were grazing in the field nearby and said, “We
had three cows and two goats. But we lost them to the conflict”. Her body (re) orients to everyday
objects both living and non-living and sites through her lived experience of terror.
(Kirmayer 1992, 333) shows, metaphors are extrarational and are tools not only to think, but
also especially to work with experience. Metamorphosing how the body makes such negative
associations, my interpretation of Babulal’s account of leeches is that this haptic can be a mode
of interspecies connection to describe the general feeling of disgust that is elicited by the touch of
sticky substances on the skin. A part of that comes from an assumed viscosity and shapelessness
associated with insectile forms; insects after all are other because of their general associations with
stickiness, death and decay. Plus, the leech is horrifying since it obliterates boundaries between
inside and outside- sticking to the skin, it bores within. The body (re) oriented to everyday objects,
like the well, the bushes, the trees, the river, where memories of conflict was etched onto the bodies
and surfaced in the everyday narratives, “See that well, they tied two men from our village and
plunged them into the well”. Or “see those bushes, we hid inside them when the militants raged our
village”. Or “see that river, we swam through it, often underwater to go to the other side into safety.
Unfortunately the children couldn’t make it”. The conflict passes, but these everyday objects in the
outside world remain to reverberate incidents bygone.
The untimely rains, only added to their misery, as the tarpaulin tents barely offered any protection
when it rained heavily, and it often did rain heavily given the location of the camp within the reserved
forest on the foot hills of Bhutan. It was as if the everyday life had come to a standstill, since they
were too scared to venture far out into the forest or even go and check on their burnt homes. The
men sometimes took day trips to the nearby town of Kokrajhar to enquire about the compensation
money, which they had still not received. They lived to survive, one day at a time. Temporally
this is where the present loomed large leading to the emaciation or bloating of memories and hope.
Bodies move within nested identities: the household, the fields, the village all define the individual”.
Conflict upturns and throws people out of these nests, and survival becomes essential.
I soon became a familiar presence in the life worlds of the residents. This was also around the
time when monsoon was well on its way with regular thunderstorms and most families had received
at least a part of the compensation from the government along with some utensils for everyday
use and mosquito nets. But this was due to the elections to the Bodo Territorial Council that took
place in April 2015, and the local leaders capitalized on the conflict situation as a strategy to garner
votes. Spending more time with the residents soon revealed how everyday conversations alternated
between what was to be cooked for dinner, if the ration would arrive on time, future of the children,
illness, gossips about Jonaki, a young mother of two, who according to Bimala and her friends,
“is usually drunk and flirts with the BSF guards”; to counter insurgency operations taking place
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inside the forest, abductions, raids by the army, sighting of NDFB(S) cadres in the local market and
violence. The urge of going back to their own villages, reconstructing their homes and buying new
cattle was often overshadowed by feelings of fear and uncertainty. The general sentiment seemed to
echo, “at least we are all together here, and what if they attack us again when we go back, and this
is too soon”. In the recent days, they had started going to their villages during the day. The farthest
village was at most one mile away from the relief camp. They took this time to clear and ruffle
through the charred remains, pull out the weeds and nettles from taking over their lands, feed any
remaining cattle or those that strayed back, but way before nightfall they made way to the safety
of the relief camp. Once the ration did not arrive for ten days and the residents were forced to go
seeking for work in nearby Bodo villages. Their bodies often trembled and shivered with fear when
they made their way outside the comforts of the camp and their own villages, but as they recounted,
“upai naai” (there is no other way). The body adapts and (re) orients but only when it becomes a
necessity, as the wound was still fresh and not healed. It was only after six months, \the monsoons
forced them to re-orient their steps towards their villages. Recurring exposure to terror has the
affect of incapacitation; it can render people immobile on the face of anticipatory danger. Mobility
became extremely restrained and people rarely ventured into the forest out of fear. When I spoke
about why they were so hesitant about leaving the camp, I was told “‘baido ei NDFB keta etia o
aahi thake. Aami hodai heo tok bozaar ot dekhi pau’ (the NDFB rebels continue to come to this
village and roam around. We often see them in the market). This surprised me since the camp was
heavily guarded with the presence of the Army as well as paramilitary. I had the most obvious
counter question, ‘Are you sure?’ to which the response was, ‘ ami xiotor mukh cini pau. Etia xihot
civil dress ot ahe. BSF nejei ph(f)oreigher hoi. Xiot keneke gom pabo. Ami kio kobo zaam, amak
bhoi laage. Aku amak attack koribo’ (we know these insurgents by face. These days they come
dressed as ordinary people and added, “what does the Army know. They are foreigners” I am not in
a position to confirm the presence of NDFB(S) cadres around the relief camp, but what this reflects
is how terror creates a general aura of distrust and insecurity. The body is guided by the notions of
familiarity, intimacy and habit. The case of the relief camp shows how people circumvent through
the everyday at the immediate aftermath of a world-shattering event, in their life world.
7.4.2 The Village of Misalmaari
I now to move to the narratives gathered from Misalmaari, where the memory of the conflict had
become slightly stale, yet was part of the everyday vocabulary. After almost two years since the
violence, people had rebuilt their houses and were also in the process of going back to work. As the
village headman recounted, “men and women from our village have started going to Bodo peoples
houses and fields for work. We are scared of them and we hate them, but we need money and that is
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why we go. Not everyone in this village has their own land or cattle. Since we are surrounded by
Bodo villages, we have to go there to find work”. Unlike, the relief camp, here the villagers spoke
about the past when they used to be friends with their Bodo neighbors, before 2012.
Fatima was a thirty years old woman who lost her husband in the conflict of 2012. She has three
children aged three, six and nine. Fatima recounted her story,
My husband had gone to visit a neighbor and we thought he would join us but even
after we moved to the relief camp there was no trace of him. I have been going to
police stations and morgues and looked for him in every corpse they showed me, while
also hoping for him to return. But now I have come to accept that he is dead. I cannot
continue to mourn with three little children to feed and not a roof over my head. I have
started collecting firewood and selling it in the market, after all but how long can one
mourn.
She continued, “although I go to the local market and sometimes even sit next to Bodo women, I
make sure to come back to my village before it gets dark. We do not speak to our Bodo neighbors
unless they speak to us. But if they speak to us, we have to respond, right?” One day when I went
to Fatima’s house with some medicines for her daughter who had a bout of flu, I happened to meet
her brother, Abdul, who had moved to the nearby town of Kokrajhar after the conflict and worked
as an apprentice to a mechanic in a garage. Abdul said to me, “these Bodos killed us and now they
will also all die. Allah will see to it and give us justice”. The village headman who had also been
affected by the conflict in 1998, once said to me, “they all came with black handkerchiefs wrapped
around their faces…”, his son who was sitting nearby immediately interrupted, “father, you are
again mixing this up with 1998. This time their faces were not covered”. This was not just a one
off incident. On another day, the headman said to me, “did you notice those embankments by the
river on your way to the village. After the conflict we often saw hands and finger of those killed or
shot sticking out of the ground”. This time, Fatima who was nearby said, “oh that was way back in
late nineties, during the Bodoland movement. He is getting old and always muddles up details of
the numerous conflicts”. Usually, for a story to count as memory it must have a sense of pastness
about it, but repeated violence distorts the sense of time rendering it difficult to approximate when
the past flows into the present. Ewa Dománska (2005: 405) has termed this the “non-absent past,”
which she describes as a “past, which is somehow still present, which will not go away or, rather,
which we cannot rid ourselves of”.
This becomes particularly true when the body is exposed to repetitive cycles of violence in one
lifetime. Awidow named Jahan ran the tea-stall where I usually sat. I usually indulged in more than
one cup of the sugary syrup. However, one day I refused my cup of tea as I was in a hurry since I
had another appointment and it upset Jahan. When I promised her that I would be back soon to have
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that cup of tea, she said, “what if me and my tea stall is not here anymore. What if they kill me and
burn my stall?” Another time, Jahan recounted, “baido raati judi kiba hobdo xuna pao, aru ekjon
douri polai, aami sobe polau” (sister, if at night we hear a sound, any sound, and we see someone
from our village running, we all follow suit and run with him). This is how experiences from the
past feed its tentacles into the everyday, and the body reacts as if it were in a state of emergency
within the ordinary. The anticipation of the future emerges in discrete, bound temporal segments.
The possibility of death is momentarily stalled before the cycle repeats itself, as has in the past.
These narratives show how the body has moved beyond the immediate present and had reached a
stage of endurance rather than mere survival. This is similar in ways to Judith Pettigrew’s work on
the civil war in Nepal, where she found that in landscapes marred by violence and strife, keeping
the everyday chores going helped eased anxiety. People are usually hyper vigilant and try to pay
enhanced attention to daily activities as they try to evaluate the degree of risk. It is like how the
body returns home before dark, or only takes certain routes to the market avoiding others. How the
river that flows by the village continued to remind them of swimming through it to save their lives,
or the school that stands as a site of carnage, which they refuse to repair. Despite all the physical and
mental sufferings, they continue to persist and this can be referred to as endurance. The catastrophic,
crisis-laden, and sublime form of violence, still fresh in the relief camp, is usually followed by the
uneventful less visible forms of structural violence- the ordinary chronic and cruddy, as visible in
Misalmaari.
Contrary to the relief camp, in Misalmari, people had started going to the market and even to Bodo
households, seeking work. Labour which of course is a very bodily activity, assumes prominence as
it was imperative to use one’s body by engaging in manual work to earn money which was necessary
to sustain the bodies, overruling fear.
They also spoke about revenge or how “we should have also burned their houses”. Misalmari was
surrounded by Bodo villages and even after returning from the camps for a while they just remained
in the village and did not take the main road, which led to the Bodo villages. Since, Misalmari only
had a primary school, many children had to travel to Kokrajhar to attend high school. But since
travelling to Kokrajhar would mean going through the Bodo villages, the children were not sent to
school. What upset Jahan most was,
before 2012 we were friendly neighbors, we never harmed them, then why would
they hurt us? Each time we walk past their village, we see our cows, our chicken, our
television sets and mobile phones. Yet when they greet me, I smile back. This makes
me so angry…makes me want to break their heads.
The villagers have to put on masks of affability to sail through everyday social situations. Jahan
had to struggle to retain control over her body in order to maintain cordial relationship with her Bodo
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neighbors. Although the past contains the germ of antipathy, defensiveness, and violence, it also
contains the possibilities of trust, openness, and reconciliation (Jackson 2005). It is for those in the
present to decide which options would be preferred and how the past will be interpreted. Fatima’s
narrative revealed hope even in distress. Through her reflections, Fatima realized she needed to
focus on her present for her children who needed her and actively discover meanings and purpose in
her present life. Unlike in the camp where the everyday was still trapped within the extraordinary,
in Misalmari, a return to everyday activities gave existence some stability, and clarity.
7.5 Emergence of two Tropes — Endurance and Survival
The narratives lead me to identify two central but analytically distinguishable troupes through
which the bodies practice agency, survival and endurance within the domain of the quotidian. The
distinction between the concepts is one of temporality. Elizabeth Povinelli describes endurance
as a mode of being that “encloses itself around the durative – the temporality of continuance, a
denotation of continuous action without any reference to its beginning or end…” Internal to this
concept, she adds, is its sense of “strength, hardiness, callousness; its continuity through space;
its ability to suffer and yet persist” (Povinelli 2008:32). This form of endurance can be explained
using what Ghassan Hage calls the state of stuckedness. He argues that the “social and historical
conditions of permanent crisis we live in have led to a proliferation and intensification of this sense
of stuckedness”. He further adds that this mode of confronting the crisis by a “celebration of one’s
capacity to stick it out rather than calling for change, contains a specific experience of waiting
that is referred waiting it out” (Hage 2009), even though the crisis appears to be never ending
as in the case of the villagers on Misalmaari. The temporal horizon here is that of the constant
present, relentlessly affected by the past. The temporal horizon of survival, however, is that of the
deferred-yet-possible future (Baisya 2018). While being stuck in the present, modes of excessive
life and escape flit intermittently and can expose lines of flight from emergency like situations in
the relief camp. Survival through crisis gestures to an excess, to that which escapes sequestration
and lives on.
I must however admit that the distinction is more conceptual rather than empirical. Since the
concepts are invariably more fluid in the everyday life worlds of both the residents of the relief camp
and Misalmaari. As Das found in her work with those affected by the 1984 anti Sikh riots in India
that it is not only violence experienced on one’s body in these cases but also the sense that one’s
access to context is lost that constitutes a sense of being violated (Das 2007:8-9). Similarly, for
Jagori, the village headman and Jahaan, among others the fragility of the social became embedded
in a temporality of constant anticipation since they stopped to trust that context is in place. This
leads to the production of fear that is real but not necessarily actualized in events, and comes to
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constitute the ecology of fear in everyday life (Das 2007:11).
7.6 In Conclusion
I have tried to illustrate using a phenomenological approach, the lived experiences of conflict across
the two cases and how they vary in their temporal aspects. I have tried to add to the existing body
of work on the anthropology of conflict by using two case studies to show how bodies move from
point (a) that of living in a relief camp to point (b), the village while constantly remaining vigilant,
engaging in everyday chores, rebuilding their homes and (re) orienting their everyday spaces and
sites of familiarity, intimacy and habits. Yet another analytical distinction I emphasized on across
the two cases is that of survival and endurance. With narratives, I have unpacked the notion of how
the conflict affects the body and ruptures the life worlds of people yet the external world continues
to operate. By ushering in the added analytical layer of elections, I have strived to understand how
the external world not only continues to operate but also expects from the individual to function in a
certain way. Daniel (1996) writes in the context of Sri Lankan civil war, that an analytic ambiguity
in ethnographies of conflict is that “experiences of conflict in the camps, other rural areas, and towns
– which differed substantively – tend to be conflated”. I have strived to overcome this ambiguity
by using the two cases, which are spatially and temporally different from each other. Therefore,
what has emerged as a process is a comparative shared repertoire of expressing emotions and shared
views on the lived environment of violence since the narratives are woven into patterns related to
temporality, space and sites. Given that anthropology is increasingly focusing on conflict, violence,
suffering, oppression and marginalization, there exists an impending scope to thoroughly realize and
reflect upon the deeper effect that consistent volatility and uncertainty have on both our interlocutors
and the conceptual apparatus we employ to comprehend their lives, especially in the context of
SouthAsia. Finally, this is not just remain an academic exercise, but as Das states, that anthropology
is obliged to remain “tireless, awake, when others have fallen asleep”(Das 2006 : 79).
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8 Conclusion — Carrying on in the Charred Forests
Remembrance
This summer it rains more than ever.
The footfall of soldiers is drowned and scattered.
In the hidden exchange of news we hear
that weapons are multiplying in the forest.
The jungle is a big eater,
hiding terror in the carnivorous green.
Mamang Dai1
In this final chapter, I aim to bring together and expand on the arguments presented in the
different articles included in this PhD thesis to transcend the more narrow geographic and thematic
focus. I will try to strike a chord with a broader research agenda on political ecology of extraction,
illegal forms of rural encroachment and conservation by armed forces in a wider context of societies
afflicted by recurring conflict and violence. Notwithstanding the fact that in this collection of articles,
each chapter in its own right has engaged with a particular conceptual debate and/or showcased an
aspect of the interrelation between processes of extraction, informal encroachment, violent conflict,
diffusion of power relations and authority structures among multiple state and non-state actors at
different scales; some general conclusions can be arrived at from this compiled set of work. In
the respective articles I have attempted to historicize and contextualize certain political ecological
elements conspicuous within the RF in particular and the complex political milieu of Assam, in
general. This concluding chapter consequently provides me with the scope to reflect upon the multi
dimensional aspects of the debates presented, the strands of thought these have generated, and the
potential room for future research in this sphere.
1 Mamang Dai is a poet from the Northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. She writes in English.
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Before formulating the concluding remarks, it is useful to restate the three key research question(s)
that I outlined in the introductory chapter of this PhD, which ameliorated the discussion around the
multi-scalar politics of violent conflict, extraction, encroachment and conservation in and around
the RF in BTAD.
• How has the Reserved Forest in Assam (particularly in BTAD) emerged as lived geographies
of violent inter-ethnic conflict, cooperation and competition?
• How these complex web of inter-ethnic relationships among the three major ethnic groups
(as explained in the first article) and actors further operate in the (il)legal extractive economy
and within forms of encroachment(s) and/or dokhol?
• How conflict and forms of domination, feed into (or not) the conservation- counterinsurgency
nexus, eventually encompassing therein the notions of everyday?
In line with this, the thesis has been divided into three parts. In this concluding chapter I shall first
highlight the overall implication and contribution this thesis makes to a larger social science debate
that goes beyond the individual chapters. Thereafter, drawing on this, I shall group the concluding
remarks into three leading scholarly and socio-political debates each closely intertwined with the
research framework outlined in the introduction, in order to reinforce and partially expand these
discussions.
As already mentioned in course of this thesis, the outbreak of large-scale violence that spread
throughout the Brahmaputra valley in both lower and upper Assam from the late 1970s posed a
challenge to conservation of forest and endangered species in protected areas and nature preserves,
which in response has been militarized over time. This environment of frayed socio-political and
economic relations among the forest (protected areas) and conservation bureaucracy as well as local
residents, and administration, that is, the state, non-state, armed and non-armed actors had been the
norm for over three decades by the time this research project was undertaken. This dissertation en-
riches and expands on the wider literature on the political ecology of forestry and land management
by empirically and theoretically examining the state of violent (internal) displacement and contesta-
tion of rival land claims. One of the major contributions the dissertation makes investigating and
explicating how practices like forest management and nature conservation are introduced into fragile
conflict afflicted areas and are followed through apace with counter-insurgency operations, elections,
temporary rehabilitation and other similar measures to restore rule of law and environmental and
ecological safeguards. It further touches upon the literature on borderlands, given the geographical
location of the research site to show the ways in which such remote and troubled areas experience
and struggle with assertions of sovereign state power in the everyday. The dissertation analyses the
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intersection between ethnic conflict and processes of environmental (conservation) politics within
the framework of how ‘everyday’ lives of local populations unfurl within conditions (pertaining to
events like episodes of elections, evictions, recurring conflict, access to forest, among others) that
eventually normalizes an unevenly enforced regime and recognizes violence as a ubiquitous mode
of interaction for political negotiations.
The first remark relates to the discussion on political ecology of extraction and encroachment in
an area of conflict as discussed in the second and third article. In this chapter, I strive to transcend
the narrow geographical and thematic focus, by additionally looking into debates on public authority
structures and their operations in the wider political economy of lootable resources literature, among
others. The second debate draws from and relates to the notion of conservation on war footing by
national armed forces in actual areas of conflict, which I examine in the fourth article. I take this
forward by delving into the additional debates surrounding civil-military relationships in areas of
conservation to further enhance the linkages between conservation, counter-insurgency and armed
forces. The third and final point of the conclusion carries forward the notion of everyday and the
ordinary, which I dealt with in some detail in the introduction as well as the fifth article in the
thesis. This discussion further assumes significance in order to exhibit a critique and way out of the
chokehold of sovereign power and/or the prevalence of exceptionalism theses in northeast Indian
studies. Additionally, I will conclude this chapter with recommendations for various avenues for
future research.
8.1 “This (forest)land is mine” — RF as Site(s) of Extraction, Encroachment
and Informalities
In the second article I have discussed the complex web of social and political inter-ethnic interactions
and networks that are embedded within the illegal timber economy along with the modus operandi
of grass roots social and political actors. I ought to reemphasize that this (il)legal economy has
emerged as one of the major sources of livelihood and income generation for populations within
and around the RFs, especially in context of enduring conflict, in a region with zilch industrial
infrastructure coupled with severe paucity of urban job opportunities. However, in the second
article our conceptual and empirical focus rested on unraveling the diffused and unequal authority
structures associated with the timber commodity chain—akin to what Richard Snyder has called
the ‘institutions of extraction’ (2006)—thus making illegal timber extraction possible. We further
argued that the spatial logic of the timber extraction chain itself allows different forms of authority
to claim differentiated access to rents. Through this article, I furthermore empirically connect the
political ecology of extraction literature and critical conflict studies (the main emergent themes in
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this thesis) through the outbreak of frequent ethnically inspired violence in the BTAD and show
how this violence plays a role in transition or transformation of the informal political economy as
well as the roles, the different state and non-state actors play, who are embedded in this economy.
Conversely, this discussion within the context of BTAD, could additionally benefit from a political
economy of extraction and accumulation framework (see Snyder 2006; Ross 1999) which Snyder
(2006) applies in the context of the illegal opium economy in Afghanistan and argues against the
erudite binary inclination to assume that those involved in poppy farming or the opium trade are
either greedy entrepreneurs or profit-maximizing farmers. According to Snyder (2006) for the
majority, involvement in the opium economy is motivated by coping or survival. This holds true
also in the context of BTAD, where for the conflict-affected communities, access to this economy
serves as a major source of livelihood. This also ties into the notion of everyday within a conflict
context, where in these communities resort to engagement in different forms of economic activities
to live through the crisis and support their families. As research has shown, war is less about the
breakdown of political and economic relations than about their reordering and transformation (Keen
1998; Le Billon 2000; Duffield 2001).
Moreover, scholarly work on political ecological forms of resource extraction and violent conflict
in the northeast in particular as well as mainland India still remains scarce (for an overview see
Robbins et.al 2009; Lahiri-Dutt 2007; Suykens 2010; Padel et.al 2010; Witsoe 2016; Bhan 2018).
Therefore, such fine-grained analysis in other sites and contexts (social and political) of resource
extraction within India pertaining to sand-mining, illegal wildlife trade, coal-mining and (il)legal
extraction of other minerals like bauxite and uranium can aid in unraveling the complexity of
production in addition to distribution of such illicit goods to further move beyond the simplistic
warlords and greedy profiteers type of discourse that often seems to drive thinking and policy on
this issue. If scaled up to a broader and more global context, these forms of extraction reverberates
with other cases (e.g. Coronil 1997; Jones 2001; Tsing 2000; Watts 1992; Yang 2000) which
re-contextualizes the modes that the movements of the global polity are constituted within energies
of creative-destruction at the peripheries; thereby contributing to and building on the wider work on
resource extraction in the South Asian context.
In continuance with forms of extraction, illegalities and authority structures, in my third article, I
expound on the emergence of RFs as sites of informal forms of encroachment by forest dwellers
and/or encroachers akin to their counterparts in urban slums. The modes of encroachment in the
remote rural forests are guided by forms of negotiations and only very selective (violent) contestations
with the forest department, responsible for managing (read controlling) and conserving the forest.
These processes have to be understood within the tacit context(s) of colonial forest making in India,
which I speak about in some detail in the second, third and fourth articles. As Sivaramakrishnan
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(1995) writes in order to understand the political moments of culture embedded in colonial forest
practices, continued to be used by the modern state, that hegemonic processes are not self-securing.
In fact, they are constructed, maintained, and modified by both human agents and state agencies
through contest and cooperation on sites like India’s forestlands. Therefore, mere laws and policing
cannot take away from the forest dwellers their heartfelt ownership of the forest (including its
resources), which was wielded through the two-fold practice of dokhol and resource extraction. The
key concept that connects the notion and practices of dokhol and extraction within the RFs is the
disaggregated state apparatus and fragmented public authority. Although in the first, second and
third article I have touched upon the notions of the apathetic state in BTAD and dwindling forms
of public authority, I believe by further elucidating the concept of state and public authority more
broadly, I can open the dialogue between critical conflict studies and political ecology in fragile
contexts.
As I discuss in my third article, dokhol is carried out in a step-by-step manner both by the forest
dwellers and the state actors by navigating the interstices between legality and illegality. This
is done by exploring the process of legalization over time, which involves unpacking the notion
of the state through creation of permanent and semi-permanent institutions, which, over time,
destabilize the state–legality binary and, in turn, the categorization of the encroached villages within
the RF as an illegal space to be evicted at some point in time. Moreover, these dwellers and their
activities and spaces occupied are not inherently legal or illegal, but rather ‘legalised’ or ‘illegalised’
within specific contexts of power and politics” (Thomas and Galemba 2013: 212). This has to be
situated within the forest laws that have evolved over time. Yet, interestingly enough the discussions
surrounding ambiguous treatment of customary rights between colonial administrators and Indian
parliamentarians, separated by over a century, often reverberate (Sivaramakrishnan 1995).
Although, in principle India is a thriving democracy with institutions of (state) public authority
like the forest department, armed forces, police and the district administration well in place. In
spaces like the RFs state presence has always been limited as regulator of public life, rather the state
is fully vested with COIN operations in these peripheral zones. Therefore, in spaces with multiple
and overlapping state and non-state actors, like the RF, asserting claims over remote (forest)land
and resources in a geography strewn with violent conflict, the centrality of state law turn out to
be increasingly fragmented and internally pluralized (Santos 2002). The notion of the state as a
single agent acting above society (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) are challenged to emphasize these
very disaggregated notions of power divided between state and non-state individuals and institutions
(Sharma and Gupta 2006). These forest dwellers (referred to as encroachers) oscillated between
their allegiances to local rebel groups (out of fear) and the forest department, which in most cases
either led to their evictions or attack by the rebels (in December 2014). The assiduous claims of the
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encroachers through dokhol combined with ways to deal with and withstand (temporary) evictions
and the ability to alter between political parties, brings the state and informality together in the forest
crafting an interstitial space between legal and illegal. “This represents a becoming or creating of
legal space.”2
In this ambiguous space characterized by processes of grey legality and insecure tenure, a
symbiotic and symbolic relationship reigns between state and illegal practices and, especially, the
varied actors inside and around states [that] maneuver actual legality and illegality in complex
ways (Cooper 1998). While in the RF, often the notions of what is considered to be legal and/or
illegal converge in the understanding of the dwellers and the authorities, yet the tension surfaces
when the state administration using the notion of legality make a superficial attempt to oust the
encroachers, who in turn refrain from demanding legal rights over the land and move deeper into the
forest to escape the gaze of the state. This consistent lack of clarity in respect to state laws related
to modes of informal practices and drawing of fuzzy boundaries within the RF, on the one hand
enable flexible accommodation and on the other also gives infinite rights of eviction to state officials
(see Hall, Hirsh and Li 2011). It is evident that boundaries within RF continue to be ambiguously
assigned and is in a constant state of flux depending on relationships of contestation and negotiation
between the encroachers and officials. Therefore, the process of dokhol consisting of “fuzzy zones
of compromise, bribery and accommodation become the rule rather than exception” (ibid.: 16).
In fact exchange, dialogues and forms of negotiations continue to drive forest politics by the
forest officials through discussions with those in the timber trade as well as forest encroachers.
This is seen as an attempt to mediate between the state’s rigid task of forest conservation and the
increasing agricultural needs on the ground. As, I mention in the third article, eviction was rarely
considered an option mainly due to scant resources at the disposal of the forest department to both
carry out eviction drives and also to follow up on it. The forest department does resort to it when
new villages are established in virgin forestland even after repeated warnings, but this never has a
very efficient way of governing the forest and lives of the forest dwellers.
Consequently, these notions of controlling and restricting human populations and settlements to
save and conserve the environment connects to the rational on conflicts that characterize present-day
conservation, where the need to protect endangered species comes into contact with the lives and
rights of people who live in and around the increasingly threatened national parks and protected
areas. This makes it imperative for a better and more comprehensive conception of such ambiguous
spaces like political forests, beyond India and South Asia, that proliferates vulnerabilities and are at
the most intense during events of conflict, elections and evictions, producing continuous forms of
othering of the rural poor.
2 C.f Massey 2005
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The RFs have thus emerged as sites of conflict, extraction and conservation and in the fourth
article I highlight how conservation is carried out by the ETF, a part of the Indian Army on war
footing. An aspect that I touched upon in the fourth article but did not expound on is the notion of
civil-military relationship, so in the next section I highlight the importance of this debate and situate
it within the context of the ETF in BTAD.
8.2 “No Counter-Insurgency is not our mandate and we are not here to
foster relations with local communities” — Conservation by Armed
Forces in Zones of Conflict
Overall, the literature on the engagement of the military in environmental protection or ecological
missions is still scarce; the role of armed forces in environmental security activities particularly in
developing countries is not as well documented as is quite common in the Western democracies
these days with dedicated websites and doctrinal references. Therefore, particularly essential for
further research would be case studies on such military activities outside their traditional roles,
especially in developing countries. What is of particular interest is conservation on war footing
by armed personnel in actual war zones. Dovetailing the above, in the fourth article I draw from
and develop on the political ecology literature on green militarization and violent environments
(Peluso and Watts 2001) using the case of the ETF of the Indian Army and their role in conservation
within the RF. I strove to address the intersection between important themes like conservation on
war footing and crisis conservation in political ecology and debates about violence and conflict. I
also showed how conservation practices are intertwined with local and conflict dynamics and how
this ties into struggles over power and resistance. Moreover, my case also negates the conservation
counter-insurgency (COIN) nexus to argue that in the case of the ETF and the prevailing conflict on
ethnic lines within the RF, COIN prevails over conservation. Using a multi-scalar approach, I have
discussed the various state and non-state actors embedded in this conservation-COIN operation
and how they react to the specific challenges of conservation in ‘violent environments’ and also
co-constitute each other.
Yet, another interesting aspect of conservation by armed forces has been the sparse literature on
transformation of civil-military relationships through such practices. Using the case of Botswana’s
defense forces, Anastasia Bugday (2016) analyses linkages between environmental degradation and
civil-military relations (CMR) especially concentrating on how environmental protection missions
increase civil–military cooperation, especially in developing countries. Within this general context,
Rebecca Schiff argues that the military along with the political elites, and the citizenry should
work towards cooperative relationship in strategic situations such as foreign policy, COIN, and
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military strategy. Schiff’s concordance theory highlights the “high level of integration between the
military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship” (1995: 7).
Schiff subsequently introduces the concept of targeted partnership involving reciprocity between
the military, the political elites, and the citizenry. This reciprocity is established for a limited time
period in order to reach specific objectives. When it comes to environmental concerns, militaries
from several countries like United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Sweden and Finland, Latvia
are now also concerned with the long- and short-term effects of environmental problems on their
soldiers stationed abroad, as well as the local population (Bugday 2016). In case of Botswana, the
BDFs anti-poaching missions have been mostly successful, which is unexpected given the fact
that at the commencement of military participation in environmental protection missions, there
was no successful precedent that the BDF could have emulated or built its activities upon. This is
particularly so since similar missions failed in the neighboring states of Zimbabwe and Zambia.
Undoubtedly, the foremost challenge for the BDF in forging relationship with the local population
was to convince them that they would be able to protect them from the heavily armed gangs of
poachers. BDF thus relied on, what Henk (2007: 105) calls, good publicity to boost its image,
particularly its participation in anticrime patrols in cities that “reduced the level of violent crime”.
Of particular importance for the success of BDF’s missions was establishing and maintaining close
relationships with the local population that reside next to wildlife reserves, as in Maun, Kasane
and Shakawe (Bugday 2016). Of course, unlike Botswana, not in every case does the military’s
involvement in conservation practices result in augmentation of CMR as has been shown by Elizabeth
Lunstrum in the Kruger National Park (Lunstrum 2014) and Esther Marijnen in Virunga National
Park in Congo (Marijnen 2018). However, as Lunstrum (2014) argues that the spatial characteristics
of protected areas matter immensely for the convergence of conservation and militarization and
I would add to this the aspect of CMR. Steering this discussion to analyze the role of the ETF in
Assam within a conflict context, I found that they did not want to engage with the local populations
unlike their battalions in other states of India. To illustrate this, I would like to highlight the ETF in
the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh where unlike in Assam, the main problems that
the ETF is faced with include difficult terrains like mountainous and infertile wastelands, snow
bound regions, logistical issues like limited or non existence of water, electricity, roads, extreme
weather conditions like cloud burst, wind chill, wildlife and only rarely lack of support from the
local stake holders. Most of the difficulties are related to logistics and local environmental factors.
Therefore, the ETF is known to be working very closely in these states where local communities
often join the ETF in plantation activities. In Assam, one of the major issues that the ETF faces is
that of law and order. As I mentioned in detail in the fourth article, a few years back while the ETF
was working in their plantation site they were ambushed by local militants and their weapons were
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seized. I highlight these to foreground the importance of local spatial characteristics while taking
into account aspects of CMR and that in the studies so far the literature has either highlighted the
more negative outcomes of military engagement with environmental conservation through processes
of green militarization or a more positive outcome as was seen in case of Botswana. My case
however demonstrates that it does not always have to be one or the other and that conservation
by national armed forces can take place independently of the involvement by local populations,
depending on the wider geographical context. This further ties in to the conservation COIN debate
to highlight that actors and objectives need not necessarily converge across cases.
So, far in the first, second, third and fourth articles I have provided a blueprint of the RF as a
space encompassing within it the issues of violent conflict, extraction, conservation, encroachment
and the numerous state and non-state actors who are embedded in these processes. This leads me to
make the obvious transition and shift my gaze to the notions of everyday that operate within these
conflict contexts. From focusing on the more meso-processes, in my fifth article I narrow down
to the way communities most affected by violent conflict make sense and live through it, while
engaging in the extractive economy and dokhol practices. This is to stress that the more exogenous
political ecological processes of extraction, conservation and encroachment cannot be separated
from ordains of everyday practices of rebuilding homes, negotiating with forest officers, burying
the dead and caring for the ill. In fact these processes are largely entwined and complement each
other. Therefore, drawing from all the other articles, I now specifically focus on the agency of the
forest dwellers and those in BTAD whose lives are engulfed in the conflict.
8.3 Beyond the Woods — Conflict, Coping and the Everyday
When conflict broke out in December 2014 we temporarily moved to the relief camp.
After staying in the relief camp for three months we returned to our village and found
the charred remains of our house. We lost the paddy and mustard that was yet to be
harvested. We now live in a small hut with walls made up of cloth and plastic sheets
but have a tin roof that we received from an NGO. Our main struggles are around food,
water and elephants.3
Yet another aspect of this PhD has dealt with the way local communities live through recurring
conflict and make sense of it — at the immediate aftermath as well as with the passage of time.
The idea has been to capture narratives to comprehend how the everyday is unmade in states of
terror and how it is simultaneously remade as violence “descends into the ordinary” (Das 2006).
I resort to the concepts like the everyday and the ordinary to highlight how they crosshatch with
3 Interview with a family in the relief camp in January 2015.
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articulations of the strategic and tactical will to survive as was apparent from the empirical narratives
and observations, I discuss in the fifth article. Nevertheless the incidents of recurring violence and
retaliatory COIN operations in the BTAD have to be situated within the wider geography of violent
conflict in northeast India. The region has been governed as an exception to the rule-of-law in
India4. Although talk of conflict resolution continues to be very much in the air, emergency laws that
deal with this ostensible disturbed area are still in place. The AFSPA, for instance, was extended in
Assam for six months on February 28, 2018 (Baishya 2018). This over time has led to the production
of a ubiquitous culture of militarism, which correspondingly spawns its spectral counter-image.
Aretxaga (2012: 229) calls this a “phantomatic mode of production”—a configuration where state
terror coupled with separatist violence “produce both the state and terrorism as fetishes of each other,
constructing reality as an endless play of mirror images.” As I already argued in my introductory
chapter, this tendency to conceptualize the northeast of India as a perpetual localization of the state
of exception, especially when filtered through the Agambenian lens over the past two decades in
northeast Indian studies is but a reductive approach. This tendency has resulted in deficient attention
to the quotidian, the mundane and the ordinary, which seems to disappear in this exclusive focus
on the realms of the symbolic and the spectacular choreographies of violence and death. This in
fact impelled me to pay closer attention to the distinctly ordinary ways through which populations
survive and endure states of dispossession and abandonment, which has been highlighted in the
works of Veena Das (2006), Daniel (1996) and Sverker (2008); among others. More recently, within
northeast Indian studies authors like Pachuau and Van Schendel in their book The Camera as Witness,
in the context of Mizoram focus on ordinary dimensions of photography to illustrate “local agency
in the creation of vibrant contemporary societies that have little to do with obsolete ethnographies as
they have to do with the security gaze” (Pachuau and Van Schendel: 4). Others like Makiko Kimura
in The Nellie Massacre has critically engaged with local memories of the 1983 massacre in Nellie
in Assam through a focus on “ordinary people” and the “agency of the rioters” (Kimura 2013: 3).
On similar lines, Duncan McDuie-Ra, a prominent contributor to the debate on exceptionalism in
the region, notes in Northeast Migrants that “Academic and policy literature on the Northeast is
still dominated by attempts to explain the causes of violence rather than analyzing the ways this
violence is experienced, normalized, and contested” (McDuie-Ra 2013: 17). This stands in contrast
to Veena Das’s views in Life and Words, where she notes that how our theoretical impulse “is often
to think of agency in terms of escaping the ordinary rather than as a descent into it” (Das 2006: 7).
Conversely, for McDuie-Ra, the category of the everyday seems to be defined as a move away from
the exceptionalism, rather than being situated within the exceptional. In this vein, his work centers
4 As already discussed, the Northeast has been framed using the concept of exceptionalism. See McDuie-Ra, “Fifty
Year”; Karlsson, Unruly Hills; Vajpeyi; and Gaikwad for considerations of this notion exceptionality.
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more on migration from the region into mainland India (either as a result of this exceptionalism or
to flee this state of terror), as opposed to a focus on the minutiae of everyday life experienced by
populations who continue to live amidst recurring violence and terror (Baishya 2018). Contiguously,
where should we look for the ordinary? In response Veena Das writes:
…the notion of the ordinary takes us to an important characteristic of everyday life…its
very ordinariness makes it difficult for us to see what is before our eyes…we need to
imagine the shape that the ordinary takes…Depending on how we conjure the everyday,
the threats to the everyday will also be seen in relation to this picture of the ordinary…if
we see the ordinary as habitation within a world in which we dwell in a taken-for-granted
way as an animal lives in its habitat, then the threat might be seen as our existence
becoming ghostly (Hamlet), losing that natural sense of belonging…Framing all these
pictures of the everyday is the idea that everyday is a site on which the life of the other
is engaged (Das 2010: 71-72).
Drawing on Das, my focus has been on continuities and (re)orientations in the representations of
everyday as manifested through modalities of dealing with abject loss of life and property, moving
from life in village to temporary relief camps and not completely rebuilding the charred village
home post conflict in anticipation of future violence. Besides, my objective has also been to move
away from spectacular forms of bodily resistance, a case in point being the celebrated protest by
Manipuri women who stripped in front of the Army headquarters in Imphal, holding a banner that
read “Indian Army Rape Us”, in retribution to incidents of sexual assault and torture by the Army
under the garb of AFSPA. I do not in anyway undermine such enormously courageous and powerful
gesticulations, but it has to be kept in mind that these are not normative practices and hence arises the
need to deliberate on quotidian, diffused, uneventful narrative manifestations of modes of survival
and coping.
Coming back to the RF in the BTAD, this sustained emphasis on the uneventful as the locus
of survival expressed in myriad forms as seen in spheres of livelihood practices, moving deeper
into the forest, building of temporary settlements, enduring evictions and COIN operations, are all
illustrations of engagement with the quotidian.
It is here that I would like to call for a closer and infinitesimal examination of the political in
political ecology and society in nature-society relationships in conservation areas like the BTAD.
Especially since such areas are typically identified as spaces where a wide array of different types of
violence unfolds—physical, structural, symbolic, epistemic, slow, and green violence. Mirroring the
wider field of political ecology, critical conservation studies have strongly focused on the discursive
and political-economic dimensions of violence, often at the meso or macro level (Verweijen 2018).
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In contrast, the micro-dynamics of direct physical violence, specifically ordained by state and non-
state armed actors–have received less sustained attention. Drawing on conflict studies and sociology
of violence, there is a need to address this relative neglect for the scholarship of conservation areas,
in particular those immersed in violent conflict, along with a focus on the local communities who
live in these areas and suffer the burnt of violent conflict. In hindsight, a recalibrated sense of the
political and the social can potentially emerge both from attention to the aleatory and the capricious
in the realm of everyday life and forms of being.
This PhD dissertation using a multi-scalar approach within a remote rural conflict setting indicates
that this is an important question to ask, as to how “forests in post-colonial era” emerge simultane-
ously as geographies of conflict, competition, contestation and co-operation. This is an especially
important area of inquiry for analysis in conflict-affected zones, encompassing the intertwining
of several state and non-state actors embedded in unequal and evolving forms of power relations
and authority structures. Indeed more research needs to be conducted in modes of extraction, crisis
conservation and encroachment in protected areas and a subsequent descend into the ‘everyday’, in
zones of recurring violent conflict.
8.4 Avenues for Further Research
Although this PhD has been presented as a collection of articles, several strands of thoughts recurred,
some merely in passing, but are worth further exploration and deserve to be discussed. Moreover,
this conclusion should not be regarded as a summary of the main empirical findings and concepts,
amassed in rural Assam over the course of the past four years, but should be regarded as a nascent
effort geared towards providing additional impetus to fascinating yet critical debates about violent
conflict, emergence and sustenance of protected areas as sites of conflict, modus operandi of the local
(il)legal timber commodity chain and phenomenology of lived experiences of conflict — situating
the everyday within the spectacular. It is important that I highlight the issues and/or concepts I
touched upon in this dissertation but did not get the opportunity to engage with in detail due to
logistical constraints, personal inclinations and previous academic training, among others. Moreover,
in the end it boiled down to taking a call as regard to the spatial, conceptual and theoretical focus of
this dissertation, which requisitioned that certain themes, although important, be left out. In this
concluding section I shall broadly focus on three agendas for future research through which more
prolific discussions can surface at the intersection of political ecology, critical conflict studies and
the notion of everyday. These pertain to — firstly the concept and the area of Borderland studies;
secondly, post-colonial democracy and elections in violent contexts; and lastly, gender, and conflict.
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8.5 “Every morning we go to work in the Bhutanese town of Gelephu, right
across the border” — the India-Bhutan Borderlands
Throughout this PhD I recounted that the RF area where I carried out my research was on the
Indo-Bhutan borderlands. I also mentioned that these forests are known as Kachari Doars and were
used as trade routes to Bhutan in pre-colonial times by the Bodos. In recent times, this border is easy
to navigate due to the friendship treaty between India and Bhutan, which allows visa free entry for
Indian nationals into Bhutan. In fact, every morning one can see scored of people from bordering
villages cycling into Bhutan. The town of Gelephu offers employment to around 24,000 Indian
laborers of both sexes5. However, the border also acts as an easy escape route for the various active
militant groups. The border faces closures from time to time owing to law and order issues. There
was a brief closure in the aftermath of the Royal Bhutan Army’s Operation All Clear in December
2003 to flush out Indian insurgent camps.
In course of my fieldwork on the timber commodity chain, I was told that there are ample instances
of timber being smuggled into Bhutanese territories. The corridor between India and Bhutan has
also been infamous for frequent abductions by militant groups, attacks on passing cars for ransom
(mostly in the night) and hiding camps for the militants.
As with most borderlands, this geo-political region is characterized by disparities in the levels
of (in) stability, violence, the embeddedness of state institutions and market dynamics. Attempts
to account for this unevenness have often embraced a ‘diffusionist narrative’ (Harvey 2006), in
which borderland and frontier regions that continue to experience violence, poverty and illegal
practices are often portrayed as residual or marginal spaces left behind by the uneven diffusion of
capitalism and state-building (Cramer and Goodhand 2002). The antidote to this is the imposition
of more effective state institutions, liberal peace policies and market practices in order to both
develop and integrate these regions into national political structures and national and transnational
economies (see Das and Poole 2004; Goodhand 2005). As Snyder (2006) notes, these borderlands
are also places of constant flux as the geography of the conflict ebbs and flows and the policies
of neighboring countries change. The permeability of borders varies over time, further affecting
borderland practices. While the border exists to separate and control, it is also its very existence that
gives rise to a whole range of shadow economic activities commonly found in the borderlands - the
petty trade, tourism trade, shuttle trade, or the smuggling of (il)licit goods. In the remote borderlands
of Asia not within the reach of the formal power of the central state, dynamics of the borders are
governed not only by local governmental bureaucracy but also by various parties living their lives
in the borderland areas, for example, individual border guards, the ethnic communities, the petty
5 See https://www.telegraphindia.com/1070102/asp/northeast/story_7206631.asp
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smugglers or the more organized rackets.
Empirically speaking, unlike the comparatively well-studied borders of India—like those with
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, China and Myanmar—the Indo-Bhutan borderland is more understud-
ied. Although there is a history of ethnic violence on the Indian side of the border (see Dutta 2016,
Barbora 2015, Das 2013), it has not affected the everyday social and economic exchange across the
border.6 Therefore, despite being a peripheral space, unlike other borderlands in the region, this is
not a liminal space characterized by attacks, famines, the denial of dignity or the saga of partition.
The border between Bhutan and India does not speak to issues of belonging, forced displacement
and banality (see Cons 2009, 2013; Gellner 2012; Jackson 2006; Korf and Raeymakers 2013). In
fact, the Ahom kingdom that ruled the region for centuries before the British, had shared friendly
trade exchanges with Bhutan since the 1300s (Baran 2006). In Bogle and Manning’s (1876) account,
“The Bhutanese, the people of Lhasa, and those of several other countries located to the northwest of
the Brahmaputra carried out uninterrupted trade with Assam.” The British rule did not dampen these
exchanges. Also interviews carried out with Bhutanese nationals in Gelephu often reiterated these
connections. One of my interlocutors said: “My grandfather used to come down to the border every
summer and get rice, vegetables and eri silk in exchange for dry fish and wool. My grandfather
also spoke fluent Assamese and his friends in Assam spoke Bhutanese”.
On the diplomatic front, Bhutan and India share special bilateral relations in trade and development
by virtue of the Indo-Bhutan friendship Treaty of 1949, which was updated in 2007 and called for
the expansion of economic relations and cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and
technology, while also allowing more freedom to Bhutan in areas of foreign policy and military
purchases.
In the course of my PhD fieldwork, I found that upon the face of prolong violence on the Indian
side of the border, the Indo-Bhutan borderland has been a site of resilience to this precarity and
surfaced as a zone of “salvage accumulation” (Tsing 2015) for other commodities besides timber, like
riverbed alluvial soil and encompasses within it the labor and livelihoods of indigenous communities.
Dovetailing the above, an important arena of future research could be to describe and understand
how capitalistic values are attached to sand as it travels from the riverine upstream in Bhutan to
its downstream India; since in this movement, capitalism is sustained on an everyday basis by a
messy material base, which further acquires its shape as the ruins and remains of capitalist extraction
somewhere else (e.g. the massive infrastructure construction underway in upstream Bhutan). Some
pertinent questions to ask could be —How are the processes and practices of salvage accumulation
configured in a conflicted borderland where political strongmen, militant overlords and migrant
laborers all play their parts? What happens when a commodity, which is illegal on one side of the
6 Gathered through interviews with villagers, shopkeepers and forest officials on both sides of the border.
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border and is lifted to the level of legality on the other side? How does this change the modus
operandi of the trade, production networks, and the whole commodity chain? What does it mean for
the indigenous populations embedded within the chain?
This could advance the debates on political ecology and economy of resource extraction and
conflict in borderland areas.
8.6 “How does it matter who we vote for, our houses will be set on fire and
our children will be killed, anyway” — Post-Colonial Democracy and
Elections in Sensitive Spaces
I mentioned in my methodology chapter and in some of the articles that the fieldwork for this thesis
coincided with Parliamentary elections in 2014, the BTC elections in 2015 and elections to the
AssamAssembly in 2016. Therefore, I ended up spending a considerable amount of time in the local
party offices, interviewing candidates, attending political rallies and campaigns, speaking to my
interlocutors on their choice of candidates and parties and visiting polling booths. These interviews
and observations led me to begin with the assumption that BTAD presents a case of a democracy
that carries within it a complex intertwining of violence and a trajectory of fear. Yet, it also presents
an aberration to the way democracy has been conceptualized, theorized, negotiated and understood
in the larger Indian context. The more generic literature on democracy in India contains a vast array
of work on patronage and clientelism (Berenschot 2012; Kohli 2001; Bjorkman 2015; Banerjee
2017; Chandra 2007), corruption, functioning of state institutions (Wade 1984, Gupta 2012). Or the
work of Alpa Shah (2010: 36) with Mundas in Jharkhand where she notes that
given a choice, most Mundas preferred to have nothing to do with sarkar and expected
nothing from it. They did not accept the idea that sarkar served the public good, seeing
it instead as related to an exploitative kind of politics. Mundas associated all things
sarkari with part of an ‘outside’ and ‘alien’ world.
Moreover, it has been observed that usually people vote away from the center of fear or vote
for a certain party because they fear the advent of a certain other party (Bihar elections 2014 or
elections in Western UP). However, in the case of BTAD, the social imagery of fear was widely
prevalent and people voted for the party or rather the person they feared the most. Does this not
present an anti-thesis to India’s democracy where we have made a departure from Scott (1969),
and his depiction of electoral exchanges as machine-like and cast voters not as collective agents
possessed with real bargaining powers but as manipulated and exploited subalterns, victimized by
what de Wit (1996) calls the politics of illusion? and are in fact gearing towards a more progressive
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democracy as seen in Lisa Bjorkman’s (2015) case in Mumbai where voters give electoral support to
candidates who demonstrate access to specialized knowledge and effective sociopolitical networks,
exhibit both a willingness and capacity to act on voters stated preferences and can mobilize available
resources- social, economic, political towards desired social results. The idea of a democracy itself
gets complicated in a setting like BTAD where it is fear that reigns in between periods of violence.
In fact, I found that the timber economy and informal encroachment practices are embedded
within processes of political accommodation and local clientelistic and patronage networks. These
processes could well be framed using a post-colonial democratic theory that emerges from the
growing awareness that democracy in most of the world is not functioning according to liberal
assumptions and stresses the need to seriously explore alternative ways for understanding democracy
in the twenty first century that goes beyond the liberal democratic framework (Witsoe 2013).
However, this does not imply that most post colonial democracies are same or even regions within
India are same; each is formed by the particular histories that predate colonialism, the individual
dynamics of independence movements, and the contingencies of post-colonial political economy
(Sivaramakrishnan and Agarwal 2003). This could be used as a starting point to examine the
micro democratic processes (election campaigns, the complex embeddedness of the Indian state
in society (Berenschot 2011) - within the BTAD, polling and everyday functioning of the district
administration).
Therefore, a post colonial democracy framework could be applied to explain the complex web
of social and political inter-ethnic interactions and networks that operate within the illegal timber
economy and its connection with democratic processes by observing elections at multiple levels —
national, state assembly and local council. This could further the debate by connecting political
economy of conflict literature with studies on democracy and elections in South Asia (Berenschot
2013; Harris White 2003; Korf 2004, 2013; Eckert 2014; Witsoe 2013).
8.7 “Look! Look at that deaf and mute woman there….a few years ago she
was picked up from her house and brutally raped by five paramilitary
personnel” — Gendering Conflict
Narratives of sexual assault on women and minor girls by armed personnel and in relief camps
reigned large in the geography of violence in BTAD. Scholars like Goswami 2014; Bora 2010;
Kolas 2017 have worked on aspects of feminist politics, gender and security in northeast India. My
visits to relief camps usually greeted me with a typical sight constituting of sick and crying infants
in the arms of young, often under-aged mothers, young kids who no longer go to school (since the
school has also been burnt down), several teenage girls (who are often very shy and usually have
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to be persuaded to come out of their tents to talk to me, especially if I am accompanied by a male
research assistant. The sight that strikes me the most are groups of teenage boys and young adults
who just hang around, often as silent onlookers. It is a known fact that in most conflicts or political
violence across the world the women and children are worse affected. However, most academic as
well as policy research on civil wars or ethnic conflict have tended to focus on ‘men’ especially
when it comes to recruitment practises of rebel groups, motivations for joining insurgency as well
as rehabilitation programs for surrendered militants (for an overview see Eck 2010; Weinstein 2005;
Hegghammer 2013; Buhaug et.al 2009; Walch 2018). Therefore, what I found fascinating as a line
of inquiry is the role of women in rebel violence and their forms of participation in these groups, an
area which has barely been explored (see Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018). Specifically in the context of
the illegal timber economy yet another important field of inquiry would be the operationalization of
masculinities within the commodity chain especially focusing on the amount of risk these young
men are willing to take on and how that shapes the perception about their masculinities in the wider
society. The former line of inquiry I perused further in a blog piece I wrote for the LSE South Asia
Blog7 where I explored the role of women recruits in the NDFB(S). This was backed by empirical
evidence from my fieldwork along with a photograph shared with me by a journalist friend, of a
group of young women in military clothing and holding assault rifles. Looked like the women were
on training in a camp. However, I have not examined the dynamics of masculinity within the timber
commodity chain as it was beyond the scope of my research, but it could well be a potential avenue
for future research.
Finally, this dissertation aims to provide readers new insights in the organization of the local,
micro and the everyday in the ‘political margins’ in paces such as Assam, where perusal of research
that focuses on issues of a sensitive nature continues to remain a challenge. This PhD research
suggests that a focus on the concepts of rural informalities, crisis conservation, state and public
authority more broadly, are rewarding entry points for the analysis of these ‘real-world’ intersections.
7http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/05/17/a-look-at-insurgency-and-women-recruits-of-assams-bodo-areas/
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Fire In The Forest
They built their huts in the jungle
They built their houses in the forest
For whom did they clear the jungle
For whom did they build the huts
by the green fields...
murmured the silent rivulet
here, in the virgin forest
resounded with ancient melody
the flute of the cowherd
butterfly dreams once were there
when the lush vegetation
heard the baidemlai tune of the serja
there still was my dear little village
with jungles jiggling and jostling
with the dim light here and there
it was here that their dreams blossomed
as fragrant as the fresh bloom
the innocent laughter of children.
It was here that the beats of kham
beckoned the clouds...
the virgin fields leaped up to the tune of sifung
now they have built tall buildings
and built their capital here,
the fire they brought burns the jungle now
here, there and everywhere...
and push the virgin forest and lush vegetation
to an untimely death
there is fire, fire every where
fire in the virgin forest.
Fire in the lush vegetation.
Anil Boro, translated by the author.
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